The U.S. Navy is focused on high-end warfare—engaging antiship cruise missiles, defeating hypersonic weapons, protecting the homeland and allies from ballistic missiles, and operating the air wing far from shore in a command-and-control degraded environment. We are focused on defeating those we sometimes still call “near-peer” competitors. Our fleet’s muscle will not make it to the high-end fight, though, if it fears the deceptively destructive naval mine. Make no mistake, though not flashy, mine warfare is relevant today. The U.S. Navy generally subscribes to the notion that mines are used by lesser forces and are to be defeated by stronger navies.[1] History shows us otherwise, though. How do we combat mines in a 21st-century Navy? The answer does not require reinventing the wheel. The Fleet-tested platforms, complete with resident knowledge on board, exist. The answer involves following a path the Navy has been down before—updating and improving upon a legacy platform and reintroducing it to the fleet. Surface-borne mine countermeasures deserves its fair share of attention—from the service, from the surface community, and from resource sponsors. The Navy should make what is old, new again—build and deploy a 21st-century Avenger.
Mines are inexpensive. They present a fiscally efficient option to foes with a substantial return on investment. They are easy to deploy and are difficult to combat. They are stealthy and disrupt the world’s sea lanes and are built to guarantee a mission kill. Just the threat of their use or the rumor of their presence has immediate tactical and strategic impact, whether it be merchants avoiding chokepoints or harbors, causing untold damage to the economy, or billion-dollar naval vessels held at arm’s length, allowing belligerents to buy time and achieve objectives. The challenges posed by deterring, detecting, and defeating them make their threat to the U.S. Navy worthy of a serious reinvestment in time and resources.
The Avenger-class minesweeper, the U.S. Navy’s only surface-borne mine countermeasures asset, is more than 25 years-old and past its prime. The state of the Navy’s minesweeper fleet is notorious, primarily stemming from critical parts shortages and a shore establishment focused on other priorities, ill-postured to support the aging and unique equipment on board these wooden ships. They often are unable to get underway for myriad material and equipment issues, and are not, in the opinion of some, ready to meet the operational mission for which they are designed and deployed—both in numbers and readiness. The fight to keep equipment running on board the ship and supplies flowing outside the lifelines is like flailing in quicksand. The parts are often out of stock or obsolete. The companies that made them are out of business or have moved to other production. The warehouse shelves regularly leave the ships wanting. And the parts that do exist were, in many cases, not built to work in today’s threat environment or amongst modern standards. None of these gripes—not one–are an indictment of the platform or its sailors, nor the valiant shore establishment that works to keep them running. The Avenger-class minesweeper—capable of minesweeping and mine hunting—is a good ship and it is the right one for the job. We do not need a new, untested platform. We need updated and upgraded versions of this proud class of ships in the fleet, forward-deployed and ready to fight tonight.
In this day of advanced systems and weaponry—in a fleet dominated by Aegis—and with the rising specter of nuclear weapons-armed adversaries, why must we bother with building, fostering, and caring for a robust mine countermeasures capability? It seems logical to place our focus elsewhere. That said, the edge our well-funded priorities are supposed to give us will be dulled if those high-end assets cannot get to the fight. One also must consider that the Navy’s mandate is not simply to defeat enemies, but to keep open and free the world’s sea lanes of communication. It may seem far-fetched, but enemies with mines have the potential to severely bog down U.S. forces and could, in theory, cause a level of damage deemed unacceptable by leaders, government, and the American people. Belligerents with naval mines have the ability to shape the battlespace in their own vision—we must preserve our own capability to rip the seaways back from them, kick in their door, and allow a stacked-up Fleet to follow in the minesweeper’s wake with peace of mind and certainty of victory.[2]
Still asking: “why?” Because, while more than 50 countries boast a naval mine inventory, the five most likely—or current— U.S. adversaries all command a massive stockpile and the ability to lay mines nearly unimpeded by American forces.[3] Russia and China are estimated to have more than 100,000 mines each. Some believe North Korea has more than 50,000 mines. Iran’s stockpile is estimated in the thousands. Even the Houthi rebels, funded largely by Iran and al-Qaeda, are fielding low-tech, improvised naval mines in the Red Sea and along Yemen’s western coast, forcing an international response. Russia can exert influence throughout Europe, the Mediterranean and Black Seas, and in the Northern Pacific. China can hold us at bay. North Korea can make reinforcing our allies to the South very difficult. Iran can, in theory, shut down access to the Arabian Gulf, causing potentially calamitous impact to the world economy. And a terrorist organization has shown interest in a warfare area that can disrupt the choke-point connecting Europe to the Arabian Peninsula, Africa, and beyond. Our potential enemies have the resources to stop, or slow us down, in every area of operations we care about. The mine threat is real. And yet, the future of the Navy’s surface-borne mine countermeasures forces is unclear.
