It has now been three years since the Comprehensive Review of Surface Force Incidents was conducted to find root causes underlying ship mishaps in the Western Pacific. One area identified was the impact of manning shortfalls across the fleet. In spite of the fact that the Department of Defense has had its largest budget in years, funding shortfalls that underlie all challenges to man the Navy to minimum requirements do not appear close to resolution by Navy leadership anytime soon. Today, the Navy still has thousands of gaps at sea in operational fleet units.
Beyond powerful anecdotes and personal conversations with the fleet chief petty officer (CPO) mess, there is research to support the Navy’s ongoing failures to man the fleet and correlations between manning and performance. A USNI Blog piece titled “Manning Matters” and three Naval Postgraduate School studies present this research, and all provide specific details which support this thesis. Also, the Comprehensive Review explained that “with respect to watch team performance, resilience, and operational safety, there is strong Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) survey evidence that forward deployed operational readiness overall is affected by fatigue and stress.” Coincidentally, suicide rates have consistently increased over the past several years. Real-world case studies support the idea that manning gaps induce risk to mission and risk to force—there was a gapped quartermaster chief billet on board the USS Fitzgerald and several cross decks to the USS John S. McCain prior to those collisions. Increasing gaps at sea, extended work days at sea and in-port, and the quality of work and life for fleet sailors are all connected whether Navy leaders are willing to admit this or not. This story needs to be routinely and strongly told on behalf of fleet sailors bearing the brunt of these decisions.
Gaps And Their Impacts
A 2017 CNA study provides an in-depth analysis of the cradle-to-grave process of buying people and distributing them to the fleet. This is an informative resource for those who want to, or should, fully understand these processes and their effects. Bottom line, a series of decisions during the complex process of manpower programming yield inadequate distributable inventory and are the root of most fleet manning woes. These include:
- Gaps between the ship manpower document (SMD) requirement developed by the Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) and the authorized billets.
- “Friction” from unplanned losses or what’s known as the transients, prisoners, patients, and holdees (TPPH) account which takes another 8 percent reduction of the distributable inventory.
- The “tax” on the fleet to fill billets such as recruiters and recruit division commanders.
- The current use of the metrics of fit and fill, currently 92 and 95 percent respectively (much less in the basic phase). Intended to serve as a deliberate priority system to help manage risk between authorized billets and the number of currently on board, but which also signals to programmers a willingness to accept fewer authorized billets.
- Missed accession and retention goals.
Consider the following illustration of how this plays out in the fleet. Pick your favorite division and assume it has ten manpower requirements in the SMD to meet the full workload of the standard 67-hour workweek. In many cases, the factors listed above converge to impact the number of sailors actually on board. If division manning dropped down to eight sailors, in theory, they would have to work 83 hours per week to make up for the two unfunded billets. If it went down to seven, 95 hours per sailor per week would be needed to meet the readiness requirements for that division. Each cut to that division’s manning results in a corresponding increase in workload for the sailors left to perform, leave undone, or perform to lower standards. Keeping in mind that NAVMAC uses some very well-defined science and fleet input to determine the minimum manpower requirements based on a 67-hour workweek for afloat units, is it right to expect each sailor to routinely work about 83 hours per week or about 12-hours per day, seven days a week, under way for an entire three-, four-, or five-year tour?
This math does not account for time off, transit time to and from work, other externally-imposed requirements such as Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) roving patrols, just-in-time training on diversity or sexual assault, or the “friction” of unplanned losses. Anecdotally, I know there are many fleet units manned at levels that require every enlisted sailor work 80+ hours per week to meet the minimum requirements and most, if not all, are manned at levels that require every enlisted sailor to work more than the 67 hours per week requirement. And fleet sources tell me there are manning shortfalls of 15 to 20 percent within some enlisted rating communities on board some classes of ships. It should be no surprise to fleet leaders when inspection and certification results are poor, ships collide, maintenance availabilities go long because of excessive “growth” work, alcohol misuse is high, and suicide rates continue to climb.
