Archive for the 'Coast Guard' Category
In the August issue of Proceedings, Commander Darcie Cunningham, USCG complains about the personality traits brought to the naval service by millennials and gives advice on how to better assimilate them into the ranks [For other responses to the article see here and here]. I find the article incredibly condescending and patronizing with a hint of fear of impending irrelevance in a world that the Commander does not want to see change. Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of remaining stagnant. The world is continuously changing. Our great nation is continuously changing. Our long tradition of citizen soldiers demands that we change with it.
I currently serve on a multi-generational crew with a hearty presence from generation X (those born between the early 1960s to 1980). They have stood a solid watch and I firmly respect how their service strengthened American seapower, but they are less dynamic than the current generation. They cling to inefficient means of communication and are more concerned with “work ethic” than the quality of product produced. This generation has me questioning how they can adapt in today’s rapidly changing world.
Here are some of their behaviors I have noticed:
• While the younger generation is more concerned with quality product, the older generation views a correlation with performance and hours worked. Given the same quality of results, they see laziness and a lack of dedication instead of efficiency.
• Along the same lines as correlating product with hours worked, they also would much rather see a more experienced individual be promoted over one vastly more skilled and qualified. They view accelerated advancement as an affront to their culture of advancement through keeping their head down and staying out of trouble. To them it is much better to be cautious and safe than tenacious and bold.
• They do not understand the need for the younger generation to know the basis behind requirements. The younger generations sees power through knowledge and asks why in hopes of finding a way to improve the status quo. The older generation is more apt to simply accept the way things have always been and can devolve to a frustrated “because I said so,” when asked for an explanation from subordinates.
Whether the older generation likes it or not, millennials are currently leaders within our organization. We are serving with discipline and dedication equal to those who have come before us, but we are doing it our own way. We will continue to preserve the liberties this country enjoys. So how does the structured military culture adapt to our new generation?
First, we must educate them on the benefits of promoting based on merit and not time in grade. The current antiquated system lets more competent individuals await their turn while they watch the less skilled continued to advance once it is their time to promote. If this merit-based promotion idea does not sit well with some members of the older generation, perhaps it is a subtle concern that they needed a time-based system to make it as far as they did. Job satisfaction should be the motivator for retention, not scare tactics of a poor economy and poor unemployment rate.
They need to be “course-corrected” that a desire to understand the basis for requirements and wanting to improve how we do things are NOT insubordination or disrespect. If this does not happen, our best will continue to be driven out and the military will remain a carbon copy of what it looks like now. Once we stop adapting we will most surely become irrelevant. The only way we can improve is if we ask if there is a better way and have an open and honest discussion about it. Progress has always been seen as a threat to the present. It takes courage to move forward as an organization.
I am very appreciative the older generation of senior leaders made sure the United States continues to rule the seas. They did an amazing job and they all deserve our thanks and respect. Their way of doing business worked, but previous performance does not guarantee future success. There are sure to be aspects of the current way of doing business and we should figure out what those are, but blindly maintaining the status quo is a sure way to fail.
Is the profession of arms, as the Navy believes it is, primarily a technical job for officers – or is it something else?
To create the cadre of leaders one needs, do you train them as empty vessels that one only needs to fill up with what you want or an empty checklist to complete – or do you train them by helping them bring out their ability to lead and make decisions through informed critical thinking?
Our guest for the full hour to discuss this and more will be Major Matt Cavanaugh, USA. Matt is currently assigned as an Assistant Professor in military strategy at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.
Prior to this assignment, Matt was a Strategic Planner at the Pentagon, after service with the with Second Squadron, Third Armored Cavalry Regiment with multiple deployments to Iraq from Fallujah, Ramadi, and Tal’Afar.
Matt earned his Master’s in Strategic Studies at Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand and is currently at work on a PhD dissertation on generalship at the University of Reading (UK). He is a Fellow at the Center for the Study of Civil Military Operations, has been published with several peer-reviewed military and academic journals, and is the Editor at WarCouncil.org, a site dedicated to the study of the use of force. Matt has represented the United States in an official capacity in ten countries, including: Iraq, Kuwait, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Latvia, and Great Britain.
