In 1998, as the executive officer (XO) in the USS Cole (DDG-67), I had a once in a lifetime experience that changed my way of thinking. I got a call on a Friday afternoon from the destroyer squadron chief staff officer who asked if I could drive to Washington, D.C., on Sunday and have breakfast with (late) Representative the Honorable Ike Skelton at 0600 Monday (hint—he wasn’t asking!). There were three of us—one from a surface ship, one aviator, and one submariner—all XO’s afloat. The congressman, well known for his advocacy of the armed forces, was very cordial at that early hour as the mess specialists laid out breakfast. As we finished, he said, “OK, you each have 20 minutes. Here is a magic wand. Fix the Navy.” Then he listened. For an hour. He did not say a word. We finished our breakfast, thanked him, and departed. The next day, a friend of mine called me and said he heard us cited on CSPAN. After I got over the shock (somebody watches CSPAN?!), I realized that Representative Skelton had mentioned that he was briefing the Armed Services Committee that day and apparently started with “I had breakfast with three Navy officers (listed our names) and here is what they told me . . .”

This event came to mind recently when I spent an enlightening lunch with a group of Navy reservists. For context, there have been significant changes in the reserve force structure in the past few years, much of it aimed at operationalizing the reserve force. Many of these changes have been accelerated following the recommendations of the U.S. Fleet Forces Comprehensive Review of Surface Force Incidents and the Strategic Readiness Review, which cited more than 6,000 gaps at sea—and getting worse. The two surface type commanders have a force of more than 3,200 reservists assigned for waterfront support, and the Littoral Combat Ship Concept of Operations includes a force of more than 1,000 reservists to support planned maintenance and other tasks designed to mitigate the small crew size of these vessels. They also constitute the entire workforce of the Afloat Culture Workshop, which is transitioning from “nice to have” to a requirement.

As these changes occur, it will be crucial for Navy leaders, both active and reserve, to take a break from PowerPoint slides and check the pulse on the waterfront. There is much for active-duty folks to learn about the reserves, and for all involved, using the powerful lessons that I learned on that day. First, it is possible to listen without interrupting (I say I learned it—not that I always practice it!). Second, if seniors listen, what you say can make a difference. As for my group if reservists, I had interacted with them in a work environment, and they took me afterwards to lunch for small talk. After the meal, I (figuratively) handed them the “magic wand” that I got from Ike. Here are some of the frustrations they shared.

1. Please don’t call us “Weekend Warriors.” One by one, they described their workweek duties as a real estate agent, stay-at-home mom/dad/full-time student, shipyard welder, electric company lineman. All were raising families, working Monday to Friday, and traveling (in some cases several hours) to support the waterfront on Saturdays and Sundays, then driving back home to go to work Monday morning . The chief petty officers and above spend many hours in between duty weekends performing leadership tasks such as evals, awards, counseling, and training—much of it uncompensated.
2. You can trust me. Many of the reservists at lunch had many years of active duty as fire controlman, electrician, hull technician, etc. The reported that often, if they did report to a ship to assist, they were assigned cleaning duties or fire watch. Said one E-6 “I’m not a Molly Maid.” They have skills and they want to use them. If their training is rusty, they are professional enough to speak up.  

