Archive for the 'Training & Education' Category

Please join us at 5pm (remember Eastern Daylight Time) on 13 March 2016 for Midrats Episode 323: Building a Navy in Peace That Wins at War

The wartime record of the US Navy in under four years of combat from late 1941’s low point to the September 1945 anchoring in Tokyo Bay did not happen by chance. It did not happen through luck, or through quick thinking. It happened through a process of dedicated, deliberate, disciplined and driven effort over two decades in the intra-war period.

What were the mindset, process, leadership, and framework of the 1920s and 1930s that was used to build the fleet and the concepts that brought it to victory in the 1940s?

This week we are going to dive deep in this subject for the full hour with Captain C.C. Felker, USN, Professor of History at the US Naval Academy and author of, Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises, 1923–1940.

Listen live if you can or pick the show up later by clicking here or later from our iTunes page



For more than 200 years the U.S. Navy has been integral to the security and prosperity of the United States, evolving to meet the security and maritime needs of America. The Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) grew out of recognition that after 14 years of sustained combat operations for our deployed units, the resultant trends in maintenance and modernization execution, training time compression, deployment length increases and personnel churn were unsustainable. OFRP is designed to optimize a series of processes to generate a maximum amount of operational availability of our naval forces in order to deliver rotational forces; accomplish maintenance and modernization to achieve the service life of our platforms, and be able to surge forces. All of this must be accomplished while maintaining our normal operational tempo – in short “we have to reset in stride.” In order to meet that goal, OFRP creates a framework for predictable deployment cycles with aligned and stabilized manning, stable and predictable maintenance plans, and ready forces fully trained to the high-end level of the warfighting spectrum. This is no small challenge given our Navy’s global presence requirements, resource constraints, and force size. Meeting these challenges, today and in the future, mandates we optimize the processes of our supply-based readiness model by implementing OFRP.

CSG Alignment

The previous force generation model, the Fleet Response Plan (FRP), needed adjusting in order to more efficiently deliver ready forces for deployment; achieve the life-expectancy of our platforms and provide a more sustainable surge capability. The Optimized Fleet Response Plan provides the needed change to maximize readiness by aligning staffs, ships, and air wings to Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) at the beginning of a 36-month cycle. A key distinction in the OFRP instruction is the delineation of Carrier Strike Group Commanders and Amphibious Ready Group Commanders as the Supported Commanders. Previously, TYPE Commanders (TYCOMS) moved units through the Maintenance and Basic Phases of the training and readiness cycle, with a notional hand-off to the CSG Commander when the ships entered the Integrated Phase and began operating as a Carrier Strike Group. Today within the OFRP framework, all of the ships are brought under the CSG commander at the beginning of FRTP. According to Russ Williams, USFF Deputy Director for Fleet Training and the OFRP Cross-functional Team lead, this means that “The CSG, ARGS, and TYCOMS work together to ensure the readiness of that Strike Group given where they are in the OFRP phase.”

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower operationsUSS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) and the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group is the first aircraft carrier and Strike Group to implement OFRP, having entered into the first cycle of OFRP last fall, and initiating the Navy’s new strategy for force generation. The Ike CSG and all of its assigned units have been a complete team throughout the maintenance phase and into the basic and integrated phases of OFRP. As they prepare to deploy mid-2016, Ike CSG’s progress through OFRP reveals the benefits of the plan and what can be improved upon.

Maintenance and Modernization

One of the goals of a maintenance and modernization process is to achieve on time and on cost execution of the schedule. OFRP is designed to help stabilize and synchronize the execution of the maintenance and modernization of our fleet in order to achieve these two goals. The stabilization and synchronization leads to other benefits than predictability. Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus said to the House Armed Services Readiness Committee on Sept. 10, 2015, that he was confident the Navy is taking the right steps to get maintenance on track. “We’re going to be in a position to get the life span of the ships that you’d expect out of those ships when they enter the fleet.” This is in large part due to the Optimized Fleet Response Plan. Russ Williams stated that with OFRP maintainers are given more time to “dive into the planning phase of maintenance.” With more time to plan the maintainers ensure the efficiency of the phase. It appears OFRP sets up CSGs going through the process to achieve these goals, yet with all new processes there are some issues to work on. What makes OFRP different than previous force generation models is that it takes into account the Navy being a learning organization, and therefore fosters an environment of innovation for problem solving. “World events will cause changes to the production plan – if somebody’s maintenance gets extended beyond our ability to absorb it within the shock absorber that’s built into OFRP, we would have to adjust accordingly and modify the schedules,” Rear Admiral Jeffrey Harley told the House Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee. Issues in the maintenance phase faced by Ike CSG lead to four of the seven Ike CSG deployers experiencing unexpected delays. Russ Williams noted that the “industrial base simply cannot support eight or nine surface combatants going into maintenance at the same time and coming out at exactly the same time, but that isn’t the goal of OFRP, it isn’t designed to be that rigid.” This sort of issue highlights the importance of OFRP’s flexible yet disciplined approach to force generation. Each of these late deliveries created issues in the Basic Phase of Training that had secondary negative effects leading into the Integrated Phase of training. Meeting the issue head on, the Casualty Report to Certification Crosswalk (C3) process was developed to minimize the impact of the unexpected delays. This now helps ships identify, prioritize and facilitate maintenance solutions that enable the ships to complete their certification events on time, first pass. Russ Williams notes “It was never the OFRP intent to get everybody out of maintenance at the same time. It was an OFRP construct to get everybody to begin the Integrated Phase at the same time.” Mr. Williams went on to say that OFRP enables backlog to be rectified within the cycle. The OFRP process has led to some incremental material improvements within Ike CSG, yet Maintenance and Modernization remains a critical Line of Effort (LOE) that requires continued attention by naval leadership in order to ensure the Strike Group assets all enter the Integrated Phase on schedule.