Matt is the author of the blog essays Ten Questions West Point Does Not Ask Cadets – But Should, Another Ten Questions West Point Does Not Ask Cadets – But Should, and What Cadets Should Study – and Why Military History is Not Enough.
Join us live at 5pm (U.S. EDT) on Sunday, 29 June 2014 or pick up the show later by clicking here.
Since WWII, have we developed an officer corps that has not only developed a record of defeat, but has become comfortable with it?
Is our military leadership structurally unsound?
In his recent article, An Officer Corps That Can’t Score, author William S. Lind makes a scathing indictment of the officer corp of the United States in from the structure is works in, to its cultural and intellectual habits.
We will have the author with us for the full hour to discuss this and more about what problem he sees with our military’s officers, and what recommendations he has to make it better.
Mr Lind is Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation, with degrees from Dartmouth College in 1969 and Princeton University.
He worked as a legislative aide for armed services for Senator Robert Taft, Jr. and Senator Gary Hart until joining the Free Congress Foundation in 1987.
Mr. Lind is author of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Westview Press, 1985); co-author, with Gary Hart, of America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform (Adler & Adler, 1986); and co-author, with William H. Marshner, of Cultural Conservatism: Toward a New National Agenda (Free Congress Foundation, 1987).
Mr. Lind co-authored the prescient article, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” which was published in The Marine Corps Gazette in October, 1989 and which first propounded the concept of “Fourth Generation War.”
Join us live at 5 pm EDT if you can or pick the show up for later listening by clicking here .
The famous polar explorer Richard Byrd once said, “As long as any part of the world remains obscure, the curiosity of man must draw him there, as the lodestone draws the mariner’s needle, until he comprehends its secret.”1
The Coast Guard has a long history of operating in the Arctic spanning from the purchase of Alaska to present day. In 1867 the Revenue Cutter LINCOLN was deployed to Alaskan waters to gain understanding of the newly acquired territory initiating a Coast Guard tradition of Arctic exploration.
Coast Guard icebreakers have supported scientific research in both the Arctic and Antarctic for decades and Coast Guard Cutters HEALY and POLAR STAR proudly continue this legacy. Recently Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak, under the 17th Coast Guard District, came into the fold and began providing a platform of opportunity for various members of the scientific community in the form of the HC-130H Hercules. With the increase in focus on the Arctic, the need to understand this foreboding region and to further the efforts to do so have never been greater. It is in the best interest of the country, in line with national, defense and Coast Guard strategic objectives, and necessary to ensure long term success of the Coast Guard, to support scientific research in the Arctic.
The Beginning of Coast Guard Arctic Domain Awareness Flights
Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak began conducting Arctic Domain Awareness (ADA) missions in 2007. The original intent was to increase U.S. and Coast Guard presence in the Arctic via the HC-130H Hercules while simultaneously exposing aircrews to the challenges and intricacies of operating in this high-latitude environment. The earliest missions were relatively simple, if any operation in the Arctic can be labeled as such, flying the Alaska coastline, noting strategic airfields and geographic points along the way. There were, however, missions of higher visibility such as the October 2007 flight to the North Pole and gradually they evolved to encompass numerous objectives including scientific support.
In 2008, University of Washington scientists, many of whom had worked extensively from Coast Guard icebreakers in the past, reached out to the Coast Guard 17th District and Air Station Kodiak to investigate the feasibility of deploying a series of data collecting buoys from the ADA flights for the interagency-sponsored International Arctic Buoy Program (IABBP). With keen foresight the 17th District supported this request and in 2009 the first delivery of an Airborne eXpendable Ice Beacon (AXIB) by a Coast Guard HC-130H was accomplished.
The deployment of this automated floating weather station, which transmits its data through the Iridium satellite communications system for years at a time, initiated a burgeoning partnership and marked the beginning of a new Arctic exploration opportunity for the scientific community.
The Growing Need for Arctic Accessibility for the Scientific Community
The current National Strategy for the Arctic Region states that, “Vast areas of the Arctic Ocean are unexplored, and we lack much of the basic knowledge necessary to understand and address Arctic issues. The changes in the Arctic cannot be understood in isolation and must be viewed in a global context.”2
Furthermore the Coast Guard’s Arctic Strategy, released in May of 2013 describes the need to “assist government-sponsored scientific exploration to develop a greater understanding of the changing Arctic environment”3
These statements highlight the fact that there is a significant amount about the Arctic that is unknown, and science is working to keep up with this changing environment.
