The sea services have a rich history. Maritime superiority in today’s environment depends on the proper application of that rich history through established doctrine. Naval doctrine shapes the planning and execution of naval engagements. The naval commander must be well versed in history as well as current capabilities and limitations to best apply doctrine to today’s situations. Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP 1) is the foundation for naval doctrine and is nested within Joint Doctrine. It describes the naval services in terms of who we are, what we do, and how se fight. “[NDP 1] reviews the Principles of Joint Operations from the naval perspective and describes how naval forces focus their resources to attain the force commander’s objectives.”[1]
Although these principles are enduring, they require proper understanding and application to maintain maritime superiority throughout the 21st century. Naval doctrine “is authoritative but requires judgement in application.”[2] The principles of joint operations—objective, offensive, mass, maneuver, economy of force, unity of command, security, surprise, simplicity, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy—are requirements for maritime superiority.[3] Failure to effectively apply these concepts is a recipe for disaster, as shown in the Battle of Savo Island during the Guadalcanal campaign in World War II.
Purpose for Guadalcanal
Guadalcanal was conceived following the decisive, yet defensive, Midway Operation in June 1942. American attention soon shifted to the Solomon Islands to maintain open sea lines to U.S. allies in Australia and to secure bases for future operations in an approach to attack and invade Japan. With intelligence that the Japanese were constructing Henderson airfield as an advanced airbase in Guadalcanal, Admiral Ernest J. King ordered Operation Watchtower (the Guadalcanal invasion) to commence.[4] Following a successful amphibious landing on the island on 7 August 1942, the Japanese Imperial Navy sent reinforcements to repel the Americans. The following conflict is a case study in failure. Some principles of joint operations were followed, but many more were ignored. The result was the worst U.S. naval defeat in history at the Battle of Savo Island.
Initial Actions
The Guadalcanal campaign began with adherence to the principles. This was the first offensive action taken in the Pacific Theater with a specified objective. Despite a “Germany first” policy, Navy leaders knew that defensive-only plans were insufficient to halt Japanese expansion and victory required offensive actions. U.S. and Allied forces established a clear objective to occupy Guadalcanal to deny its usage to the Japanese and establish an advanced base for future operations en route to Japan. Vice Admiral Jack Fletcher, Commander Task Force 61, was the designated commander for the entire operation, and Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Commander Task Force 62, was the designated commander for the Guadalcanal landing operation. Sufficient mass was gathered in an amphibious force of 19,000 Marines embarked in 19 transports protected by six heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and 19 destroyers with carrier air support from three aircraft carriers.[5] Allied forces obtained almost complete surprise and secured the beachheads and airstrip by the following morning on 8 August 1942. An initial air raid response by unready Japanese forces was defeated and U.S. forces began to consolidate gains made ashore.
Plans for Guadalcanal Protection
U.S. forces realized that the Japanese would not be content to yield Guadalcanal and its surrounding islands to the Allies. Following the landing, Rear Admiral Turner split his forces into two task groups to defend the landing zones: the Western Screen Group led by British Rear Admiral Crutchley and the Eastern Screen Group led by U.S. Rear Admiral Scott. Crutchley further divided his forces into two picket ships along the western approach—a Northern Group led by Captain Riefkohl, and a Southern Group he directly led.[6] Further early warning would be provided by periodic air patrols from Malaita, Espiritu Santo, and New Caledonia.[7] Superficially, this should have provided sufficient protection for naval and landing forces still in the process of unloading. In practice, key principles were ignored.
Fletcher arguably ignored the principles of objective and offensive by immediately withdrawing his three-carrier task force. Whether this decision was correct or not continues to be debated, but the risks were clear. Had the Japanese successfully recaptured the islands and airfields, the larger operation would have been a failure. Though air power was seen as a revolution in warfare, Fletcher ordered the removal of carrier air power from the area of operations. A key objective in the operation was the seizure of Henderson Field to allow further land-based air operations in the region. General MacArthur stressed the importance of air power stressed prior to the landing, stating that inadequate “air coverage during each phase would be attendant with the gravest risk.”[8] Fletcher’s withdrawal of carrier air support made that gravest risk a reality. Likely, he was overly cautious after the sinking of the USS Lexington (CV-2) and USS Yorktown (CV-5) in the battles of Coral Sea and Midway, respectively, and wanted to avoid more carrier losses. While risk must be balanced against reward, the objective was to seize and control Guadalcanal, and additional carrier air support could have provided greater search coverage or offensive power in repelling the Japanese counterattack.