Manning and Individual Training

USS Dwight D. Eisenhower operationsHistorically, ships have struggled to achieved their manning goals early in the pre-deployment work up, often receiving new Sailors “just in time” before the deployment, or prior to composite training unit exercise (C2X), the Integrated Phase capstone training event. This resulted in numerous x- deck personnel transfers, which sub-optimized the deploying unit’s readiness, hurt the manning of the ship remaining at home, and eroded the morale of the force. Sea-centric manning policies under OFRP prioritize personnel requirements to ensure forces are ready to deploy on schedule with the right Sailors in place fully trained. This policy mandates units be manned to 92% fit, 95% fill and at threshold for all critical naval enlisted classification code (NECs) by the target Manning Date, or “M-Date,” which is the start of Basic Phase or 12-months prior to deployment (if Basic phase starts earlier than that). This allows the necessary time for shipboard teams to form, train together, and build a cohesive warfighting team prior to deploying. It is because of this OFRP protocol that Ike CSG has seen the greatest improvement in the manning and individual training LOE. With deploying Sailors onboard earlier, OFRP ships in the Ike CSG were able to better manage their school requirements and ensure individuals received the training they needed prior to both the Basic and Integrated Phases. Additionally, direct support Sailors were assigned no later than nine months before deployment (D-9) which further enhanced the integration of off-ship personnel into the warfighting team. As a result, Strike Group warfighting syndicates were able to start developing during the Maintenance Phase, leading to early engagement and increased tactical training opportunities across the Strike Group. Having the right Sailors at the right time provides a more stable and predictable organization and ultimately leads to greater unit cohesion, experience, and development of the critical warfighting skills needed for deployment.

Training

A “side effect” of previous manning practices was that many times units may not be as well-trained as they could be. OFRP ensures forces are trained with the right capabilities and trained to a single, high-end standard. Unit level training during the Basic Phase is the critical foundation toward maximizing Strike Group combat effectiveness and efficiency. Optimizing the basic phase helps by giving time to identify and overcome possible shortfalls. For example, issues during the Maintenance Phase led to a compressed Basic Phase schedules for four of seven Ike CSG deploying ships. In order to lessen the impacts of these delays, the Maintenance-Operations Float Process was employed as part of a cross functional working group to identify risks to the mission – deploying on time and fully trained. This process leveraged the expanded relationships of all the stakeholders to mitigate the identified risks. For instance, both USS Monterey (CG-61) and USS Nitze (DDG-94), both a part of Ike CSG, conducted combined sea trials to regain time within their Basic Phase schedules. Additionally, through early engagement and collaboration with Afloat Training Group (ATG), CSG-4, and Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (NSMWDC), Ike CSG developed a group sail schedule. The schedule included Basic Phase events, and moved previous unit-level events that were historically conducted in C2X, forward into the Basic Phase, and added new Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical Training (SWATT) events early in the Integrated Phase. This collaborative effort will have allowed the entire Strike Group to get to C2X on time, fully prepared to train to the high-end level of tactical warfare.

160204-N-QD363-122In order to maximize the benefits of optimizing the basic phase Ike CSG utilized information technology and subject matter experts to help units meet their goals. Ike CSG used a Schedule Synchronization Tool (Integrated WEBSked), which is available to all stakeholders as required by USFF/CPF Instruction 3000.15A, and a Command Monitor/Mentor Process that together identifies areas where staff subject matter experts can provide assistance to individual units prior to ATG inspections or certification events. Implementation of this program has had an immediate impact on Strike Group units. Two ships, the USS Mason (DDG-87) and USS Stout (DDG-55), within Ike CSG, have completed the Basic Phase and according to ATG Atlantic, both of these ships performed above fleet average, which is attributed to the implementation of our Optimized Fleet Response Plan protocols.

Ike CSG was in the Integrated Phase of OFRP (as of the time of publishing this article), and there were some successes due to innovative measures to cope with early challenges brought about mostly by disaggregated ops being conducted within the FRTP cycle. For example, USS Oscar Austin (DDG-79) returned from a seven-month deployment during which she superbly executed national level tasking. Rejoining the Strike Group’s schedule, she met every Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual milestone, including her CNO Maintenance Availability. USS Porter (DDG-78) transferred to Sixth Fleet two weeks earlier than scheduled after completing a Joint Warrior exercise with British and NATO allies. She completed her first BMD patrol and did very well in her first maintenance availability overseas. USS McFaul (DDG-74) deployed with 91% FIT/97% FILL /1 in manning and no active C-2 CASREPs. She finished her Fifth Fleet deployment and escorted USS George Washington (CVN-73) through SOUTHCOM area of operations. These successes continue to show that OFRP allows for adaptation in order to ensure forces are ready to deploy with the right capabilities and trained to a high standard.

FRP Length

World events and our previous demand-based force generation model put stress upon Sailors and their families with long deployments, deferred and unpredictable ship maintenance schedules and unpredictable pre-deployment schedules. Chief of Navy Personnel, Vice Adm Moran said “We need to make sure we attract and retain the best people,” and he believes that the predictability and stability afforded by the Optimized Fleet Response Plan will help increase retention. OFRP provides stability and predictability, thus relieving stress and lessening uncertainty, to our Sailors and their families. Ike CSG has been scheduled for a seven-month deployment since entering OFRP. Despite 23 months of collective maintenance delays across the Strike Group, the scheduled deployment date has not shifted. The flexibility afforded by OFRP across the Strike Group has allowed the Ike CSG to absorb the maintenance delays and training schedule changes, while still tracking to the initial deployment date, fully trained to the high-end level of tactical warfare, creating a more predictable schedule for Sailors and their families.

Summary

At the outset, Navy leadership was clear that fully implementing OFRP across the Fleet would take time. As the first Strike Group to enter and execute the early cycles of OFRP, Ike CSG is laying the foundation for significant improvements throughout the entire process. The lessons learned have enabled the improvement of manning and training within the scope of the Strike Group; however, there is still work to be done in the maintenance and modernization LOE. While the performance in the Basic Phase continues well above average, the ultimate measures of effectiveness will be deployed performance. The Ike CSG goal is clear: to tactically outperform the Theodore and Harry S. Truman CSGs during the demanding and rigorous pre-deployment training and throughout deployment, and to have the Bush CSG outperform us. As a premier learning organization, only then will it be known if OFRP has been operationalized at the tactical level.



I recently spoke on a panel on combat integration held by the Service Women’s Action Network at a think tank in downtown Washington, DC. After the panel, I had the privilege of speaking with a group of midshipmen and young officers. During our conversation, one of the officers asked how to make organizational change happen. Without hesitating, I said, “Be willing to rock the boat and make your voice heard.” While my response may have seemed glib, it was actually quite genuine. As part of the military, we owe it to our respective services to speak out when we believe change is necessary. Admiring problems has never been a naval tradition. We need bold young officer and enlisted personnel to take up their pens as they would their swords to courageously identify problems and propose solutions for the betterment of the sea services. This is the essence of constructive dissent.

