The incident between the USS Chancellorsville (CG-62) and the Russian frigate Admiral Vinogradov is another indicator of rapidly increasing tension between the United States and Russia. This incident is not the first case of Russia conducting “unsafe and unprofessional” maneuvers and operations against U.S. and Allied forces in international waters. Some of the more recent incidents include:
- 11 April 2016 Russian fighters harass the USS Donald Cook (DDG-75) in the Baltic Sea while conducting flight operations.
- 17 June 2016 The Russian frigate Yaroslav Mudry interfered with the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group while conducting flight operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Mudry maneuvered dangerously and in close proximity to the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) and the destroyer USS Gravely (DDG-107).
- 30 June 2016 The Mudry interfered with the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group as they conducted flight ops. This time, the Russian ship closed within 300 yards of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69), and 150 yards of the cruiser USS San Jacinto (CG-56).
- 10 February 2017 The USS Porter (DDG-78) was buzzed by two Russian Su-24 Fencer aircraft, as they passed within 200 feet of the U.S. ship. This occurred at the end of the multinational Sea Shield exercise conducted in the Black Sea.
- 28 January 2018 A Russian Su-27 Flanker closes within five feet of an U.S. EP-3 Aries conducting operations in international airspace over the Black Sea.
- 4 June 2019 A Russian Su-35 intercepted a P-8A Poseidon over the Mediterranean on three separate interactions, one of which was deemed unsafe.
These actions equate to a “game of chicken” on the high seas and are in integral part of the Russian strategy to deny the United States the ability to operate freely. Through harassment, the Russians are able to simultaneously interfere with U.S. operations and test its resolve to carry them out.
This sort of naval brinksmanship is modeled in the “Hawk-Dove” conflict of game theory. The Russians act as the “hawk,” acting aggressively to make the “dove,” the United States, concede. The classic way to beat the game of chicken is to throw the steering wheel out the window as the other vehicle approaches, guaranteeing a collision if the other vehicle does not move. The game is about communicating resolve to carry out an action, and by removing the steering wheel, the course is irreversible.
This was a common practice in the early days of the Cold War. Russian and U.S. commanders would steer their ships on a collision course to see who would lose face first, as they were willing to “take a bump or two.”[1] In 1962, the USS Dewey (DLG-14), commanded by then-Commander Elmo Zumwalt, came within 50 yards of a Russian destroyer escort that set its course directly at the Dewey. Five years later, the USS Walker (DD-517) came into physical contact with the Russian destroyer Besslednyy in the Sea of Japan.
The USS Walker comes into contact with the Besslednyy. U.S. Naval Institute Photo Archives
To avoid these conflicts during the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet governments created the U.S.–Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement of 1972 (INCSEA), which filled the gaps of the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs), or “Rules of the Road.”[2] This agreement regulated the use of ships and aircraft to deconflict interactions between the United States and Soviets and reduce the likelihood of disaster. Articles of the agreement specifically cite proper behavior of aircraft while ships conduct flight operations and prevent surface vessels from interfering with formations of the other nation’s ships. That agreement is still maintained and reaffirmed annually, in theory.
In practice, the Russians have strayed from INCSEA and resurrected Cold War strategies, and some would advocate that the United States act in kind. It is clear that INCSEA in its current form is not adequate for preventing dangerous interactions between Russian and U.S. naval vessels or aircraft, but playing chicken with the Russians is a losing strategy. First and foremost, the Navy cannot afford to trust the safety of its ships and aircraft, and their respective crews, to Russia’s willingness to “get out of the way.” Given recent behavior, it is safe to assume that the Russian government would risk a collision with one of their ships or aircraft to cast blame on the United States. Frankly, they are more resolved to hazard their vessels than the United States. Second, the United States cannot afford to deviate from the rules because the U.S. Navy would assume more accountability should a collision occur.
As it stands, there is no codified strategy for commanders at sea to counter Russian harassment and aggression. In the May 2017 issue of Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute Board Chair and retired Navy Admiral James Stavridis advocated for the need to develop a strategy that accounts for Russian response and counteraction. In addition, he argued that commanders should be prepared to take actions in defense of their ships and aircraft. He also called for more open communications with Russia in regard to the actions and exercises taken by the United States, as well as strict adherence to international law regarding the conduct of U.S. ships and aircraft. Two years have gone by and improvements have not been made regarding interactions at sea. In fact, they have worsened, as incidents have spilled out of the Mediterranean and into the Pacific with the most recent incident between the Chancellorsville and Vinogradov.
The Chancellorsville and Vinogradov nearly collide, causing the Chancellorsville to take evasive action. U.S. Navy Photo.
INCSEA was effective at preventing accidents during the Cold War, and it can be effective today if the United States and Russia to come together and reassess the agreement on a meaningful level. On the U.S. side, the Navy needs to place INCSEA at the forefront of its strategy, and it needs to take a proactive approach to countering harassment. Condemning Russian acts after every incident as “unsafe and unprofessional,” while true, is not a solution to the root problem. The Navy has been the forward force of U.S. diplomacy for a long time, but that power diminishes if the United States does not have a measured response to Russian harassment. That power will disappear if the Navy waits for tragedy to strike before developing a solution.
Endnotes
- A. Denis Clift, “Chicken of the Sea: US-USSR Incidents-at-Sea Agreement” (speech, Navy League Council, Annapolis, MD, September 11, 2013).
- Ibid.
