The SOF Truths have become the basic fundamental guidelines for all special operations forces across the services.[1] They are taught to every special operator and are listed on SOCOM’s website and all official SOCOM publications and media. These truths are fundamentally applicable to the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISR-E) and should be adapted for how the MCISR-E conducts operations to increase effectiveness, adaptability, creativity, and lethality. The Intel Truths would be:
- Humans are more important than hardware or software.
- Quality is better than quantity.
- Relevant intelligence cannot be mass produced.
- Relevant intelligence cannot be created after emergencies occur.
- Most intelligence requires non-intelligence support.
Humans Are More Important than Hardware or Software
Having recently served as the Operations Officer of an intelligence battalion, I can say that the demand for intelligence professionals is constantly increasing. No amount of hardware, software, or artificial intelligence has been able to replicate or replace the live intelligence professional, and I do not anticipate this trend to change within the next 10–15 years. In the profession of intelligence, hardware (supercomputers, drones, sensors, cameras, and satellites) and software (operating systems, analytical tools, and databases) have provided enormous leaps in capability; however, it is still the analyst that utilizes these tools. The centuries-old profession of intelligence has always relied on wit, cognitive ability, and the inherent capability of humans to solve problems. But, as software algorithms improve, hardware becomes more advanced, and billion-dollar tech companies attempt to tailor artificial intelligence solutions to the DoD, the intrinsic value of the human behind the screen is often overlooked.
This first truth does not refer to just the training and education of intelligence analysts. The concept of humans over hardware or software additionally refers to the idea that humans possess certain intrinsic characteristics, experiences, and abilities that hardware or software currently cannot match. The advantage that humans have over hardware or software when it comes to their ability to understand human nature, culture, or regional intricacies cannot be overlooked. The architect behind every intelligence problem set is a human, and the key to solving these problem sets rests with other humans whose cognitive abilities can match or exceed the architects. Analysts must undoubtedly be technical experts on the hardware and software they utilize, and these tools may help analysts further their theories and speed up their solutions to a certain degree, but a computer or program (such as Palantir) will never be able to completely solve a highly complex problem. Intelligence analysts in the MCISR-E are the modern calculators, and their cognitive, regional, and technical training should be a priority (in that order).
Additionally, prioritizing humans over hardware or software means that a premium must be placed on talent management. The challenges of retaining and cultivating talent within the Marine Corps, and the MCISR-E in particular, has been lamented in many articles and discussions, however, there doesn’t seem to be a cogent solution. The idea that “serving your country” or “being a Marine” should be enough to satisfy the cognitive desires and the needs of some of our brightest intelligence professionals is archaic at best. Being able to retain, stimulate, challenge, interest, and wrest high-quality intelligence professionals away from the private sector and other intelligence community agencies should be a joint focus. The MCISR-E occupational field sponsors, the Intelligence Directorate, and Manpower Management must work hand in hand to place the right Marine in the right job. Technical proficiency gained through expensive training, subject-matter expertise gained through extensive experience, specialized skills possessed by Marines, and self-professed and tested language skills must be considered when assigning Marines to billets. Retaining high-quality individuals requires placing Marines in billets where their professional intelligence capacity will be utilized at the highest possible level while they work on projects that they would not have access to in a civilian capacity, or perhaps even at another agency. High-quality intelligence professionals should be able to say with excitement, “I can’t BELIEVE I’m getting paid to do this,” instead of saying with disappointment, “I can’t believe I’m getting paid to do THIS.”
Quality is Better than Quantity
Both the quality of intelligence produced and the quality of intelligence professionals is better than quantity. Data is collected in petabytes, and sensors soak in and store information as fast as possible. The accumulation of data at a high rate may mean that the information required to solve a problem set has been collected; however, the enormous amount of data collected is a serious impediment to analysis and an analyst may not find the answer or the relevant piece of information in time. This problem is relatively commonplace, and it is one that analysts have been dealing with since the introduction of various sources of data collection and mining. The problem with the cascades of information being collected is that intelligence is expected to be produced from every single input. Additionally, intelligence is expected to be produced with less latency and just as rapidly as raw data is inputted or received.
The unreasonable expectation of rapidly produced intelligence forces analysts to generate a body of intelligence that commanders (customers) become reliant upon, rather than a curated selection of products. A customer does not need to know everything about a product as it’s developing, and it may even be detrimental to the customer’s end state. For example, a customer asking for a targeting package does not need to know the intimate details of a target (how many cousins he has, what is his favorite color, what school he went to). The customer needs a high-quality product that synthesizes the body of knowledge and information the analysts have carefully produced. The goal of quality over quantity is something that both commanders (customers) and analysts (producers) have to be cognizant about. Customers must be mindful when requesting information and should work to decrease the number of pedestrian requests. This can be accomplished by researching existing bodies of information and databases prior to submitting requests for information (or products). Likewise, producers of intelligence products must be certain that what they provide is curated, meticulously researched, and high quality—not a dusted off version of a previous product with updated dates. Otherwise they are mass-producing intelligence for the sake of production.
