Training and Education

NROTC Wargaming

If the naval services are truly looking to develop the next generation of leaders and strategic thinkers, it is time to consider introducing wargaming to NROTC programs. This would be a logical step in light of Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work’s 2015 memorandum on the subject.[1] Another authority, King’s College London professor Philip Sabin, states “[t]he most important function of wargames is to convey a vicarious understanding of some of the strategic and tactical dynamics associated with real military operations.”[2] When working with the Air Force ROTC (AFROTC) program at Montana State University (MSU), we took a basic weapons systems course and turned it into a military campaign planning course culminating with a major force-on-force map wargame. The course was open to all students and attracted a number of non-ROTC students every year.

While I plan to use my experience with AFROTC to illustrate how to bring wargaming to an ROTC program, the situation I encountered was unique. MSU took a relatively hands-off approach to its ROTC programs, allowing us to tailor university elective courses to meet our academic needs. This will not be the case at all institutions, which limits the ability of programs to create stand-alone courses like ours. Staffing may also be an issue, although I feel NROTC faces fewer challenges in this area when compared to AFROTC.

When I joined the department in 2005 (ten years before Work’s 2015 memo), I inherited a class titled “Aerospace Weapons Systems” created by a previous active-duty cadre member. The two-credit offering centered on a very detailed aircraft and weapons recognition curriculum and ended with a simple three-class exercise. It was a rough beginning: it focused mainly on hardware – John Warden’s book on air campaigns provided an operational/strategic backdrop with no serious discussion – and ended with an exercise lacking any challenge. But there was potential. Hardware lessons could be balanced with opportunities to practice airpower theory in a setting with military and political limitations on the teams. Ground forces controlled by students would require coordinated joint operations. Finally, the four country teams could become two alliances, with points of friction between the allies on each side. Working with students who’d taken the earlier version, we play-tested the changes over the course of several months. The process was as thorough as we could make it, and the results were well worth the effort.

We crafted a course teaching the basics of airpower and the use of ground combat formations (grouped into infantry, armor, mechanized, and some specialized formations including airmobile units and rotary aviation battalions). Students controlled all combat forces available to a nation. We also added an overview of operational warfare including campaign planning, military and political objectives, and general principles of conflict (Sun Tzu and Clausewitz in a short overview, although we did retain Warden for airpower discussions). The students were divided into national teams and developed a campaign plan for their nation. The White Cell (the lead instructor and a cadre of students who’d been through the course before) evaluated those plans looking for major errors, and teams had a chance to make corrections before the exercise started.

The EOCX (end of class exercise) eventually made up almost half the course in terms of classroom time (eleven classes of actual exercise play as opposed to three sessions in the original version). Armed with four different scenarios (including a low-intensity conflict modification that could be used with three teams and the White Cell controlling the insurgents) and an expanded map area, the White Cell could shake things up from year to year, preventing the creation of a “school solution” among students who’d taken the course before. [3] It also allowed us to tailor the exercise to the needs of each class in a consistent and repeatable way.

Since our scenarios used notional second-world nations, we configured the orders of battle to match. One of the large nations used Soviet-style doctrines and systems (a large, if lower-tech and mostly multi-role, air force and an equally large infantry-centric army), while the other was more Western (a specialized, higher-tech air force and a smaller, more diversified army). The two smaller countries tended to parallel their larger allies in terms of weapons and equipment. This required the players to consider aircraft range, strike-package mix, and ground-unit capabilities during every turn. For example, the more Western teams had to be especially careful when building their strike packages (they had a limited number of pure interceptors to perform air superiority missions), while the Soviet-style team had to guard its limited high-tech platforms (airborne command-and-control systems in particular) from attack as they could not be replaced.

We required teams to plan realistically based on their forces. If each team has aircraft that can span the map without needing to refuel, there’s no challenge when it comes to building strike packages. If every team has omniscient reconnaissance assets, there’s no need to consider bomb damage assessment missions or send scout helicopters into regions to find enemy forces. And if every team has unlimited deep strike weapons, they WILL shoot them every phase. Tiny nations operating B-2 bombers and F-22 fighters have predictable (if boring) scenario results. Through play-testing, we ensured each order of battle was capable of achieving victory when used within its limits. The results show we succeeded: no single country or alliance team consistently won the exercise based on sheer military strength at the start. It typically came down to the abilities of each country team.

The wargame was also designed with measurable goals to help teams develop their plans and to aid the White Cell’s evaluation of their performance.[4] Each team had a series of military and (occasionally contradictory) political goals, some as simple as “capture X city by D+3 of operations” and others as complex as “overrun the border region to a depth of X kilometers without triggering NATO involvement.” In keeping with the goal of exposing students to the realities of international conflict, outside intervention (by NATO, the U.N., the United States, the Russian Federation, or a combination of those groups) was always a possibility. One scenario even started with multi-national forces already in place!

Conducting the game was simple. The first phase (turn) saw teams deploying their forces on their country maps (one for each alliance team). Aircraft were deployed on special tracking sheets, while ground forces used counters with sticky backings. Each team got to look at the other team’s map for 10 minutes (simulating a last bit of real intelligence before the conflict opened) and mark ground units’ positions on their maps. That was the last time each team saw their opponent’s map. There was no omniscient intelligence in EOCX, which required teams to conduct both air and ground reconnaissance to locate units if they were not in direct contact and to determine which airfields were occupied. Finally, they issued their first orders to air and ground units and turned those sheets in before the end of class.