Land-based aircraft patrols were established to provide early detection of any enemy approach. Five sectors were created for aircraft launching from New Caledonia, Espiritu Santo, Santa Cruz, and Malaita.[9] Turner, appropriately expecting a Japanese response, asked for additional coverage over the New Georgia Sound, which ultimately proved to be the Japanese avenue of attack.[10] Poor weather and search gaps allowed the Japanese to approach unseen despite these patrols. While the air search planes failed to spot the enemy, American B-17 bombers returning from raids against Rabaul spotted enemy ships approaching and submitted three contact reports.[11] Insufficient security and lack of offensive spirit prevented the reports from reaching Turner until the following day when his staff summarily dismissed the reports. His staff, believing that no enemy force could reach Guadalcanal without being spotted by search planes, disregarded all other reports.[12] With an objective of early identification of any enemy approach, Turner’s staff failed. Any report, whether from search planes or other assets, should have been taken seriously. Unity of command operates in both directions. Vital reports should have been passed from Turner’s staff to the affected subordinate commands of Crutchley’s and Scott’s surface groups.
Crutchley’s defensive organization violated principles of mass and economy of force. The Japanese force consisted of five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and one destroyer.[13] Crutchley’s force of six heavy cruisers and six destroyers should have been more than a match for the smaller Japanese group. Unfortunately, Crutchley ignored mass and divided forces into smaller groups. Without effective means to communicate and coordinate, the Eastern, Southern, and Northern groups were isolated and could not provide support to each other. Rather than massing twelve Allied vessels against eight Japanese vessels, there were two battles of five Allied vessels against eight Japanese vessels with two U.S. picket ships further separated from the other groups. The Eastern Group of four ships never engaged Japanese forces in the battle. These unnecessary divisions easily invited the Japanese into a very successful divide and conquer approach.
Crutchley positioned two destroyers with radar as early warning picket vessels to detect any approaching ships from the west. With his poor understanding of radar and radar limitations, these vessels were placed too far apart from each other and nearby islands. Insufficient screening forces were assigned to the vital task of monitoring the approaches to the sound. The remainder of his divided forces were positioned into two steaming boxes about halfway between the picket ships and each landing zone to serve as the Northern Group and Southern Group. This was inadequate economy of force. Protection of the landing zone was the primary objective, not necessarily maintaining proximity to the landing zones. The northern and southern zones were too far into the sound to prevent Japanese entry into the sound. This created a significant gap that the Japanese exploited. The Japanese armada slipped right between these ships without being detected. Although close enough for visual contact, the picket destroyers were too far away from the main conflict areas. Upon Japanese entry, the groups were unable to force the Japanese armada to Maneuver into restricted or other less advantageous waters. The only response possible for the Allied forces was to engage in battle at the enemy’s choosing. Coupled with ineffective picket ships, the enemy also maintained total surprise, further enhancing their combat efficiency.
The Eastern Group did not contain a picket line. Scott accurately assessed his objective as guarding the eastern approach. His four ships stayed together to mass power and economy of force at the entry. Understanding the geography and that naval forces could not cross the landmasses to the north or south plus the reef-studded waters, any enemy entry would be forced to maneuver into specific zones. Scott was ready, but the Japanese chose not to make an eastern approach.
Crutchley further violated unity of command and simplicity. As a British officer, he may have been reticent to command and control U.S. forces in a manner to which he would have controlled Royal Navy or Royal Australian Navy forces. Despite a common language, there was no common voice radio channel.[14] No joint or combined tactical doctrine existed between U.S. and British forces.[15] Some of these training and doctrinal challenges could have been mitigated with bolder and more intrusive leadership, but Crutchley would not oblige. He had not met with the commanding officers of any U.S. vessels and did not provide guidance beyond the steaming box and vague instructions of repelling a night attack. No training was conducted en route to the sound.[16] Most egregiously, Crutchley departed the Southern Group with HMAS Canberra to attend a conference without notifying the rest of his forces. Captain Bode of the USS Chicago (CA-29) assumed command of the Southern Group as the next ranking officer, but Captain Riefkohl in the Northern Group and Scott in the Eastern Group remained unaware of the absence.[17] As the conference ended, Crutchley decided not to return to his ship that evening without informing either his group or his immediate-superior-in-command, Turner. This disrupted unity of command for an already divided force. Precise and simple instructions should have been provided to improve interoperability between U.S., British, and Australian forces as well as establishing better coordination between the disparate groups.