4th Marines Jump Through ITX 2-15While sitting at the airport a few weeks ago, I listened to a fascinating TED talk by Margaret Heffernan about courage. During her presentation, Ms. Heffernan discussed a survey of thousands of employees across Europe and the United States on organizational effectiveness in the corporate setting. The employees were all asked, “Are there issues people are afraid to talk about in your organization?” Astoundingly, she found that 85% of the employees responded yes, despite the fact that none of the employees taken any action to address the issues themselves. She called this phenomena willful blindness – the tendency of the vast majority of people to look the other way even when they know something is wrong.

In examining what makes the 15% willing to speak up when they see problems, Heffernan’s research revealed that job title and authority are not the determining factors in who demonstrates the courage to speak up. In fact, she found that many whistleblowers are often junior in rank, position, or experience, but are simply doggedly committed to making change happen. Most importantly, Heffernan determined that people with the courage to speak freely help create an organizational culture that makes it more permissible for individuals at every echelon in the chain of command to voice their concerns. It turns out that this up and down free flow of ideas and information is the way to reverse willful blindness and change organizational culture for the better. In my view, this is exactly the kind of environment the military aspires to, but more often than not, fails to achieve.

Heffernan’s TED talk and my discussion with the young officers after the combat integration event made me stop and think about this predicament. In the military, it often seems like senior ranking bright idea fairies are harder at work than anyone else. No matter our age or experience, every service member at one point or another has felt frustration about a policy or service mandate and wondered where the hare brained idea came from. But rather than raise our concerns in a constructive manner, most of us choose to gripe about the problem amongst friends and drive on with the tasks at hand. The question is why more service members do not recognize the value of using media forums to present their ideas and foster discourse and public debate. Simply put, each of us has the potential to be a change agent, because each of us has a hot button issue we feel passionately about. It doesn’t matter if you are officer or enlisted–anyone can spark a debate, simply by putting pen to paper.

In speaking to the midshipmen who attended the combat integration panel, I was struck by their versatility of thought and their willingness to step forward and talk to me about their ideas. The common thread to the conversations was an inherent frustration about the current “system” and a feeling of powerlessness to do anything to change it. But the reality is that you can’t simply think an idea up and expect change to happen. You have to be willing to expose the idea to criticism from others by talking about it and writing about it. Being willing to rock the boat means that you have to be willing to be vulnerable by putting your thoughts and ideas out there in the marketplace of ideas for others to refute (or potentially agree with!). You must have the courage to expose yourself to potential ridicule by others who may not share your point of view. But the beauty of having an idea shot down by someone with a dissenting view is that if your idea truly has merit, the opposing view will allow you to hone your own argument and make it stronger. Sadly, fear of rejection condemns most of us to the silent majority of problem admirers.

140718-N-TO519-002Luckily, one of the best ways for service members to stimulate constructive dissent is right at their fingertips – literally. By putting your ideas about why change is necessary out there in the marketplace of ideas for others to read and consider, you have the power to influence how decisions are made in your service. There are a number of credible forums devoted to the military readership, to include Proceedings and this blog. Further, using digital connectivity to vigorously advance a well-articulated idea ensures that an audience of hundreds of thousands of readers is just a click away. It has never been easier to become published. But first, you must put your pen to paper.

So what is the worst that could happen? That you go down in history as someone with the courage to speak up? What is more likely is that by speaking up, you will have individuals you have never met contact you to thank you for saying what they have been thinking for a while but just didn’t know how (or have the courage) to express. As Amelia Shaw, State Department employee and winner of the 2015 W. Averell Harriman Award for Constructive Dissent said, “But I can’t help wondering what the department would look like if there were more of us willing to speak up about issues that matter, large and small, regardless of whether or not we think we can actually change anything. Or as one senior officer pointed out to me, we dissent every day—but the difference is whom we dissent to and how far we are willing to go with it.”[i] So be bold. Speak up and let the sparks fly. With courage and conviction, you can move the world, and truly, this is the stuff of progress.


 

[i] Shaw, Amelia. Deconstructing Dissent. American Foreign Service Association, September 2015, http://www.afsa.org/deconstructing-dissent.



I was intrigued by the recent article under the ‘Charting a Course’ column. The notion of ‘geometry’ in a career is certainly an interesting one, and in the previous article it is formed by the relationship between the individual officer and the Detailers, with an aim to help the individual officer get what they want. We can extend the author’s concept of geometry to the relationship of all Officers with the Enterprise. As a supplemental lesson, I would like to present the ‘iron triangle’ of manpower.

doorfig1

Figure 1: The “Iron Triangle” of Operational manpower, modeled after expeditionary helicopter squadrons. At any given time, 36 LTs representing 3 year groups will ‘neck down’ to 12 Department Heads, eventually becoming 3 CO Selectees (CO, XO, PXO) Other community triangles may have different angles, but all follow the same basic geometry. This is stolen, of course, from the “iron triangle” of systems engineering, which consists of Weight, Strength and Cost.

While we can argue about selection policies for any given year group, in aggregate, the Operational Fleet as a whole cannot stray too far from the triangle. This structure is in our organizational DNA and attempting to change it would be folly. Actual selection rates should be slightly higher than the triangle, because some leave the Operational Fleet, either by separating or transitioning to staff/support functions.

If you are convinced that you will make it to the top of your operational triangle, I wish you all the best.

If you are not as certain as the average Charting a Course reader – or if you supervise someone who might not be certain – the next part applies to you:

Your Operational leaders don’t usually know very much about those who ‘evaporate’ from the triangle – i.e. escape from the sides. This is because everyone you deal with in an operational setting is by definition still inside. Here’s the insight and our second lesson in geometry – Corporate Navy is not a triangle but rather a ‘square’.

 doorfig2

Figure 2: The “Iron Triangle” in context with the overall ‘value ecosystem’. The challenge for talent management in the current epoch is to recapture those who exit the ‘white’ pyramid and put them into the Orange or Green triangles.

The challenge for the manpower system is to manage the box as a whole. Should the white triangle take priority? Absolutely. It should not do so to the complete disregard of the box. Picking and Paying for the equipment is neither (physically) dangerous or glamorous, but it does require competence – frequently in specialties that bring unique one-off skills to the Navy.

BONUS: Sometimes we don’t get what we want from the Detailing Process. Sometimes we wonder why our tours/careers/lives have taken the path they have, it is useful to recall Sherlock’s answer when Watson asks a similar question (His Last Vow, BBC, 2014)

Watson: What have I ever done? Hmm? My whole life, to deserve you?

Sherlock: Everything.

Watson: Sherlock, I told you. Shut up.