“Every year the Arctic sea ice cover expands during the fall, winter and spring to a maximum extent essentially covering the whole Arctic Ocean. Over the summer, it retracts to a minimum in September. The most remarkable aspect of Arctic environmental change is that the minimum (September) extent has declined faster than climate models predict over the last two decades, reaching a new record minimum in 2012,”4 said Dr. James Morison, principal investigator of the Seasonal Ice Zone Reconnaissance Survey (SIZRS) project.
The explanation for this observed extra-rapid decline is a critical scientific question. The absence or presence of ice in any particular place in the Arctic is controlled by two different factors, thermodynamics and the kinetic effects of wind and sea currents. Measuring these two factors has become increasingly essential for answering that question. The balance of these two factors form the base of much of the scientific exploration of the Arctic, but the way in which they do or do not work together has a great effect on ice extent. If a major storm event forces ice out of the Arctic Basin, the greater amount of exposed, open water present allows more solar radiation to be absorbed into the sea rather than being reflected off a frozen surface. This added heat melts more ice from below creating more open water in a vicious cycle termed ice-albedo feedback. Further, the reduction in ice thickness and coverage makes the ice more responsive to the wind and more wind energy that is converted into wave action, which can further break up the ice. It is also theorized that the increase in ocean heat can affect the growth of ice well into the next year.
The increasing sea ice retreat in the summer increases the potential for ship transport and offshore resource exploitation off the coast of Alaska, and this increases the need for better predictions of ice conditions in the seasonal ice zone. The quality of these model-based predictions is critically dependent on knowing the initial conditions at the beginning of the melt season. However, the vast bulk of measurements are made in late August and September when conditions allow traditional icebreaker operations. This limit precludes surface-based observations in the critical May-June timeframe. According to Dr. Morison,
“Only ocean sections with aircraft expendable probes and buoys beginning in May or June repeated throughout the melt season can give the information we need to understand and ultimately predict the evolution of the seasonal ice zone.”5
Coast Guard Hercs Answer the Call
Building on early successes, ties with the University of Washington and the Coast Guard through Air Station Kodiak have grown increasingly intertwined. The number of missions has expanded dramatically from one or two in the first test years to nine missions in 2013. To date five research sensors are deployed by Kodiak based Hercules crews.
The previously mentioned AXIB and the Upper Temperature of the Ocean (UpTempO) are buoys that are designed to survive for months at a time sending vital data on the atmospheric and ocean via satellite. The Aircraft Expendable Conductivity Temperature Depth (AXCTD) and Aircraft Expendable Current Profiler (AXCP) are probes that are deployed in leads in the ice at strategic stations in the Beaufort Sea and radio back to receivers on the aircraft information on the water’s temperature, salinity and current down to a depth of 1000 meters. The DropSonde measures atmospheric condition as it drops through the air column from an altitude of 10,000 feet.
Concurrently in 2009 Air Station Kodiak began supporting an inter-government partnership with NOAA’s Global Monitoring Division working on their Carbon Cycle Greenhouse Gasses (CCGG) aircraft project. This mission is also supported by the ADA mission flights and consists both real-time measurements of methane, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and ozone as well as flask samples that are sent back to Boulder, CO where the NOAA’s CCGG group is based. The primary goal of these aircraft-based measurements is to understand how the large changes observed in the Arctic climate impact emissions of these gases in the Arctic. In particular the NOAA’s CCGG group is most interested in documenting changes in emissions of methane and carbon. As with the ice-albedo feedback, enhanced methane or carbon dioxide emissions with a warmer climate would result in more warming because both methane and carbon dioxide are strong greenhouse gases. Although some studies have suggested methane emissions are increasing with warmer climates current measurements of methane in the Arctic by NOAA have not confirmed this.