To those leaders making these decisions, or who are unaware of them but could influence them, I would ask, “Would you feel safe boarding a civilian airline whose maintenance department was routinely and chronically undermanned this way?” and “Would you feel comfortable letting your family?” Even though leaders and budgeters save costs in the MPN account, there are personal costs that result from reductions in their sailor’s sleep, fitness, personal time, or cognitive performance. Manning shortfalls contribute to crew fatigue and reduced crew endurance, increasing the chance of mistakes and increasing their risk tolerance to a point of ethical dilemma and decisions to cut corners with maintenance and other administrative requirements to self-manage the workload.
Perhaps, to understand the fiscal cost, Navy leaders and programmers should compare the financial cost each year in mishaps compared with the cost savings in the manpower account. I believe Navy leaders fail to recognize the long-term risk and costs of chronically manning platforms below the requirement. The severity of the outcomes of these decisions will be understood when fleets meet in war—parity matters not only in numbers and types of forces, but in their material and operational capability.
What the Fleet Needs
As former Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces, retired Admiral John C. Harvey explained in his comments in the Manning Matters blog piece, “I think it’s important to take a new look at the level of risk the Navy has been more than willing to accept in the past by not funding the known manpower requirement. The costs associated with not properly accounting for the inevitable manpower “friction” and significantly increased overall systems complexity appear to me to have risen exponentially—it is a new ball game and it looks like we are playing by an outdated set of rules, assumptions, and expectations. These higher costs translate directly to higher operational risks in the fleet at every point in the deployment cycle—be it the maintenance, training, or operational phase. It looks like it is well past time to rethink the programming rules in [the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations]; intentionally undermanning the fleet is no longer an acceptable approach to fixing the Navy’s enduring budget problems. The price has become too high.”
That blog piece offers much advice, but I will reemphasize several points. First, draw a line and direct manning to be resourced to meet mission-based and validated requirements—set type-commander manning goals to 100 percent of the full requirement and fully fund the total cost of ownership—100 percent of the SMD requirement plus the TPPH friction. When Vice Admiral Robert Burke was Chief of Naval Personnel, he often spoke of being able to fully fund the manpower account for the first time in the history of the Navy ,and the importance of paying for the total cost of ownership. This indicated an awareness and willingness to work toward a long-term manning solution.
In addition, it is time to be more intellectually honest in reporting and use fit, not fill, to represent manning shortfalls against the full requirement, and leverage modern data analytic tools to establish a more relevant and accurate manning dashboard that displays risk thresholds independent of Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) phase. Giving the fleet billets is one thing, but in a highly technical environment requiring specialized people, giving them the right billets with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to meet the job requirement is another. And, the sailor working 80 hours suffers the same effects regardless of where their unit is in the OFRP. Once any ship falls to a certain level of fit, they could be displayed as yellow or red to more accurately reflect the level of risk, so force manning managers could decide where to accept risk. To this end, leverage the new type commander human factors engineers, fleet safety officers, and naval safety center to analyze and articulate the risk to mission and force. Then, communicate to OPNAV N1 in terms of operational risk and challenge them to take actions to mitigate it, such as increasing recruiting goals, retention incentives, or adjusting distribution policies.
Second, continue to find efficiencies in the fleet. The math is simple, either you man the fleet to the requirements or reduce the requirements. If decision makers decide to buy the total requirement of manpower, there still will be lag time in filling gaps to recruit, train, and distribute new sailors to the fleet. On the other hand, if decision makers are unable to buy the total manpower requirement, the resultant gaps and their effects will chronically exist. For either case, the Navy must become more efficient with its human resource capital—it is not an inexhaustible and inorganic resource. It should set bold efficiency goals, aggressively probing the current certification processes, operational requirements, and maintenance programs for efficiencies. For example, the Navy could curtail redundant or ineffective fleet maintenance requirements such as reducing the requirements for the number of maintenance spot checks or making zone inspections less administratively intensive, and continue to validate or reduce certification requirements. One note of caution here—the Navy cannot lower standards because it does not have sufficient manpower. The Navy must find more efficient ways to meet and measure a ship’s readiness and capability to meet mission requirements.