Sherlock: No, I mean it. Seriously. Everything, everything you’ve ever done is what you did. You were a doctor who went to war. Your best friend is a sociopath who solves crimes as an alternative to getting high…you’re addicted to a certain lifestyle! You’re abnormally attracted…to dangerous situations and people, so is it truly such a surprise that the woman you’ve fallen in love with conforms to that pattern?

We are who we are, or as Popeye the Sailor man would say:

I yam what I yam.

 



c5db817c565459e739af64f9cd6c617a9189b9eaLack of self-awareness. We all know people who suffer from this problem. Can organizations suffer from the same?

Let’s look at the basics of looking for problems and fixing them and see where it takes us.

As a firm believer in continuous improvement, no organization can remain excellent over time without clear, and often cutting, self-examination. Good, regular “preventative maintenance” is just solid leadership. When all is well, you want to make sure all is well. You inspect, measure, compare and report. If something is not what it should be, you correct and move on.

Sometimes, problems come to you before you can find them. At sea, in the air, or even in a car – you can often “feel” something is not quite right well before a light or alarm goes off. Sometimes it is obvious like a subtle shimmy or noise, other times obvious – but you never just ignore it, you investigate.

As is often the case, you may not find the cause of your unease on the first path you take in trouble-shooting. You try one thing for a certain period of time, and if that is not productive, you move on to another possibility. What you don’t do is to double down on an area of investigation that, in a reasonable period of time, shows you nothing that is wrong.

Most can agree with this. So, let’s move away from the practical area of trouble shooting to the other side of the brain, the bureaucratic method.

What if an organization created to fix a problem finds nothing, but in its search, exemplifies a greater problem that is infecting the entire organization?

Well, we may have that.

Behold, the Pentagon’s Office of the Senior Adviser for Military Professionalism;

(RADM Peg) Klein has spent nearly two years helping the services sharpen their professional development and leadership training. Her office was created in March 2014 by then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel amid a spate of scandals involving senior officers and mounting concerns of a systemic or cultural problem in the ranks. Those fears may have been overblown, she said.

“We’re not in a crisis. But this subject of human behavior requires constant attention,”

What have we found?

The slew of scandals that emerged a few years ago made for stunning headlines. A Navy corruption scandal. An Air Force major general who oversaw nuclear missiles was fired after his drunken bender on a visit to Moscow offended both his Russian hosts and his own staff. An Army four-star general was reprimanded for spending lavishly on official trips.

But Klein said those are anecdotal and she’s found no systemic or deeply rooted cultural problem. “We’re seeing numbers within historic norms,” she said.

OK. No crisis. Good intentions here though;

“We always want to be shooting for a target that decreases the incident rate.”

“We think the right answer is a little different for each service based on their heritage.”

Improvement. Good. What other subjective ideas have come up in two years? I say subjective, as I don’t see any metrics. What we know is that they like the Marines and the Army and all their schools. They think, ahem, that the Navy and USAF officers spend too much time … well … not going to school, I guess;

During the past two years, Klein and her seven-member staff have helped the Navy and Air Force set up their own centers: the Navy Leadership and Ethics Center at the Naval War College in Rhode Island and the Air Force’s Profession of Arms Center of Excellence at Joint Base San Antonio.

“Those two organizations are helping airmen and sailors to understand the importance of trust, humility, integrity, empathy. They are helping them understand those very important virtues of command,”

Let’s take a moment and let that soak in. Based on a staff of seven’s subjective service envy, we have set up schools that won’t touch but a few officers, to understand “trust, humility, integrity, empathy.”

If you have made it through the selection process for an officer program, OCS, NROTC, USNA, and go through at least one sea tour – and we as an organization do not know at a minimum that you are a trustworthy person with integrity – what are we doing? As for humility and empathy, neither one of those things can be taught, they can only be demonstrated.

I’ve worked a lot with Marines, Army, and Air Force personnel, and have served in their units as well. Do they have different cultures? Sure do. But …

“The Army and the Marine Corps have a very mature profession of arms,”

“The ground forces, they send really junior people into leadership positions. They have company command, they have O-3s going into command, and their professional identity is learned very early on,” Klein said, referring to the paygrade for captains in the Army, Marines and Air Force. Navy O-3s are lieutenants. Yet the Navy and the Air Force, historically, “are very technically focused,” she said.

That is an incredibly broad brush. I’m not sure what she is actually going for here. Is the implication that our Navy is “immature” in its professionalism? That your standard issue Navy O3 has no “professional identity?”

That might be true in isolation, but I don’t see that in any general way in the Navy than other services. A LTjg flying a EA-18G? A LTjg XO of a PC? A LT SEAL?

Do we need more LT and LCDR commands? Of course, and to our great shame we don’t, but I don’t think that is what her team is focused on.

… Klein found that the Army and Marine Corps created “centers of excellence” for commanders’ professional development, but the Navy and Air Force had not. These organizations develop training programs for current and future leaders that focus on the intangible virtues of leadership as well as more mundane matters like travel regulations, restrictions on accepting gifts and using official vehicles — issues that can cause headaches for some leaders and their staffs.

I’ll stop there. You can read the rest Andrew Tilghman’s bit over at MilitaryTimes. But after two years, the answer for the Navy and the Air Force is less time leading Sailors, forward deployed, honing their craft – but busy work ashore to make sure they don’t have issues with,

travel regulations, restrictions on accepting gifts and using official vehicles

This has nothing to do with “warfighting first” or building leaders, this has everything to do with trying to prevent bad news stories that evolve from fallen beings in an imperfect world making leadership read embarrassing stories like Fat Leonard in … MilitaryTimes.

Goodness knows we don’t want “some leaders” having headaches or their staff’s dealing with problems.

Shipmate, I’ve got news for you – the job of “some leaders” and their staff is just that – dealing with headaches. That is why they exist.

I am not impressed. We have no uptick in human failings, by her own admission, and are not in crisis, but we are acting as if we are in crisis. It begs the question, why?

If we are concerned about people with personality defects being promoted, then we need to stop promoting them. Do the regression analysis. More schooling is not going to make an adult suddenly have more empathy or humility. Look deeper in to a culture that promotes people with these problems. If we actually have one.

Do we have things in our Navy culture that needs improving? We sure do, but I don’t see anything in RADM Klein’s report that would do that except more LT commands.

Another thing we need to do is to know when we have dug a dry hole. Let’s go back to part of an earlier quote;

RADM (Peg) Klein has spent nearly two years helping the services sharpen their professional development and leadership training. Her office was created in March 2014 …

Wait for it;

She has asked Defense Secretary Ash Carter to extend its life through January 2017. “A little bit more time is a really inexpensive investment in getting traction in these ideas that we’re trying to institutionalize,” she said.