Relevant Intelligence Cannot Be Mass Produced
When intelligence is produced to meet production metrics, quality and capability is degraded. Intelligence professionals require years of operational and subject-matter expertise, along with specialized schooling to produce intelligence to accomplish certain difficult and specialized objectives (especially at the joint and SOCOM levels). Intelligence that is mass produced becomes white noise and could complicate a problem set instead of helping to solve it. The desire to increase production levels mean that junior intelligence professionals are given more and more tasks to complete—without an increase in manning levels—and with little to no oversight. Increased production levels ultimately degrade overall capability. As production levels increase and consolidation efforts are not made, it becomes increasingly difficult to obtain relevant and timely information. It is the intelligence commander’s, supervisors’, and intelligence professional’s job to consolidate and collapse information in accordance with Intelligence Community Directive standards and to synthesize products to an “intelligence concentrate.”
Likewise, consumers of intelligence need to recognize that relevant intelligence analysis will take time, and supervisors need to understand that a lack of a flood of intelligence does not necessarily mean that information is not being collected. Consumers and intelligence professionals must recognize the difference between information and intelligence. The job of the intelligence professional is to reduce the level of uncertainty and “provide information and assessments to facilitate mission accomplishment.”[2] At times this means providing the consumer with less information (raw data) but more intelligence (processed, exploited, and analyzed data), which will translate to less noise in crisis response situations.
Relevant Intelligence Cannot Be Created after Emergencies Occur
The creation of high quality and relevant intelligence takes time. The ability to collect, process, exploit, analyze, and disseminate intelligence requires highly trained and constantly available intelligence professionals. The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Intelligence Centers (MICs) are well on their way to being a consistently available intelligence apparatus that produces intelligence to prevent or mitigate emergencies. The MICs, however, are not standardized across the MEFs and creating a fully mission-capable MIC staff takes time. The ability to employ fully capable intelligence professionals within the MICs on myriad threats requires a highly trained and constantly available pool of intelligence professionals during peacetime. This concept also translates to data collection and intelligence production. Assets must be constantly recruited, vetted, maintained, utilized, and upgraded to stay ready, relevant, and responsive to any emergent requirement, which ties into the last truth.
Most Intelligence Requires Non-Intelligence Support
Most intelligence requires non-intelligence support, whether that is breathing or non- breathing assets. Additionally, intelligence professionals require access to databases, networks, computer systems, and communication suites. The final product produced by any intelligence professional is an amalgamation of multiple inputs from various assets and the operational effectiveness of the MCISR-E is not possible without this support. Intelligence that is produced or reported by analysts can only be as good as the support received from these non-intelligence assets, which come with challenges and limitations that customers and commanders must consider when requesting intelligence support. The availability of overhead, full-motion video, near real-time imagery/video, and real-time reporting (audio or visual) has created an aversion to risk and promotes inaction if one means of real-time reporting is missing. Obtaining real-time raw data (not intelligence) is a risk to the collection asset and these risks must be considered when requesting this type of data analysis. Even simple non-intelligence support, such as life-support systems and functions (food, lodging, environmental controls), can affect the quality of intelligence produced through a direct effect on the cognitive abilities of the intelligence professional. Intelligence commanders, supervisors, and those utilizing intelligence assets must ensure that all support systems and functions are in place to provide maximum utility. When the time comes to execute intelligence operations, there must be coordination between assets and supporting units to decrease friction and maximize available support. Intelligence commanders and supervisors must also be prepared for and accept the loss of support assets (both breathing and non-breathing); they must not be tied to a zero-defect mentality of “no losses.”
Upon first glance, these Intel Truths may be disregarded as simple facts or common sense. However, deeper consideration of these truths and a frank observation of current operating procedures across the MCISR-E may change this perception. The objective behind publishing these Intel Truths is to cement such common-sense approaches and make them a part of the MCISR-E’s mantra, which can be understood from PFCs to flag officers. Just as the SOF Truths have not solved every single adversity facing SOCOM, the Intel Truths will not solve every single issue within the MCISR-E. However, the Intel Truths can create an atmosphere of mutual understanding both within and outside of the MCISR-E as to what it takes to produce relevant, high-quality intelligence products, and professionals, which will directly increase the MCISR-E and the Marine Corps’ effectiveness, adaptability, creativity, and lethality.
[1] USSOCOM “SOF Truths,” www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths.
[2] Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence,” ix, October 22, 2013, www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp2_0.pdf.