The current crop of Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships are old, tired, and too often, broken. The outdated equipment does not operate reliably, having a negative effect on operational tempo and the proficiency of the crews. Avengers mostly go unused, solemn monuments to a time when the U.S. Navy looked beyond air and missile defense, set alongside otherwise active piers. In a bittersweet quirk, though, the contrast between the condition of the ships and their crews is staggering. These ships are crewed by phenomenal men and women who are motivated and passionate about their ships. There is a fraternal pride, and unstopping zeal, oozing through the pores of these small, wooden ships. That esprit de corps—that pride in being the toughest Sailors on the block—comes from the fact that at their foundation, these ships are great ships. They are, in theory, incredibly capable, boasting both minesweeping and mine hunting capabilities—unique amongst the world’s navies—with well-thought gear and advantageous construction. This reality makes their fall from grace more frustrating. Though they have withered from the vine, their keel marks the future of surface-borne mine countermeasures.
Updating, upgrading, and reintroducing a legacy platform is ingrained in the service’s DNA—the Navy has done it throughout its history. In the surface fleet, a tangential example is the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, rolled out in its original specifications and updated in new construction via follow-on flights, or variants, effectively replacing, or augmenting, early hulls with further evolved variants of the same ship. An example more in line with the 21st-century Avenger, though, is that of the F/A-18 Hornet and its much younger cousins, the Super Hornet and Growler. The Hornet entered service in 1984 and the Super Hornet did likewise in 2001, replacing the F-14 Tomcat; though largely a new aircraft, it was explicitly based on an asset with a 16-year-old airframe. The EA-18G Growler, itself an even more specialized variant of the Super Hornet, entered service in 2008 and gradually replaced EA-6B Prowlers—another example of expanding upon an existing platform. In these cases, the Navy proved that what is old can be new again. While new and evolutionary platforms are staples of the world’s greatest military might, there are times when the warfighter simply needs a new version of what they currently have. Designing a new platform from the keel-up takes excessive time, loads of money, and the burden of competition—all hallmarks of the Department of Defense’s acquisition labyrinth. There is an opportunity here for the Navy to jump back into the surface mine countermeasures game quickly and in a fiscally responsible manner. Build the fleet a new Avenger and get them back into the fight!
More than anything else, the Navy’s updated mine countermeasures ship needs to be sustainable. Self-sufficiency is critical and a well-stocked supporting shore infrastructure will be the foundation of the class’s success. Durable nonmetallic parts, currently a misnomer, are a must, and making use of emerging 3D-printing technology—already proven on Navy ships—will ensure longevity and the ability to affect prompt repairs. Sturdy, high-capacity air conditioners and the associated sea water pumps and strainers will ensure the ship’s combat systems are appropriately cooled and a semblance of quality of life is maintained for the crew. The new ships will need new, more powerful diesel engines, capable of producing higher speeds over longer distances at an efficient fuel burn rate. The engineering plants also will need an updated, reliable bow-thruster, giving ships increased independence in-port and a superior capability while mine hunting. Along with the bow-thruster, a gas-turbine generator encased in an appropriate module, like its counterparts throughout the fleet, will guarantee the ship’s unique capabilities and keep the crew and associated equipment safe. Upgraded means—whether it be SHF, EHF, or a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solution—to achieve and maintain IP services will be extremely important. The combat systems suite also needs to add Link-16 capability, which will come in handy when dealing with Navy and allied forces around a minefield, and an infrared-capable optical sight system to allow watch standers to identify surrounding contacts on the horizon day and night. To best achieve the benefits of the surface force’s recent focus on a circadian rhythm for shipboard watch standers—arguably critically important to the crew executing a slow and drawn-out mission —the new MCM would benefit from an increase in crew size from 86 to 110, and thus an average of 23 new racks and associated berthing accommodations. At a minimum, the additional rack space would allow a faithful attempt at providing for an explosive ordnance disposal berthing, thus ensuring that the future Avenger is able to fold into the mine countermeasures triad and expand its capabilities through distributed lethality. And, last but not least, the Navy needs more of these updated hulls—at least six in every forward deployed location—to ensure operational commanders’ demands can be met in a contingency.
There are excellent and exciting new technologies entering the Fleet and they no doubt have a positive impact today and will in years to come. But mine countermeasures is a unique warfare area. Its future largely lies in its past. Emerging Littoral Combat Ship capabilities and unmanned technologies may serve as fine supplements, but the clearing of strategic waterways is painstaking work requiring the collective knowledge of the fleet’s minemen, engineers, and the tactical experts at the Navy Surface and Mine Warfare Development Center. The Avenger-class minesweeper was a fantastic platform when first conceived, but now it is ready to retire. Not only would a 21st-century Avenger build on the capabilities of a time-tested platform, ensuring timely and capable mine countermeasures forces to fleet commanders, but reinvesting through innovation as we improve upon the legacy class will keep early command opportunities alive and well in the Navy’s surface warfare officer community—building future commanders and keeping mine warfare at the forefront of our future leaders’ collective consciousness.
Endnotes
[1] Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces, 2001. National Research Council, 17.
[2] Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces, 2001. National Research Council, 17.
[3] Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces, 2001. National Research Council, 19.