By measuring different trace gasses NOAA hopes to link measured gas concentrations to natural and anthropogenic processes. For example if a high concentration of methane is recorded the scientists can use the presence or absence of other gases such propane or ethane to determine if of the release was due to thawing permafrost or thermogic processes like natural gas leaks that will also have large amounts of ethane and propane. There are a plethora of different processes that affect the gas concentrations in the atmosphere. These need to be studied and understood before trends and baselines can be established and before a declaration of change can be made. Air Station Kodiak’s ADA flights are providing the data needed to model these.
“The ADA mission is a great opportunity to monitor what is happening in Alaska. Flights on Coast Guard HC-130H aircraft have given us access to multiple regions of Alaska, all reacting in different ways to the changing climate. Flying from March to November gives us a good snapshot of the entire seasonal cycle for [critical regions that are represented throughout] the Arctic,”6 said Dr. Colm Sweeney, head of the Global Monitoring Division’s CCGG Aircraft Program.
This diversity of measuring equipment provides a large, effectively simultaneous picture of conditions over a desired locale in the Arctic. A typical ADA mission might see the deployment of an ocean going buoy followed by AXCTD, AXCP and DropSonde deliveries along a longitudinal line at up to six different stations along with taking the standard 24 CCGG air samples. Shift this effort 10 degrees of longitude on the following day’s mission and an equivalent amount of data was collected to an entire ship-based expedition requiring weeks. And it can be done months before sea ice conditions allow the first research icebreakers on the scene. Combine this unparalleled collecting ability with the fact that Hercules flights are feasible from early March to November and suddenly the Coast Guard is in a position to facilitate unprecedented understanding of the Arctic environment.
Payoff for the Coast Guard
It is widely accepted that with the retreat of Arctic ice will come increased commercial vessel activity taking opportunity of beneficial sea routes, newly exposed resources and a growing tourism market. September 2012 marked the least extent of sea ice in recorded memory.7 Only four vessels utilized the Northern Sea Route in 2010, but 2012 saw 46 transits.8 Moreover, increased oil exploration drilling is scheduled to begin as early as summer of 2014. The Coast Guard will be required to increase capability and presence in order to respond future operational needs. This need is rapidly approaching and operators are facing unpredictable conditions. As any aviator or mariner knows it will be absolutely vital for crews to have accurate environmental and weather forecasts in order to safely complete a myriad of possible missions.
One of the most vital will be the ability to predict the ice edge. The National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan states:
“Sea ice forecasting is one of the most urgent and timely issues in the Arctic region. To ensure the best tactical and long-term ice forecasts are available for safe operations and planning, Federal agencies will work together to better quantify the rates of sea ice melt and regrowth, understand shifting patterns of distribution of ice, develop better maps of the ice edge, expand participation in the sea ice observation program, and coordinate with international partners to enable better model-based forecasting over larger areas. Improved observations will contribute to improved forecasts, which will better inform Arctic maritime safety and security activities.”9
The ability to understand a shifting ice edge will enable planners to adjust the Coast Guard’s Arctic posture for each season accordingly.
Having accurate forecasts of the weather and sea state will be important in responding to incidents such as search and rescue cases and oil spills. The ability to predict conditions in the marine domain is listed as one of the top research priorities for the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Joint Subcommittee on Ocean Science and Technology. In its Ocean Research and Implementation Plan this is highlighted: “Enhancing environmental observation, characterization, and forecasting of ocean and waterway conditions (e.g., currents, turbidity, surface waves, sea-ice extent, lake levels, biogeochemical conditions) across the global ocean is necessary for safe and efficient marine operations.”10
With the increase in commercial activity already outpacing the Arctic modelers the Coast Guard is faced with operating in an area without the benefits of these accurate forecasts. Furthermore, increased awareness will not only aid operationally the Coast Guard’s Arctic efforts but will assist in the modernization of Arctic governance, a mainstay of Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Robert Papp’s Arctic strategy.
By providing stalwart support of this scientific effort the Coast Guard is poised to be amongst the first to benefit from the coming revelations, ultimately increasing the service’s effectiveness at carrying out its 11 statutory missions.
