The Black Sea is a challenging operational environment for the U.S. military because of its confining geographical features, Russia’s established military dominance in the region, and the restrictions placed on the U.S. Navy as a non-Black Sea nation by the Montreux Convention of 1936. Overcoming these challenges and developing a strategy to deter and, if required, defeat, Russia in this region requires a new approach to U.S. thinking about naval strategy.
An analysis of the Soviet Navy’s historical development offers insight into how a weak naval power can nullify a superior maritime adversary by denying it access to the littorals and chokepoints, rather than attempting to dominate the entire maritime environment with the objective of projecting power ashore and securing sea lines of communication (SLOC). It also offers U.S. naval planners an opportunity to learn from their former Cold War adversary to counter the disruptive Russian threat to the post-Cold War international order.
The Soviets developed their early maritime capabilities for confined bodies of water, such as the Black and Baltic seas, and, more importantly, from a position of relative weakness in numbers of ships, crews, and experienced naval officers compared to their European rivals. The U.S. Navy should examine the lessons learned by these early Soviet naval strategists and the unique insights gained from the constraints of geography and geopolitics placed on them, so as to adapt them into an effective U.S. and allied approach these bodies of water.
In the Black Sea, Russia will have the dominant military position at the beginning of any future conflict. Allied naval planners must accept that the tools they are used to employing to project power (submarines, amphibious assault forces, and carrier strike groups) will not be available in the Black Sea; the Montreux Convention prevents non-Black Sea nations’ submarines and aircraft carriers from transiting the Turkish Straits, and the tonnage limitations placed on warships from outside the region would prevent the deployment of a U.S. amphibious readiness group.[1] In addition, building up massive land-based conventional forces in Romania or Georgia could provoke, rather than deter, Russia from taking aggressive action in a region it considers equivalent to how the United States views the Gulf of Mexico. Furthermore, while a few U.S. destroyers could be deployed to the Black Sea prior to a conflict without upsetting the Montreux Convention’s restrictions, they would be at a serious disadvantage if full-scale war were to ensue, given the abundant naval and air forces Russia has concentrated in the region. In such a circumstance, these ships would find themselves operating in an environment where the United States and NATO would not have air superiority, at least not in the short term, and they would find themselves isolated and on the defensive.[2] Because of these considerations, it is clear that Alfred Thayer Mahan’s ideas are of little help in the Black Sea: the concentration of a large fleet into a single fighting force, the essential tool Mahan’s theories demand, is untenable. The Western alliance, therefore, must create a new approach adequately defend Europe’s exposed southeastern frontier.
The use of air power in a Black Sea conflict is a logical choice, as it is less restricted in peacetime; however, it has complications. The first obstacle to the use of air power in the Black Sea is Russia’s sophisticated air defense network. The Russians are more advanced than their Soviet forefathers, and the new versions of land- and sea-based surface-to-air missiles Moscow has deployed in the region are serious threats. In addition, U.S. and NATO suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) capability has atrophied since the end of the Cold War. Compounding this problem is the realization that, in a war with Moscow, the Black Sea will not be the center stage: NATO likely will concentrate its defensive efforts on the European core, where critical bases and economic centers of gravity are located. This means the assets required to establish air superiority likely will be prioritized away from the Black Sea, and therefore, any plans for defending this region should address operating under contested airspace – at least in the short term. In the case of shaping (Phase Zero) operations, however, or even in a limited confrontation with Russia, air power is, and will continue to be, the premier instrument of U.S. power projection over the Black Sea and in Southeastern Europe.
The following five elements are proposed as part of an approach to developing a naval strategy tailored for winning a possible future conflict with Russia in the Black Sea and its environs:
Element #1 – Allied A2AD posture. What the West calls Russia’s antiaccess area denial (A2AD) strategy is nothing more than a descriptive term for the culmination of the Soviet Navy’s original defensive effort to deny a superior maritime adversary the use of the littoral environment, close to shore, where the Red Army’s supply lines were exposed. The Soviets initially employed minefields, costal defense artillery, land-based aircraft, submarines, and small torpedo boats, to protect its army’s flanks from amphibious assault and bombardment by the German Navy throughout World War II. They did not have the strength to confront their enemy directly at sea, nor did they need to, as they had no SLOCs to protect in the Black and Baltic seas.
Eventually, as the Cold War unfolded and new technology emerged, the Soviets developed antiship cruise missiles and deployed them ashore, on small surface craft, and eventually aircraft. With this capability, they were able to deny maritime space progressively farther from shore. Today, the Russians have developed a capability to strike virtually any surface ship in the Black Sea from shore-launched costal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs) based in Crimea and on the Caucasian shore. The Russian Black Sea Fleet’s many surface units, its new submarines, and its land-based strike and ISR aircraft add layered depth and redundancy to this core defensive sea denial effort, while its advanced surface-to-air missile umbrella and dedicated fighter aircraft protect this elaborate system from air attacks. Russia’s A2AD concept has, with the advent of long-range antiship weapons and improved targeting capabilities, evolved into a regionally focused offensive concept—today, enemy ships are not only targeted when they approach or threaten the Russian coast, but they can be targeted at any time and at any position in the Black Sea.