A few years ago, I tried to create a measure of time that would give proper context to the programs we keep shoveling money borrowed from our grandchildren in to. I called it a WorldWar, or WW.

A WW is the length of time it took to fight WWII. 1,366 days = 1 WW.

From March 2014 to Jan 2017, that is roughly .76 WW.

In ~3/4 the time it took us to fight WWII, we are going to have a 2-star and a staff of 7 look in to the cause of,

a spate of scandals involving senior officers and mounting concerns of a systemic or cultural problem in the ranks.

~.5 WW in to that investigation, the group realized that concerns were unfounded, but they liked their little exercise and wanted to extend its life by another 50% to see if they could find any more happys that needed to be put in to glads. Any light grey that needed to be dark grey.

If you are looking for cultural problems, you can start here. In a time where the US Navy is facing,

… a $7 billion reduction in fiscal 2017 funding – about 3.5 percent over last year’s plan … The Navy is planning on a uniformed force of 322,900 sailors in 2017, down from 327,300 authorized in 2016 and last year’s forecast of 326,500 for 2017. … the permanent elimination of a tenth carrier air wing and four aviation squadrons, and a new request to take seven cruisers out of service in 2017 …

… and we are trying to keep a Flag Officer project alive another year that, after two years, determined that the purpose for which it was created was unfounded, nothing is systemically broken, but they found some things they personally found interesting that they want to spend unknown millions of dollars to tinker with.

This staff has done its job. It has some recommendations – some that one could argue could have been discovered in a much quicker time. It is time to let it submit its report and to recode the manning document.

It has been .5 MM.

The Tamarians may have had, “Shaka, when the walls fell,” perhaps we can have, “Klein and Hagel on leadership.”



CAPT Cooper’s “Retaining Our Most Talented…To Fight And Win” is both exhilarating and empowering. As a SWO and Officer Recruiter (OR) for all 3 accession sources, provided are actionable recommendations to support PERS-41’s goals in front-end talent management.

For USNA/NROTC, the first sales pitch is at grey hull cruise. Deep engagement is necessary and a responsibility that lies with the COs of ships. The Midshipman Early Ship Selection Initiative is on-target to emphasize this priority.

Within Navy Recruiting Command, there are opportunities. The following are immediate impact changes that parallel the paradigm shift from ‘most willing’ to ‘most talented’ for recruiting:

  1. Allow SWO to be third or below choice on applications. Currently, if an applicant desires SWO behind two other communities, their application is an immediate nonselect, regardless of qualifications or desire to serve as a Naval Officer in any capacity. This creates a barrier to entry for competitive nonselects of Nuclear Power, Civil Engineer Corps and Naval Aviation (all of which are prioritized via incentives for ORs).
  2. If selected SWO before next higher board convenes, work with SWO ORs to push sale for acceptance vice waiting. Once the next community selects an applicant, the offer for SWO is retracted. Alternatively, remove requirement for ranking of programs until after boards convene.
  3. In some cases, the SWO application is more cumbersome than others. Because we are competing so extensively with other communities for talent, our application should be streamlined to the least common denominator. By removing recommendation letters and test requirements, for example, our checklist requirements would match the Nuclear Power and Civil Engineer Corps programs.
  4. Create Board Precept to be disseminated to the field outlining attributes desired by the initial talent pool as well as quantifiers for recruiter identification.
  5. Insert a structured interview with an O-3 or above SWO into the application process.

At the “identify” step, the perception among ORs is that the SWO program is leftovers. This perception is valid in that our ideal applicant is poorly defined compared to other communities. In reality, a SWO prospecting plan is nonexistent because the profile of a SWO top-performer prior to commissioning is unknown.

Beyond the horizon, SWO can differentiate itself by evolving our selection process. Doing so will create a competitive advantage over other communities. While the rest focus on GPA and test scores, the opportunity exists to emulate Fortune 500 companies utilizing job analysis to identify which behavioral competencies are most suitable for their organization and then structuring selection to hire individuals with those attributes.

The OR is our strike capability. If we make SWO distinguishable and recognizable to them, via development and formal communications, the probability of a sale for SWO over another program when better fit exists will increase and reduce the risk that applicants choose another program when SWO may best serve them. This will allow us to attack effectively first in this zero-sum game of talent acquisition.



Please join us at 5pm (EST) on 24 Jan 16 for Midrats Episode 316: “Getting Female Combat Integration Right With LtCol Kate Germano”

How do we get combat integration of women right? The quest has moved well away from “if” and in to “how.”

With an apparent broad disconnect between biological realities, cultural norms, and political desires, what is the right way for military leaders to carry out their orders while ensuring that combat effectiveness is maintained.

Our guest to discuss this and related issues for the full hour will be Lieutenant Colonel Kate Germano, USMC.

Commissioned in August 1996, LtCol Germano has served for over 19 years on active duty in the United States Marine Corps. A combat veteran, she additionally participated in numerous operational and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief deployments. Ashore, her duties including a year as the Marine Aide to the Secretary of the Navy.

She was selected for command twice, most recently as the commanding officer of the Marine Corps’ only all-female unit, the 4th Recruit Training Battalion. She holds a bachelor’s degree from Goucher College, where she majored in History with a pre-law emphasis. In 2011, she graduated with distinction from the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, earning her Masters of Military Science degree. She is actively engaged in the struggle to end gender bias in the military, and is a vocal proponent for equal rights and the elimination of double standards and lowered expectations for female conduct and performance.

Join us live or pick the show up later by clicking here. You can also pick up the later from our iTunes page here.



Over the past several months, senior naval leaders have highlighted the importance of organizational learning to accelerate innovation and adapt to future challenges. For instance, the SECNAV noted the confluence of people, ideas and information as the foundation of the DON’s Innovation Vision; Admiral Richardson introduced his concept of “accelerated learning” in A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority; and LtGen Walsh unveiled the Marine’s “campaign of learning” in a speech at CSIS. However, many internal barriers must be addressed to fully implement their vision.

The concept of a learning organization has been discussed in management circles for several decades. Yet there is no consensus on a standard definition nor are the steps to build one clear. A 1993 Harvard Business Review article by Professor David Garvin serves as a useful starting point for the Naval Services to consider.