3. My rate may belie my experience. There seems to be a mismatch between the needs of the active fleet and the reserve force. Otherwise, why would my lunch crowd include a second class religious petty officer who used to be an machinery repairman, and an electrician’s mate first class who used to be a culinary specialist second class? They also reported great difficulty passing rating exams in the new rating because they lacked experience and generally were tasked to perform duties in the “old” rate instead of the new rate (see #1). This can result in what I have heard called the “deadly anecdote”, when they are engaged to assist a ship in their rate, but lack experience; one such event results in “negative reviews” for the reservist—through no fault of their own—and for the reserves as a whole.
4. (Opposite of 3). I may have skills beyond my paygrade. For example, one hull maintenance technician fireman at the lunch was new the reserves, but in his mid-20s and with several years as a commercial welder, he is more experienced than many of active-duty hull technician HT2s. He had never been asked to weld as a reservist in more than a year of service. I was ecstatic during my tour in the USS San Jacinto (CG-56) to benefit from the expertise of MR1 Johnson, who shared on arrival that is “day job” was as a tool and die maker for an automotive company, as we prepared for an inspection. I recall him saying “I never had a CO hug me before”!
5. I want to contribute but there are so many obstacles. One group showed up to work, but the ship turned them away because they lacked coveralls (which are organizational clothing). Many are on their third style of uniform (and looking at a fourth) as the Navy changes its mind and they have to replace perfectly good clothing to go to work one weekend a month. Many reported a desire to spend their training days assisting shipboard sailors but there was no path nor was funding available to get them there, so they spent the weekend performing office duties and mandatory e-learning, then went back to their day jobs in frustration—month after month.
6. Good intentions are not enough. The Ready and Resilient Campaign (R2C) and the Reserve Component to Active Component (RC2AC) are new ideas designed to match reservists with at-sea gaps and activate them for extended periods. According to my lunch crowd, there are issues with matching sailors to billets and funding them, so they sit for months after activation awaiting orders. Some were told “be ready to not get paid.” This program has great potential for all ships but especially for minimally manned ships and support staffs like littoral combat ships and Zumwalt-class destroyers.

These sailors were not just grousing. They had recommendations that I would like to share, and they plan to do the same:

1. Build and outfit coherent teams. The surface type commanders have stood up material readiness teams, bought tools and coveralls and turned them loose to conduct minor repairs on ships. They perform better with small teams led by competent chief petty officers or E6s and with a mission. This could easily be expanded and refined to address manning shortfalls and maintenance backlogs. One area that is ripe for the picking is a traditional challenge of “Green Berthings” on amphibious ships, which often are relegated to “orphan” status when not occupied. Win-win!
2. Leverage our skills. In the group were hull technicians, machinery repairmen damage controlmen, and electrician mates—sailors with a host of repair skills. If properly paired with the appropriate shore staff or shipboard work center, they could both contribute immediately and learn their trade. In addition to some newer programs to return reservists to active duty to fill gaps at sea, known as RC2C and RC2AC, there are the maintenance teams for the newer classes of ships, littoral combat ships and Zumwalts, with opportunity to grow and integrate even more in the future. Many have skills from their civilian careers that may benefit the Navy when they don the uniform—but that would require tracking and fostering engagement to leverage this layer of capability.
3. Align the reserve billet structure to the active force. The 6,000+ gaps in the surface force are both known and predictable—the Comprehensive Review detailed thousands of gaps and an increasing trend over the next few years. A more agile way to adjust the reserve demand signal to match the fleet would save time and money and relieve stress on the force. Many of the 25 percent or so in this lunch group who were “force converted” knew of gaps in their old rating through their active-duty friends on ships, but instead are trying to learn a new rate (see gripe # 3 above). Meanwhile many active ships are manned far below desirable measures—another ripe opportunity.
4. Engagement by leaders at all levels—active duty and reserves. Said one first class: “Get the leadership to hand out more magic wands.” One Afloat Culture Workshop team leader, a captain, recalled her reserve team referred to as, “the quitters” by the commanding officer of a ship that they were assisting. He thought he was funny, but he wasn’t. Lots to learn.

Although the individuals in this discussion were enlisted, there are areas where reserve officers also could contribute more. One example is the Afloat Culture Workshop, which consists entirely of reservists and examines command culture. As a commanding officer, this was one of the most valuable resources to me in improving operational readiness—it is in the process of being expanded and improved in the wake of recent Comprehensive and Strategic Reviews. As a Strike Group N3, my “deputy” was a reserve 04 who supported the training and certification both remotely and as a watch stander during fleet training events. This program also could be reinvigorated at fleet and type commander staffs, keeping reserve officers abreast of fleet events and policies. Certainly, it can be expected that senior officers will take initiative to stay current, but they should not have to overcome so many obstacles to do so.

Bottom line, the reservists that I met were motivated, professional, skilled, and ready to assist. There are a plethora of new programs or initiatives to augment and assist the active-duty fleet and operationalize the reserve, but there is still work to be done on both sides, active and reserve, in recognizing—and eliminating—cultural and procedural obstacles. Based on this engaging lunch experience, it will pay huge dividends.