Japanese Attack
Prior to entry into the sound on the evening of 9 August 1942, Japanese forces launched aircraft for scouting and intelligence purposes. Despite notification by one of the picket ships of unknown aircraft in the area, the Western Groups did not question the flight and allowed overflight for over 90 minutes.[18] Ineffective security conditions existed when watch standers should have expected enemy reprisal. When the Japanese forces entered the sound, they encountered the Southern Group first. Japanese ships launched torpedoes and engaged in combat for seven minutes before the first Allied report, “Warning, warning, strange ships entering harbor!”[19] Japanese forces wrought swift devastation on HMAS Canberra, HMAS Australia, USS Chicago, and USS Patterson (DD-392) without further reports made to the Northern Group. Ships in the Northern Group received the single radio report and heard gunfire, but still questioned its meaning. Japanese ships illuminated Allied ships and launched airplane flares for targeting without a clear U.S. response. Captain Riefkohl and his executive officer were still debating the issue when Japanese gunfire began hitting his vessel. Within an hour, the USS Vincennes (CA-44), USS Quincy (CA-39), and USS Astoria (CA-34) were at the bottom of the sound and Japanese forces were returning to port in Rabaul.
Crutchley and his forces lost the offensive and maintained inadequate security. Mass and economy of force were violated. Positioning his protective screens greatly inhibited maneuver and allowed for nearly complete surprise by the Japanese. He did not provide clear and simple orders and compromised the unity of command by departing the area without notification for his forces.
Despite the enormous tactical failure, the Guadalcanal campaign continued. Allied forces properly maintained perseverance to continue fighting and maintained legitimacy in the effort to stop Japanese aggression and seek retribution for unprovoked aggression at Pearl Harbor. Also, like Pearl Harbor, an inquiry was conducted. The resulting Hepburn Report determined many failures, both procedural and personal, at fault. While the report did not specifically cite doctrine or the principles of joint operations, findings do correlate to the application of the principles. Key findings included, “inadequate state of readiness on all ships” and the “withdrawal of carrier groups on the evening before the battle,” which reflect the improper application of objective, offensive, and security. [20]
Application for Tomorrow
While some specifics of the tactical situation and other historical details may be relegated to the dustbin of history, the lessons of doctrine are enduring. The principles of joint operations, especially in the maritime domain, remain as relevant today as they did to Themistocles in ancient Greece to Alfred Thayer Mahan in the 19th century to the junior officers of today who will serve as admirals tomorrow. The learned commander must understand doctrine and apply it to scenarios today to maintain maritime superiority tomorrow. The principles of joint operations form the basis for proper execution in strategic, operational, and tactical levels across the range of military operations. Failure to do so makes maritime superiority virtually impossible, as seen in the Battle of Savo Island.
[1] Naval Doctrine Publication 1. Naval Warfare. (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, March 2010), v
[2] Ibid., iii.
[3] Joint Publication 3-0. Joint Operations. (Washington D.C.: The Joint Staff), 17 January, 2017, A-1.
[4] Samuel Eliot Morison, Two-Ocean War (New York: Galahad Books, 1963), 165.
[5] Ibid., 166.
[6] Richard B. Frank, Guadalcanal (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 100–101.
[7] Ibid., 91.
[8] Ibid.,38.
[9] Ibid., 91.
[10] Ibid., 90.
[11] Ibid., 92.
[12] Ibid., 92.
[13] Ibid., 100.
[14] Ibid., 98.
[15] Ibid., 98.
[16] Ibid., 99.
[17] Ibid., 97.
[18] Morison, 172.
[19] Ibid., 173.
[20] Ibid., 122.