Given the applicability of the Soviet experience to the current restrictions faced by the U.S. Navy in the Black Sea, adopting an A2AD strategy to U.S. and allied needs is a logical solution for achieving strategic deterrence in this region without placing major U.S. Navy vessels at risk. When considering the Black Sea from an Allied perspective, the present situation is similar to where the Soviets found themselves prior to World War II. The U.S. and NATO now are the weaker naval powers, access to the Black Sea is already restricted, so there are no SLOCs to preserve, and in this regional context, preventing Russian incursions into allied Romania and Bulgaria are more important than projecting power from naval forces against the Russian homeland.[3]
To achieve an A2AD posture, the U.S. Army currently is developing a new version of the ATACMS MLRS system with an extended range and possibly with a warhead capable of targeting ships. In fact, Admiral Harry Harris has identified this system as offering great potential for the Pacific; however, it is arguably more applicable to EUCOM, where the Black Sea and Baltic Sea environments call for such a land-based anti-ship weapon. Furthermore, this system, called “Deepstrike” is a ballistic missile with a 499Km range that gives it the added benefit of creating a very difficult, and expensive, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) problem for the Russians to solve, or risk ceding an advantage to NATO.[4] This problem is familiar to U.S. BMD planners and engineers who have been persistently seeking a solution to this challenge for years – we even created a separate agency to address this challenge.
The United States also must achieve and maintain an accurate recognized maritime picture (RMP) to facilitate targeting Russian shipping in the Black Sea. Existing maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and space-based sensors are ideal for this task; however, developing a fleet of small vessels that can provide persistent coverage of the Southwest corner of the Black Sea, especially the approaches to the Turkish straits, is essential. This can be achieved through building-up Allied navies (Romania and Bulgaria), but a parallel U.S. Navy option is optimal for achieving such a capability quickly.
Element #2 – Push the Limits of the Montreux Convention: Despite the usefulness of air power and space-based sensors to achieve an RMP and targeting for shore-based weapons, these capabilities have the potential to be denied in a full-scale confrontation with Russia. Therefore, the U.S. Navy should develop a means to achieve a persistent maritime presence in the Black Sea, albeit a necessarily small one. Besides building up our Allies’ capabilities to develop reliable maritime awareness, the U.S. Navy could base small ships, such as patrol craft, in Romania, where they could enter the Danube River to fulfill the Montreux Convention requirement that non-Black Sea warships depart the Black Sea after 20 days. Another option would be to look to the naval special warfare community that has, through its organic combat craft capability, potential solutions to this problem—small, fast boats with great range that are hauled out of the water when not in use. Therefore, these craft can meet the requirements of the Montreux Convention while maintaining a persistent presence from shore-based mobile forward operating bases, which would increase this force’s chances of surviving a full-scale armed confrontation with Russia.
Element #3 – Address the Turkish Question. NATO historically has depended on Turkey to deal with Russia, and its Soviet antecedent, in the Black Sea; unfortunately, Turkey is undergoing a political shift away from the West and toward Russia, China, and Iran. It is likely that Turkey would adopt a position of neutrality in any future NATO/Russian confrontation, and therefore, it should not be counted on as an asset in formulating a strategy to counter Russia. Consequently, bilateral U.S. relationships with Black Sea allies that share a similar view of Russia should be used to implement any future operational plans. The mature bilateral relationship between the United States and Romania, in particular, provides an ideal model from which to start implementing a broad Allied A2AD posture for the region.
Element #4 – Naval Mining. The naval mine is perhaps the ultimate maritime asymmetric weapon. The Soviets were quick to recognize its value, and they incorporated the use of large and layered minefields into their A2AD paradigm, which survives today in Russia’s Bastion concept. The U.S. Navy, however, largely has allowed this skill to atrophy, despite its successful use in denying the North Vietnamese the use of Haiphong Harbor during the final years of the Vietnam War. There are signs that this skill is being re-examined by the U.S. Military; however, much more is needed to develop this capability to its full potential.[5]
Element #5 – The Cost. The A2AD approach to addressing strategic deterrence in the Black Sea is a cost-effective solution to a difficult problem. The required tools—Deepstrike, space-based sensors, MPA, naval mines, and small combat craft—already are developed, in late stages of development, or relatively low-cost to produce. The alternative strategy—building an Ally’s fleet and air force to a level where it could directly challenge the Russian Black Sea Fleet—would require massive funding to establish a modern shipyard, which could build and service such a fleet, and acquire the necessary numbers of advanced aircraft and weapon systems needed to achieve parity with Russia. Besides being expensive to establish, this approach would take years and require continual financial support and oversight.
In conclusion, the Black Sea presents U.S. naval strategists with problems Mahan’s legacy has ill-prepared them to deal with. U.S. strategic thought has evolved from seeking to dominate the open oceans with large, concentrated fleets of modern warships with the aim of securing SLOCs and projecting power ashore. By improving the A2AD concept—refining it with Western material, training, and skill—and then turning it against the Russian threat, an effective defense can be built for NATO allies in Southeastern Europe, and strategic stability on the continent can be preserved until the atmosphere of antagonism between Moscow and the West clears.
Endnotes
[1]MFA, Implementation of Montreux Convention, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/implementation-of-the-montreux-convention.en.mfa).
[2]This was addressed by a 2016 RAND study related to the defense of the Baltic States; however, this observation is equally applicable to the Black Sea. See David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, RAND Cooperation, 2016, DOI:10.7249/RR1253.
[3]The caveat to this statement involves Georgia. If NATO elects to defend Georgia SLOCs may be required, especially if Turkey decides to adopt a neutral status.
[4]Kyle Mizokami, The Army Is Getting a New Long Range Tactical Missile, Jun 16, 2017, http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a26960/army-new-long-range-tactical-missile-deepstrike/
[5]Mike Pietrucha, The Antiship Mine Gets New Wings, The Diplomat, May 10, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/the-antiship-mine-gets-new-wings/