Garvin defines a learning organization as, “…an organization skilled at creating, acquiring, and transferring knowledge, and at modifying its behavior to reflect new knowledge and insights.” Garvin also identifies five building blocks to create such an organization. They are:

Systemic Problem Solving: This first activity rests heavily on the scientific method, wide use of data and statistical tools. Most training programs focus primarily on problem-solving techniques, using exercises and practical examples. Accuracy and precision are essential for learning. Employees must therefore become more disciplined in their thinking and more attentive to details. They must continually ask, “How do we know that’s true?”, recognizing that close enough is not good enough if real learning is to take place. They must push beyond obvious symptoms to assess underlying causes, often collecting evidence when conventional wisdom says it is unnecessary. Otherwise, the organization will remain a prisoner of “gut facts” and sloppy reasoning, and learning will be stifled.

Experimentation: This activity involves the systematic searching for and testing of new knowledge. Experimentation is usually motivated by opportunity and expanding horizons, not by current difficulties. It takes two main forms: ongoing programs and one-of-a-kind demonstration projects. Ongoing programs normally involve a continuing series of small experiments, designed to produce incremental gains in knowledge. Demonstration projects are usually larger and more complex than ongoing experiments. They involve holistic, system-wide changes, introduced at a single site, and are often undertaken with the goal of developing new organizational capabilities. Because these projects represent a sharp break from the past, they are usually designed from scratch, using a “clean slate” approach.

Learning from past Experience: Companies must review their successes and failures, assess them systematically, and record the lessons in a form that employees find open and accessible. Unfortunately, too many managers today are indifferent, even hostile, to the past, and by failing to reflect on it, they let valuable knowledge escape. A study of more than 150 new products concluded that “the knowledge gained from failures [is] often instrumental in achieving subsequent successes… In the simplest terms, failure is the ultimate teacher.”

Learning from Others: Not all learning comes from reflection and self-analysis. Sometimes the most powerful insights come from looking outside one’s immediate environment to gain a new perspective. Enlightened managers know that even companies in completely different businesses can be fertile sources of ideas and catalysts for creative thinking. At these organizations, enthusiastic borrowing is replacing the “not invented here” syndrome.

Transferring Knowledge: For learning to be more than a local affair, knowledge must spread quickly and efficiently throughout the organization. Ideas carry maximum impact when they are shared broadly rather than held in a few hands. A variety of mechanisms spur this process, including written, oral, and visual reports, site visits and tours, personnel rotation programs, education and training programs, and standardization programs.

To some extent the naval services are already engaged in these activities but significant improvement is needed if we are to turn these efforts into a real competitive advantage. Several internal challenges need to be addressed to become the learning organization envisioned by our senior leaders. Here is a short list:

Culture: Dr. Frank Hoffman recently noted that the Navy’s learning culture was essential for overcoming the challenges of countering German U-Boats in WWII. According to Hoffman, “Brutally candid post-exercise critiques occurred in open forums in which junior and senior officers examined moves and countermoves. These reflected the Navy’s culture of tackling operational problems in an intellectual, honest, and transparent manner.” To regain this learning culture, two issues must be addressed: fostering an environment of candor and preventing organizational hubris, often buttressed by questionable models or rhetoric intended to defend programs of record, from lulling leaders into a false sense of security. Learning cannot begin if we cannot have candid conversations about what is working and what needs to be fixed. The best agile organizations today continually use stress-testing of plans and strategies to identify areas for improvement.

Incentives: Many individuals and organizations view knowledge as a source of power. Therefore, the more knowledge one collects and retains, the more one’s standing and influence increases. In Team of Teams, General McChrystal examines this issue through a game-theory lens. In a “knowledge-is-power” environment, those who share knowledge are considered the losers, while those who receive knowledge are winners. We must create the right incentives to change this behavior by rewarding those who put effort in to sharing knowledge and penalize those who hoard knowledge or prevent information from being shared.

Outdated Tools and Policies: Since the advent of the internet, senior leaders have called for shifting from a “need-to-know” approach to a “need-to-share”. Unfortunately, this shift is difficult to achieve because of outdated information-centric policies, exaggerated treats, and risk-averse leaders. The workforce must have the proper tools and effective policies so knowledge transfer can occur easily and risk is realistically considered. Further, we must resolve how to capture the great ideas of our talented workforce and share our problems with public. Our naval culture and our desire to solve problems internally often prevent us from sharing our complex problems with “outsiders”. This practice prevents novel solutions from entering our decision making cycle.

Undefined Learning Ecosystem: Pockets on knowledge and learning exist across the DON but sharing is often stove-piped by organizational boundaries. Many organizations created the position of Knowledge Managers but their effectiveness is inconsistent and there is no strategy to create a “knowledge CO-OP” across the organization. Having an enterprise-wide strategy would prevent duplication of effort in knowledge generation and permit learning from other’s experience. The DON must create a learning ecosystem, with the appropriate infrastructure, tools, and practices that enables us to become an organization skilled at creating, acquiring, and transferring knowledge, and at modifying its behavior to reflect new knowledge and insights.

Having senior leaders champion these issues today is an important first step to develop this important capability. However, the organization needs to move with a sense of urgency and not treat learning as another passing fad or simply leave organizational learning to happenstance. The digital natives entering the workforce today are knowledge sharers by nature. If no improvements are made to the issues discussed above, they will go “outside the wire” to collaborate on work related issues. This will increase risk and detract from organizational learning.

The Department of Navy possesses an incomprehensible amount of data, information, knowledge and practical experience; all are underpinned by a wealth of naval history from which to learn. We must place a priority on creating a learning organization and turn this concept into a true competitive advantage for the future.



21st

Dissent

January 2016

By

The most dangerous threat to the safety and welfare of a nation is blind compliance. Nowhere is this more important than in the military where we have seen innumerable historical examples of the pitfalls befalling militaries unable to foster creativity and unwilling to accept change.

In the last fifty years, the American military has so embraced indoctrination, discipline, and obedience that it has strayed from its most important cornerstone principle: the spirit of rebellion. Our heroes have demonstrated those most important components of a successful military: educated dissent and independent action. We are steeped in fear of an environment overtaken by austerity; the mere possibility of consequence has transformed us into the very forces we have defeated in past wars. In our litigious, untrusting, and self-defeating system we have lost ourselves.

To bring back the true power of our military, we must look to the training pipelines that develop our junior officers. These officers must face an outdated system with a willingness to engage in honest evaluation and change as necessary. To reinvigorate the greatness of the American maritime forces, a culture which promotes honest, educated, and respectful dissent is desperately needed.