The Navy must also critically review taxes on fleet manpower such as antiterrorism force protection requirements, recruiting and Recruit Training Command (RTC) billets, roving patrols, and motorcycle safety. The Reducing Administrative Distractions initiative was a start, but this kind of critical review should continue to find ways to remove and reduce manpower demands that provide little to no return on investment. I am confident the potential outcomes of taking risk in these areas are much more acceptable than those the gaps in manning at sea can produce. I have learned that the Navy has started to fill some RTC and SurgeMain billets at public shipyards with Navy Reserve sailors. This is a great example, but Navy leaders can keep exploring where distribution policies can be adjusted such as sea-shore rotation or assignment based on proficiency and experience such the Surface Maintainer Experience Metric program. Also, thought should be given to how the “friction” associated with the individual’s account can be reduced. These all require hard decisions and in some cases will touch on “third-rail” personnel policies.
Third, increase Navy leader knowledge and awareness of the service’s total force manpower policies, procedures, and the effects of manpower decision-making. To what extent is the broader lack of knowledge in manpower and manning affecting awareness of the problems or the strength of advocacy against tradeoffs made in the military personnel navy (MPN) account? Navy leaders must become more efficient with the manning they currently have, but they also must be knowledgeable about the manpower process as it “should be” and “as is.” As the CNA study explains, “Navy manpower planning is . . . a rich and complex topic that has a large body of institutional knowledge and a large body of prior research. It is a multidisciplinary subject, and there are many complicated long-standing problems.” It further goes on, “Gaining an understanding of Navy manpower planning is not easy: there’s a lot to learn and no standard texts. Moreover, knowledge is diffuse and not captured in one place.” It has been my experience and opinion that senior officers and enlisted leaders and advisors are not well-informed enough to effectively represent the effects or to challenge fiscal decision-making that takes excessive risk in fleet manning to pursue other objectives or “priorities.” It was eye-opening to me how little I knew about manpower and manning when I stepped into the role as the Fleet Master Chief for U.S. Fleet Forces Command. There is little to no formal education for senior officers or enlisted; they must rely on prior experience in the manpower world (if they have had the opportunity) or “just-in-time” (more like too little, too late) learning. The research and recommendations offered in the resources cited in this article are a great place to start!
Fourth, dial-up transparency and advocacy. To get action, you must first build awareness of an issue and then advocate for action. How aware are current naval leaders of the costs manpower decisions are having on the fleet? Anecdotally, I know that the Chief of Naval Operations visited a fleet unit whose CPO mess is manned at unacceptably low levels and was unaware of the effects. Why is there such a lack of transparency and awareness of fleet manning issues to Echelon I leaders? Who should be accountable for this? Furthermore, you have to have a willingness to advocate. I hear from the fleet that some leaders have succumbed to a defeatist attitude, lack of engagement, or avoidance of advocacy based on a belief that current funding simply cannot, and will never, be able to establish the right manning levels and buy the manpower the fleet needs. Regardless of how true or disheartening that may be, Navy leaders from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy to unit leadership have the responsibility, and the communication platforms to frequently and forcefully tell the fleet’s story on behalf of their sailors. And if decisions are made to take risk in manpower that result in manning shortfalls in fleet units, then be up front, align expectations, and tell the “why” behind the decisions and the outcomes it will have on sailors and their families.
In the end, Navy leaders have two options: continue to observe and ponder the problem or act. There is “real” data available to substantiate my assertions, so how long are leaders willing to wait for their staff to develop that story when there is plenty to drive action. Platitudes about sailors being the Navy’s “most precious resource” or it “competitive advantage” ring hollow when they are not provided with the quality of work and life they deserve. In 2016, the commander of the submarine force chose to mandate circadian watches for the submarine force. He could have waited for more information, but realized it was the right thing to do and made the decision. Navy leaders must have the honor and courage to embrace this attitude and commit to changing the manning situation today. If they do, I think they can expect Sailors will get more work done; Sailors will get more sleep; ships will have less mishaps; retention and morale will go up; destructive behaviors will go down; and wartime readiness will follow. NOW is the time for Navy leaders to use the facts at hand to say enough with accepting risk in fleet manning! Demonstrate with action that manning matters and man the fleet!
