Living in the golden age of technology has allowed us to witness the exponential growth and rapid advancement of technical capabilities. The simplest example of this is if you look at the history of the mobile phone. The first mobile phone was produced in 1973, by John F Mitchell and Martin Cooper, an engineer at Motorola1. The next major stepping stone came in 1981, with the creation of 2G digital cellular service and ten years after that, the upgrade to 3G service. Every year following cell phones became better, faster, and more advanced until 2018, and the capabilities people carry in their pocket have more computing power than some of weapon systems. Because of this exponential growth, the expectation is that the armed services have the latest and greatest; however, due to the inability to acquire this technology quickly, the Navy falls short on the leading edge.
The Technology Already Exists
The emerging technology that is going to disrupt the balance of power will not be something groundbreaking. The technology that exists today already is groundbreaking: autonomous vehicles outperform manned aircraft and ships; weapon systems can strike a target halfway across the globe. The real disruption will come from who can obtain, produce, and employ the “latest” technology and do so in a coordinated fashion.
The public sector is outpacing the Department of Defense and U.S. rivals have become experts at reverse engineering and adapting off-the-shelf technology to fit their needs. U.S. military unmanned aerial vehicle programs demonstrate the pace of the public sector. In 2002, the CIA conducted its first drone strike using a Predator drone for a targeted killing in Afghanistan.2 Since then, the program has evolved rapidly, however, it still requires two trained aviators and a giant computing system to launch an unmanned helicopter from a ship. Meanwhile, a kid down the street can take his IPhone and command his drone purchased from Amazon to launch from his backyard and nearly hit a commercial airliner on final approach to an airport. The Navy does not need to figure out what the next big thing is; they cannot even stay relevant in the current decade. The Navy needs to find a way to take what is readily available and militarize it.
Adapt the Acquisition System
There is a problem with the Navy’s acquisition system. It takes years of development and testing before the Navy will give the go ahead to purchase, put into production, man, equip, and train. By the time is process is complete, the technology it purchased is outdated. The solution right now is not, what’s next; it is what already exists and how fast can the Navy buy it?
The Navy must adapt its acquisition system. It cannot to keep things in development and testing for years. It needs the ability to take something off-the-shelf and plug it into Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures. The only community that seems to have grasped this concept is naval special warfare (NSW). Now their fiscal pot may be deeper than most communities, but their time from concept to execution is significantly shorter. The NSW community listens to its operators. If they want or need something they will open purchase it. This is seen firsthand in the weapons and gear that they carry. The lighter, more flexible armor is much different from that worn by the typical grunt Marine. The aviation community will hold a working group to discuss options for a solution it will not see for five to ten years. An example of this is its flight publications. To this day, the primary means of navigation in the MH-60R is by paper charts and the use of the 1950’s tactical air navigation system, if flying via instrument flight regulations. The use of tablets in aircraft in order to use electronic publications and commercial applications such as ForeFlight only recently became “approved,” although this technology has been in use by airlines for years. It is baffling that the Navy continues to say no to technology that gives its sailors an advantage because there is not enough “testing” complete. One of the biggest hurdles to advancement is time— time it takes to get people to say yes or sign-off and get the proper paperwork.
The other part of the acquisition process that holds back the Navy is the deep commitment that comes as part of a contract. The Navy is full of failures under the guise of technologic advancements. Two glaring black eyes are the joint strike fighter and the littoral combat ship. The seaworthiness, offensive and defensive capabilities, manning issues, module problems, and huge cost are unacceptable. However, the Navy continues to support these programs. Why is money continually poured into projects which are becoming outdated? Likely because of the acquisitions process. The Navy becomes so committed that it is impossible to drop a contract. It continue to push failure and call it success. If the Navy was working with off-the-shelf products, it simply would stop purchasing the product and look at the market to see what was better and then use the new product.
Listen to Warfighters
The best way to get newer technology into the hands of our warfighters is to listen to them. The feedback cannot come from the flag ranks or senior officers, but rather at the junior officer level. The youngest people are going to be the most in touch with emerging technology, and often still have the imagination and creativity to address a need or gap in a way that others did not think possible. If the idea seems like it could work, then the Navy should execute a proof of concept. If the trial is successful, the Navy should move forward, put the technology to work, and use it until it becomes ineffective or useless.
In 1965, Gordon E. Moore, the director of research and development at Fairchild Semiconductor, predicted that the overall processing power of computers would roughly increase by a factor of two every year for the next ten years. This exponential growth proved to be correct and continues to this day. When the Navy does get something right, it often is not long until another country is quickly able to replicate the success. It is not because they are smarter or better, it is because they are faster at moving the needle, and they do not want to remain inferior to the U.S. Navy.
Works Cited
- Brophy, Joseph. “John Francis Mitchell Bio”. http://www.brophy.net/PivotX/?p=john-francis-mitchell-biography#CELLPHONEINVENTOR. [August 7, 2012].
- Sifton, John. “A Brief History of Drones”. The Nation, [February 7, 2012], https://www.thenation.com/article/brief-history-drones/.