After that, things moved in a results-planning format. At the start of class, the White Cell distributed reports to each team tabulating their losses and providing information on enemy losses (sometimes accurate, sometimes not depending on many factors including post-strike reconnaissance) and specific news and updates for each team. A cover sheet summarized the public events of the previous phase, including any international reaction and news reports. Teams then developed their plans for the next phase and submitted them prior to the end of class. Some students later reported they were more stressed trying to develop their plans before the end of class than they were during major exams.

We did not use detailed logistics systems for the EOCX, but elements were simulated through strikes on hub locations (transport, industrial, and direct attacks on airfields), limiting movement, reinforcements, and even combat power. Since we used a Balkan model for the countries involved (each nation had a substantial minority population drawn from the opposing ethnic group), bombing cities usually led to popular unrest and added political restrictions (imposed by the White Cell) on operations. Such actions also increased the likelihood of outside intervention in the conflict, ranging from arms embargoes to military action.

One unique aspect of this class was its opportunity for advanced learning: the White Cell was always composed of myself and two to three students who’d taken the class before. They enrolled using an individual studies option in the ROTC curriculum, giving them one upper division elective credit. They helped with both phase resolution (determining combat results and outcomes of movements) and served as instructor aids during each exercise class.

The White Cell also played an important role in two major events in the wargame. After the third phase, we reviewed general observations of what teams had been doing well and common errors. The learning curve for this class could be steep, and we took this opportunity to adjust and answer questions. This was always a collective effort, with each White Cell member presenting observations. There was also the EOCX hot wash. Each team was tasked at the conclusion of the last phase with preparing a report on how they viewed their performance, including strengths and weaknesses. As part of the grading process, the White Cell did the same thing. After the teams had presented their own reports, the White Cell delivered their briefing, again with each member covering a specific aspect of the evaluation (use of airpower, commonly repeated mistakes, coordination, and things that had gone especially well).

These activities gave the White Cell members opportunities to develop their evaluation and instruction skills, as well as to share in the wargame development and improvement process. We never viewed the EOXC as complete and added to it the entire time I ran the course. Members of the White Cell played a key role, both with suggestions and acting as playtest teams to make sure changes didn’t upset game balance. A sound White Cell structure is essential.

We also remained committed to keeping the EOCX a physical map wargame. We lacked the funding to create a digital map for each team and remained wary of using a computer platform for any aspect of play aside from combat results generation (a random number generator combined with combat tables). Our biggest reason for sticking with maps was player interaction: adding a computer element reduced coordination and created more opportunities for critical errors derailing learning opportunities.

The feedback we received from students taking the course was routinely positive. Civilian students (who often outperformed their ROTC counterparts) enjoyed it and felt they learned a great deal about military capabilities and, more importantly, its limitations at the operational level. ROTC students (both Army and Air Force) had similar experiences, and those I spoke with after they commissioned felt it gave them a leg up on others in their training classes.

The most important takeaway from a class like this is the exposure students get to a simulation of command issues at the operational level of warfare, going back to Professor Sabin’s point quoted at the start of this article. They have a chance to experience the challenges of both joint and coalition warfare, the political considerations that drive and limit warfare, and the time pressures surrounding planning and execution of operations. Through the White Cell they also experienced friction in its many forms and manifestations. If their orders were not sent correctly, units went to the wrong locations, flew the wrong missions, or failed to act based on incomplete instructions. In some cases, alliances weakened, and coordination faltered as national goals diverged. We also saw intra-team friction when the ground and air elements failed to coordinate their plans.[5]

Teaching theory is an excellent first step, but if we want to stimulate operational and strategic interest, we need to give students a dynamic place to test those theories. Our course at MSU did just that. It also provided the time and space to absorb those lessons, or at least see what happens when a plan comes into contact with an opposing plan. A computer game lasting all of two classes cannot accomplish the same thing. If we want to create the next generation of operational and strategic thinkers we need to start early and making wargaming a part of NROTC is one way forward.

Endnotes

[1]. Robert Work, Memorandum with Subject “Wargaming and Innovation,” 9 Feb 2015. The memo expressed Work’s concern that wargaming capabilities had “atrophied” and he further encouraged “Military Departments to reinvigorate wargaming in Professional Military Education.” Work’s memo was echoed by one from then-Secretary of the Navy Mabus on 5 May 2015 with subject “Wargaming.”

[2]. Philip Sabin, Simulating War (London: Continuum International Publishing Group), 2012, 31.

[3]. The original exercise used a map of southwestern Montana and part of Idaho. The first modification used a map of the upper Adriatic, while the final version used the Ukraine and Black Sea region, a major increase in playing space. All versions, of course, used notional nations and created borders.

[4]. Peter Perla, The Art of Wargaming (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 211.We followed Perla’s “Elements of Scenario Design” during the design process. The game engine itself was created from scratch, but followed standard wargame conventions for combat resolution.

[5]. Perla discusses two similar situations in his book on pages 138-139, although he is dealing with large board wargames with multiple players. In one instance he came into the game as a subordinate player and suffered from poor unit deployment on the part of his higher command, and in the second he orchestrated a successful attack based in part on his opponent’s failure to monitor his forces.

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