I don’t second guess captains who are in the arena, at sea. Of course, I do have strong opinions, based upon my own similar experiences as the commanding officer of U.S Navy ships, but I also understand that for every major decision made, there are an infinite number of variables involved that I cannot possibly understand from my outside observer status.
So, I have no conclusions to bring to the table regarding the COVID-19 decisions made by Captain Brett E. Crozier, as commanding officer of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71); decisions which caused the issue of sailor illness in his ship to become a matter of public record, thereby forcing the Navy’s hand.
Still, this much is certain, the instant that Captain Crozier elected to make the issues in his ship a matter of national debate, his fate was irrevocably sealed—and he knew it.
It is fundamentally understood by the Navy’s commanders that the Navy will be not grateful to those who unilaterally decide to make “family business” a matter of raging, politically fraught debate. The danger is that to quell the noise, the Navy may be forced to take actions, which may be contrary to either the “good order and discipline” so vital to an effective fighting force or decisions which lead to unintended, unwanted other consequences.
More important, Captain Crozier precipitated the removal of one of the Navy’s few, most powerful strategic assets from the playing board. This hole cannot be filled without machinations that leave other holes and drag thousands of sailors back to long deployments early. The Navy was not allowed to work to a strategic “soft-fall,” and our potential enemies were given a wrong signal. That, if nothing else, cannot be forgiven.
In the service we have an ongoing, abhorrent fear regarding the potential for unintended, national-level consequence, which lie within the power of the “strategic captain.” Though this is an Army term, it applies, here. A strategic captain is an officer of relatively junior rank who makes a decision, which dangerously redounds far beyond his or her level of authority.
Nevertheless, many reasonable questions are being asked. What was former acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas B. Modly thinking about when he first fired Crozier, and then flew to Guam to broadcast his take to the crew? Modly was a naval aviator for seven years in the 1980s and somehow, between that experience and his appointment, he decided that he could and should usurp the appropriate chain of command regarding Captain Crozier and the Theodore Roosevelt.
Secretaries of the Navy do not involve themselves in individual ships. That is not their place. While on deployment, that aircraft carrier was and is the operational responsibility of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip S. Davidson. Even within Navy’s administrative chain, Modly sat some five echelons removed from Crozier. Further, Modly’s actions reportedly were contrary to the advice of that chain of command including the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael M. Gilday
In short, Modly was inexplicably outside of his swim lane and jumping complex and well-tested lines of authority.
Did the Navy handle this poorly? Yes! Unfortunately, we may never know exactly what happened and why. On these issues the Navy is historically mute. As for Captain Crozier, regardless of the outcome, it is unlikely that he will speak publicly on these events. Traditionally, that simply is not done.
The Navy’s leaders, however, would send the wrong message were they somehow to yield to pressure to restore Captain Crozier to command.
You may consider Crozier a hero, and as a tax-paying citizen, that is your right. Having said that, this I know: The instant that Captain Crozier went outside his “chain of command” regarding the employment of his one-of-eleven nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, he surely knew that he was putting his head on the chopping block.
That’s just how our Navy does personnel business.
