It is no secret that the Coast Guard is a unique member of the armed forces. It focuses on search-and-rescue, law enforcement, environmental safety, and aids to navigation (and much more). These missions starkly contrast the warfighting focus of its sister services. This focus has led many to forget that the Coast Guard is a military service and focus on other issues at the Coast Guard’s expense. Even though combat is not the focal point of the branch, they still carry out missions that are vital to national security. Not prioritizing the Coast Guard presents national security challenges that can be reconciled with a shift in viewpoint and treatment.
The age of the Coast Guard fleet is reducing mission readiness. A 2015 press release included commentary from Vice Admiral Charles Michel stating the lack of size and modern assets within the fleet are reducing the Coast Guard’s ability to conduct its missions.[1] He went on to state the Commandant would have to deny requests for Coast Guard cutters from U.S. commanders in the South China Sea as there were not enough operational assets to support those requests.[2] Vice Admiral Michel also pointed out that China’s coast guard outnumbers the U.S Coast Guard and their coast guard fleet is a vehicle for territorial claims in the South China Sea.
An attempt to modernize the Coast Guard fleet was made through the Integrated Deepwater System Plan beginning in 2002, but the effort lost authorization in FY2012.[3] The end of this multibillion-dollar recapitalization effort left the Coast Guard only partially modernized. The loss of authorization in FY2012, intermittent attempts to gain additional funding for modernization, and budget cuts suggests that the Coast Guard is not a top national priority. This is contrary to the other military services, that also deal with national security issues.
Arctic security has emerged as a rising national security concern in conjunction with the emergence of Russia and China as international rivals. A 2008, U.S. Geological Survey study estimates there are 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas untouched in the Arctic. These natural resources are of great economic importance to the United States and its rivals. However, it seems its rivals are prioritizing this area of economic potential. The U.S. only has two active polar icebreakers: the USCGC Healy (WAGB-20) and Polar Star (WAGB-10). In comparison, Russia has more than 40 active icebreakers.[4] Most of these icebreakers are nuclear, providing unlimited endurance. China currently is building a second icebreaker, demonstrating its commitment to presence in the Arctic.[5]
Russia took Arctic security one step further with the commissioning of two Ivan Papanin-class ice patrol ship prototypes in 2016.[6] Language in the FY2019 Presidential Budget Request awarded $750 million for a contract to begin work on a new polar icebreaker. However, this funding was not included in the House Appropriations Committee’s Homeland Security Bill.[7] This lack of congressional commitment to the Coast Guard and its icebreaking program is a risk to U.S. Arctic policy. The Coast Guard’s arctic-capable fleet is small and aging. With no new icebreaker production, the United States is taking a backseat to its rivals and could soon find itself in a situation where the nation has no oceangoing icebreakers. A loss of U.S. Arctic presence would provide nations like Russia and China unrivaled opportunities to discover untouched natural resources. Not only would the United States lose out on the economic potential in the Arctic, current national security threats would be exacerbated.
The Coast Guard’s lack of financial support has led to a corresponding shortage of assets and coverage, resulting in many national security concerns. However, if the Coast Guard was prioritized to the degree of its sister services, domestic and foreign security issues would be mitigated.
Endnotes
[1] O’Rourke, Ronald. “Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, August 3, 2018, 1-43. Accessed August 5, 2018. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R42567.pdf, 27.
[2] O’Rourke, 28.
[3] Lipowicz, Alice. “Coast Guard to End Deepwater Program.” FCW. January 4, 2012. Accessed August 3, 2018. https://fcw.com/articles/2012/01/04/coast-guard-chief-acquisition-officer-declares-deepwater-to-be-dead.aspx.
[4] Hambling, David. “Does the U.S. Stand a Chance Against Russia’s Icebreakers?” Popular Mechanics. April 4, 2018. Accessed August 3, 2018. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a19673250/future-icebreakers/.
[5] “Zukunft to Congress: U.S. Must Be Serious About Icebreaker Acquisition.” USNI News. April 17, 2018. Accessed August 3, 2018. https://news.usni.org/2018/04/17/zukunft-congress-u-s-must-serious-icebreaker-acquisition.
[6] Hambling.
[7] “Appropriations Committee Releases Fiscal Year 2019 Homeland Security Bill.” The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations. July 18, 2018. Accessed August 3, 2018. https://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=395381
