As the wheels of military justice slowly grind on, more and more information about the WESPAC collisions of 2017 are coming in to the open.

There is not a lot of commentary required here, the summary provided by Sam LaGrone yesterday provides everyone a lot to think about with how we train, run, and provide for our warships … and if you’re not concerned, you’re not thinking.

Lt. j.g. Sarah B. Coppock was contrite and quiet when she pleaded guilty on a single criminal charge for her role in the collision between the guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) and a merchant ship that killed seven sailors.

Before a military judge and almost a dozen family members of the sailors who died, she pleaded guilty to one violation of Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Coppock was the officer of the deck when Fitzgerald collided with ACX Crystal off the coast of Japan on June 17.
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In her plea, Coppock admitted that she violated ship commander Cmdr. Bryce Benson’s standing orders several times during the overnight transit off the coast of Japan, violated Coast Guard navigation rules, did not communicate effectively with the watch standers in the Combat Information Center, did not operate safely in a high-density traffic condition and did not alert the crew ahead of a collision.

That was not an empty bridge. That was not an empty sea, and yet …

When Fitzgerald collided with Crystal, the malfunctioning SPS-73 bridge radar was tracking more than 200 surface tracks – a mix of large merchant ships and fishing vessels near the coast of Japan, according to the findings of fact in the trial. Coppock was under orders for the ship to cross a busy merchant shipping lane – a so-called traffic separation – that wasn’t labeled on the charts provided by the navigation team. She was also ordered to keep the ship moving at a high-rate of speed during the transit – 20 to 22 knots. The high speed lowered the time the crew could react to ships around them.

This and the following reads like it was a specifically designed scenario to force a collision;

In her plea, Coppock admitted that she violated ship commander Cmdr. Bryce Benson’s standing orders several times during the overnight transit off the coast of Japan, violated Coast Guard navigation rules, did not communicate effectively with the watch standers in the Combat Information Center, did not operate safely in a high-density traffic condition and did not alert the crew ahead of a collision.

Coppock said she didn’t rely enough on the officers on watch in the ship’s combat information center (CIC) to help keep track of the surface contacts as a back up to her crew on the bridge.
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“Being complacent was the standard on USS Fitzgerald.

Complacency? It is a lot more than that. How long had the WESTPAC surface navy been soaking in an atmosphere that thought that all this was OK? Who set that tone? Who rewarded taking this level of risk for a nation at relative peace at sea?

… the ship had been without a chief quartermaster for two years before the collision, and the SPS-73 navigation radar was unreliable, defense attorney Lt. Ryan Mooney said, quoting from the Navy’s investigation into the collision. The watch stander in the CIC who operated the SPS-67 search and surveillance radar was unfamiliar with the system.

LTjg Commock’s story is not done here, it seems. It looks like she will have a staring role in upcoming trails.

While not specified in the trial, the nature of the plea agreement suggests Coppock will likely be a prosecution witness against the upcoming courts-martial of then-Fitzgerald commander Benson or the two other junior officers who have been charged, two military lawyers told USNI News last week.

The two watchstanders who were in the CIC during the collision will face a judge on Wednesday for preliminary hearings on criminal charges for their roles in the collision that include hazarding a vessel and negligence.

When all is said and done, this has the whiff of being more damaging to the Navy’s professional reputation than Fat Leonard.