In the current issue of Joint Forces Quarterly, General Paul M. Nakasone lays out his compelling vision for a “persistent” cyber force, citing Samuel Huntington’s concept of the “strategic concept” of a service, as articulated in a 1954 Proceedings piece. Both General Nakasone’s article and interview (in the same issue of JFQ) are worth your time to read.
The enduring value of ideas expressed in the pages of Proceedings don’t end there, even when applied to discussions of cyberspace. Take, for example, General Nakasone’s February 2019 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee:
There are people within our force right now that I call ’10-or-20x’ type of people. That means they’re 10 or 20 times better than the people that they work with, better coders, better malware analysts, better developers. And so, how do we ensure that we keep those within our force? . . . Our challenge will be in retaining the very best—not everyone, but the very best. And this is where I think identifying those categories, coming back to you to make sure that we have the proper career paths and the proper enumeration [sic] will be very helpful.
That exchange, the Navy’s Cybersecurity Readiness Review, and the broader discussion over recruiting and retaining “war before the war”-winning cyber talent made me recall a Proceedings article from 1909. It shows its age—included is an ugly racial stereotype. However, it too, is worth a read, as parts of it have stood the test of 110 years of history. In particular, the author, Pay Inspector J. A. Mudd, captures in a remarkably clear manner the conundrum that uniformed leaders find themselves in in the war for cyber talent, as well as the clear solution. Based on his testimony, General Nakasone seems to grasp this—let us hope that his Navy counterparts, and Congress, do as well:
It would seem that for years the main point in regard to getting the quality and quantity of the men that are needed has been missed, and that is, the starting point outside the navy in every case of the employment of men to do work for a wage. It is to consent to pay what the services are worth in the market. We in the navy cannot arbitrarily say what we will give per month for a gun man of the first class, this same being based on what we think he is worth, and then necessarily get the quality we want. We must pay what the stock is worth at the time of buying it, if we want that particular stock. The pay of all the enlisted men was increased the other day ten per centum. That is no way of doing it. If a reorganization based on business principles is what is aimed at, and we want one thousand more first-class gun men, and we offer $30 and cannot get the quality, we should go on up, $35, $40, or even $100 if necessary, for the final aim is that the fleet class “best.” In trying to do this there should be no driveling. When a certain quality of man’s labor is worth $50 a month, with board and lodging, in the world’s market, the navy should not expect to get a large quantity of it for $25 and try to make up the difference in other ways. A corporation builds a modern skyscraper. Its basement is filled with a mass of first-class machinery to heat, light, and run the elevators. An engineer as boss of that basement is wanted. The corporation knows the kind of man they want calls for $150 a month. Thinking that is too much, they advertise stating that they will pay $100, but will give the engineer three dishes of ice cream a day. They will very likely get an engineer, but he will be only a $100 one, or at the best a $105 one, with an inordinate thirst for ice cream. And once installed, he will probably let a lot of electrical things burn out while he is eating the ice cream. The truth is, if the government will pay the price, it can always keep the battle-ships fully manned by the best quality of skilled and self-respecting Americans.