Creating the Culture

I am marked by even my brief tenure in the military. I have felt pride, shame, determination, and defeat in rapid and unpredictable succession since I first sought a commission. I am certainly not alone in cramming all of this experience into just a few intense years, which is why so many officers are deeply affected by their time in the service. Nowhere else are consequences so dire and immediate. Most of my civilian peers will have to wait a long time to learn lessons I am already tired of repeating. Success and failure in the private marketplace for most of my peers is a small gain here, a disappointment there. The reality of our lives is so exaggerated by the authority we bear in the military that it marks us permanently. The impression left behind brands us for life, no matter where we wander.

Therefore, it is the duty of senior officers to create and foster a service for which we can be proud. Yet, in reality, we are so crippled by many of the long standing bad habits of bureaucracy that this responsibility has faded to an unrecognizable nuisance.

Officers follow a predictable life cycle. We are born of idealism, suffer as those who have gone before us, and are faced with a choice: We can either become part of the system which has robbed us of much of our original intent and in so doing become a party to the suffering of future versions of ourselves, or we can leave. The problem with the off ramp is that it denies us the power to affect change. The system is victimized by officers being crushed under the unnecessary and obsolete practices of the very leaders who once spurned against it. Their strong-willed ideas for improvement are silenced before they are in a position to enact change. The system must reflect the opinions of the best and brightest, and embrace good ideas without regard for rank of the originator. We must build new and better habits to that end.

Encouraging Dissent

There are a handful of moments which have illuminated the problem for me; the common theme among them is dissent.

It took me a long time to realize that was the key, but my commanding officer reflected on it one day. We were trying to make a decision and I was filling in for my department head at a meeting. Two plans were briefed: the first clearly made more sense than the others for many of the departments, but it did not allow my department time to fulfill our requirements; the second meant accepting a slightly less-optimal plan for the other departments, but would allow my department time to succeed.

When we went around the table, only I supported the second plan, and rather than show any sort of creative friction in front of our commanding officer, only the first plan was presented to the CO. When agreement became the goal in order to please our commanding officer, instead of offering him honest information, we lost something crucial. In the end, though we strived valiantly, the plan failed because my department failed.

Similarly, in an ethics class as a midshipman, we were presented with a mission to take a small team out for reconnaissance. During the hypothetical mission, we were notified of a possible chemical attack and donned our protective gear. In the oppressive heat, and with no way to test for the presence of the weapon, we had to decide which member of the team to unmask to test if it was safe to remove the oppressive protective gear. Knowing only their rank and positions on the team, someone had to be put in harm’s way. Many decided to unmask themselves as the officer in charge and the few who protested were quickly silenced. The mission crumbled beneath the weight of their conscience.

Though these examples are not perfect, what we should be learning is how to make hard decisions and why it is worthwhile to endure the consequences. Silence, compliance, and timidity masquerade themselves as loyalty, humility and teamwork. If we are indeed born of idealism, it is no wonder that it perishes so early in our careers. The opportunity to dissent, respectfully and when the situation calls for it, should be something senior leadership desires. It helps keep all of us honest if truth outranks simple agreement.

Strength Through Dissent

The military needs a more comprehensive way of testing not just the intelligence of incoming officers, but their ability to think logically and critically. Many eligible and interested young adults in America are intelligent, but that is only a part of what goes into the potential to be a great leader. To cultivate a culture that supports dissention and allows for an honest exchange of information, what we need is not more intelligent officers, but something more difficult to identify. We must find those willing to disagree and be disagreed with without being unpleasant, and are wary of those who would take advantage of such liberties. By recruiting officers who are passionate about this common expectation and preserving that attitude past their initial commitment, we can build a stronger wardroom rather than simply a more intellectually entrenched one.

Innovation is the backbone of enterprise and resilience. As early as the training pipeline, prospective officers must be taught how and when to present different and ideas. If things do not make sense, officers should be encouraged to ask questions. This is far more difficult to teach and enforce; it opens up the door for perceived recalcitrance and disrespect. Yet instead of being threatened by improvement and boldness, we must seek those out as positive traits and put people willing to speak hard truths in positions of authority. A person who is courageous enough to speak the truth is worthy of our trust, whereas a person who would rather meekly go along does not fully serve our strong, modern military.

We are a country which prides itself on our rebellious spirit; a culture of dissent is only fitting for the military which protects it. We must be strong enough to stand up to poor ideas, to change systems which are not working, and to address those among us who are ill suited to the position. We must develop an unwavering desire to seek the best solutions and not simply the least offensive ones. Founded on the value of the opinion of the unheard, our country blossomed from a culture open to disagreement; its military should as well.

Ultimately, although decision making authority is and should be retained by senior officers, open solicitation of honest input from junior officers should be embraced and encouraged. What we need is not a delegation of authority, but a culture which values varied input and courageous officers.

In the military today, that rebellious spirit is strangled by the conformity required to attain promotion. This has cost us good leaders and good policy. It has kept us stuck in patterns we know are ineffective. It has led my peers to write scathing articles condemning the military’s unyielding ways as a final farewell to a career of which they were once so proud. If we want to keep the officers who see the system clearly, care enough to want reform, and are capable of bringing it about, then it is time to dissent.

Our forefathers were rebels. We are not a country of meek sheep, caring so much for ourselves that we cower before authority. The greatest Americans are those who revolt against the unfair, the outdated, and the unacceptable. Instead of teaching our fledgling officers to fall in line, why not teach them to respectfully disagree? It is time to embrace the foundations upon which our military and country were built. It is time for dissent.



DSC00384 copyJanuary 5th marked Commodore Stephen Decatur’s 237th birthday. Decatur was the most celebrated American naval hero of the post-Revolutionary War era. If not for his untimely death at the age of 41, many believe he would have been elected President of the United States.

In honor of his recent birthday, I think it appropriate to take a moment to remember some of Decatur’s career, reflect on his legacy, and consider how we might go about producing more leaders like him.

First let’s talk about Stephen Decatur’s naval education and the early wartime exploits which made him a household name. The son of a merchant captain, Decatur obtained an appointment as midshipman in 1798. He served aboard USS United States, captained by his good friend and mentor John Barry. Barry was a hero of the Revolutionary War, and is recognized as the American Navy’s first flag officer. Decatur was also tutored by Talbot Hamilton, a former officer of the Royal Navy who instructed him in navigational and nautical sciences. While serving aboard United States, Decatur received formal naval training not only from Hamilton, but through active service aboard a commissioned ship. This experience, as well as his continuing education aboard other ships, would serve him well when it came time for him to lead in combat.

Before I recount Decatur’s heroism in battle, let’s briefly set the stage. In 1801, President Thomas Jefferson sent our nation’s tiny naval force to the Mediterranean to protect our expanding trade against the Barbary pirates, who had long demanded ransom for the safe passage of our merchant ships. President Jefferson’s refusal to pay for safe passage led Tripoli to declare war against the United States. “Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute” became our rallying cry for the ensuing conflict – the First Barbary War.

On 23 December 1803, only a month into his command of the schooner Enterprise, Lieutenant Stephen Decatur and his crew captured the Tripolitan ketch Mastico as she sailed from Tripoli to Constantinople under Turkish colors. Mastico had taken part in the capture of the frigate USS Philadelphia earlier that year, and was thus deemed a legitimate prize. Refitted and renamed USS Intrepid, she was taken into service under Lieutenant Decatur’s command.

Because of her appearance, the Intrepid was well-suited to enter Tripoli’s harbor, where Philadelphia remained, without raising suspicion. In February 1804, Decatur sailed the Intrepid close enough to the captured Philadelphia for his crew, a detachment of U.S. Marines, to board, capture, and burn the frigate, which was not seaworthy. The mission was executed flawlessly, and subsequently deprived Tripoli of a powerful warship. Lord Horatio Nelson, then a Vice Admiral in the British Royal Navy, called Decatur’s mission “the most bold and daring act of the age.”

DSC00373 copyLater in 1804, during a month of sustained attacks on Tripoli, Decatur’s younger brother, James Decatur, was mortally wounded by a Tripolitan captain while boarding a corsair feigning surrender. Stephen Decatur received word quickly, and diverted his own vessel to the corsair to exact revenge. He was the first to board the Tripolitan ship, outnumbered five-to-one, but ready for a fight. Decatur immediately found the man who had wounded his brother. The Tripolitan captain outweighed him by 40 pounds, but Decatur ferociously thwarted the captain with his cutlass and after a direct hand-to-hand fight, killed him with his pistol. The story of this fight made Decatur a household name, shaping the image of our still developing U.S. Navy.

For his leadership and bravery in the First Barbary War, Stephen Decatur became the youngest naval officer in history to be promoted to captain at the age of 25. His naval career continued far beyond this initial success. Decatur would further distinguish himself while fighting in the War of 1812 and the Second Barbary War. He would achieve the rank of commodore and serve on the Board of Navy Commissioners until his death in 1820 following a duel with another naval officer.

The story of Decatur’s life and career is a rich one – I’ve only scratched the surface here. Now let’s explore how and where he is remembered. Beyond the 48 cities and seven counties named for Decatur, the longest road on the Naval Academy’s 338-acre campus is named Decatur Road. The road ends next to Preble Hall, the Naval Academy’s Museum, which is named for Commodore Edward Preble, under whose command Decatur fought in the First Barbary War. Adjacent to both Decatur Road and Preble Hall sits the Tripoli Monument, the oldest military monument in the United States. It was carved in Italy in 1806, and moved to the Naval Academy in 1860. The Tripoli Monument honors six heroes of the First Barbary War, including James Decatur, Stephen’s brother.

Another name on the monument is Richard Somers, who died aboard the same USS Intrepid that Decatur captured and used to sneak into Tripoli’s harbor. Somers was a close friend and midshipman with Decatur aboard United States, and assumed command of Intrepid one month after James Decatur was killed. Intrepid had been fitted as a “floating volcano,” loaded down with 100 barrels of powder and 150 shells. The plan was to sail her into Tripoli’s corsair fleet, light a 15-minute fuse, and abandon ship before she exploded. Unfortunately, the Intrepid exploded prematurely, killing her entire crew of volunteers.

I mention Richard Somers because six U.S. Navy ships have been named the USS Somers in his honor, the second of which has a crucial connection to the Naval Academy. In December 1842, Midshipman Philip Spencer, son of Secretary of War John C. Spencer, was hanged for intention to commit a mutiny aboard USS Somers. This high profile hanging became known as the Somers Affair, and contributed to the decision to create a land-based academy where midshipmen could learn their craft instead of doing so only at sea.

The same midshipman experience which greatly benefitted Stephen Decatur was not always as successful. The United States Naval Academy, established in 1845 by Secretary of the Navy George Bancroft, would seek to formalize a curriculum for aspiring naval officers, producing a fresh crop of talented leaders each year. 170 years later, the scope of our operation has changed, but our goal hasn’t. I mentioned earlier that Decatur had his own tutor aboard the United States to teach him the technical skills and naval science he would need to succeed as a naval officer, and eventually as a naval commander. He also had on-the-job training aboard a real ship, filled with opportunities to practice and hone his craft. That’s exactly what we endeavor to provide today’s Naval Academy midshipmen, and how we go about developing leaders has been my number one priority since taking over as Superintendent.

My major focus is experiential leadership. Leadership cannot be taught exclusively in the classroom. The technical skills required of a competent leader can be learned at a desk in many cases, but that’s not enough. Leader development must be immersive. It takes repetition, with allowance for failure and success. It’s also all about being given the opportunity to try, fail, try again, and eventually succeed when the stakes are manageable. Today’s midshipmen get a world-class education from our outstanding faculty, just as Decatur had Talbot Hamilton – a seasoned officer of the Royal Navy – to keep him on track. But they also get chances to lead, be it aboard smaller ships during summer training or amongst their peers in the Brigade leadership structure.

DSC00390 copyI don’t know exactly how many modern day Decaturs I have in the Brigade, but I am confident that we provide the conditions and the opportunities for our future Navy and Marine Corps heroes to thrive and grow. Time and again, Stephen Decatur found himself where the action was. Time and again, he proved himself with his leadership and bravery. I am confident that our next generation of leaders will be up to the task as well.

I’d like to end with a brief mention of my own distant connection to Decatur. His first full command was the USS Enterprise, fighting piracy to protect American trade. The Enterprise he commanded was the third U.S. Navy ship of its name. My most recent fleet command was the Enterprise Carrier Strike Group (CSG-12), whose centerpiece was the eighth USS Enterprise. In 2012, I took the Enterprise on her 21st and final deployment in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and – yes – multiple anti-piracy missions. Soon, the keel for CVN-80, the ninth USS Enterprise, will be laid, extending the connection to Decatur for thousands of future Sailors who will follow his legacy.

Times have changed since Decatur proved himself a naval hero, but the principles for which we fight have remained constant. I’ll leave you with the oft-misquoted and misapplied words of Decatur himself, a post-dinner toast at a social gathering in April 1816. “Our country – In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be in the right; and always successful, right or wrong.”



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