The U.S. is an Arctic nation and this is a role that can neither be shirked nor ignored. It is vital that the nation and its agencies embrace this status and become a leading figure as Arctic development takes a frontal position on the international stage. Supporting scientific research in the Arctic is undoubtedly essential and in line with national priorities. The president has outlined in his National Ocean Policy that greater scientific understanding with respect to Arctic environmental conditions must be obtained.11 The National Security Strategy of May 2010 aligns with this policy by directing U.S. support of scientific research in the Arctic.12 Admiral Papp’s vision has clearly placed the Coast Guard as leader in the advancement of U.S. national interests in Arctic waters. Air Station Kodiak and its intrepid Hercules crews are spearheading this effort with support from the 17th District. The relationships and partnerships within the scientific community that Air Station Kodiak has meticulously cultivated could forever change the understanding of the Arctic. Every piece of new data collected will further the nation’s, and by extension the world’s, ability to see with clarity the Arctic environment and the impact it may have on us all.
“HOOVER PRESENTS SPECIAL MEDAL TO BYRD AS CLIMAX OF THE CAPITAL’S WELCOME; CROWDS CHEER HIM, CONGRESS PAYS HONOR” THE NEW YORK TIMES, New York City, June 21, 1930 ↩
Interview with Dr. James Morison, University of Washington, 13 September 2013 ↩
Interview with Dr. James Morison, University of Washington, 13 September 2013 ↩
Interview with Dr. Colm Sweeny,National Oceonographic and Atmospheric Association, 2 October 2013 ↩
National Ocean Council, National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan. Apr. 2013. Pg 27 ↩
“National Security Strategy”, May 2010, The White House, Washington, DC, pg. 50. ↩
Chuck Hill joins Matt to talk about design, use, and possibilities of naval corvettes, reflecting on the articles from 2013’s Corvette week. From definitions, to potential employment, to interdiction operations during Vietnam… this podcast runs the gamut. Please enjoy, Sea Control Episode 18: Naval Corvettes (download).
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Well, we had a little trouble with the technical side of live podcasting last week (and, as my old Macintosh computer used to say, “It’s not my fault”) but CDR Salamander and I are, if nothing else, persistent.
So please join us on Sunday, as we fight with electrons and, uh, other things in our presentation of Midrats Episode 210: “John Kuehn & Joint Operations from Cape Fear to the South China Sea”
Though nations for thousands of years have been wrestling with the challenge of Joint operations, as an island nation with significant global interests ashore, the USA has a rich history of doing Joint right, and blind parochialism. (Note by E1: Sal wrote this and your guess is as good as mine in what he meant in that last part there. Or, just maybe the electrons have struck again – Red Lectroids?)
Using this as a starting point, this Sunday for the full hour we will have returning guest, John Kuehn.
Dr. John T. Kuehn is the General William Stofft Chair for Historical Research at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He retired from the U.S. Navy 2004 at the rank of commander after 23 years of service as a naval flight officer in EP-3s and ES-3s. He authored Agents of Innovation (2008) and co-authored Eyewitness Pacific Theater (2008) with D.M. Giangreco, as well as numerous articles and editorials and was awarded a Moncado Prize from the Society for Military History in 2011.
We will also discuss his latest book, just released by Praeger, A military History of Japan: From the Age of the Samurai to the 21st Century.
Please join us live at 5pm Eastern U.S. on 12 January 2014 or pick the show up later by clicking here.
Every listen is a strike against the Lectroids!
By Chap Godbey
This photo sort of looks like a ship, right? It is, but then again it’s also something else.
For this example, the vessel–an Iraqi patrol craft made by an American company and part of a U.S. foreign military sales contract–is not just one of the assets Iraq’s military needs to protect a very crowded and consequential waterspace. It’s also a multi-decade relationship, where both countries get to know each other on an operator-to-operator level as well as on other levels. That relationship can have strategic effects as the lieutenants become admirals, and the relationship builds trust, access, and communications paths outside the formal diplomatic process and regionally as well as bilaterally.
One of the patrol spaces this ship protects drives the entire country’s economy–the oil platforms and pipeline infrastructure–and its shipping. This is recognizable to a military planner, though the economic part takes a bit of wider thinking to understand how U.S. security cooperation fits into it with training and equipment. But let’s add something important on here: U.S. policy is to support Iraq’s reintegration into the region, and it’s a top foreign policy priority for the U.S. with regard to Iraq. The military sphere tends to be a bit easier in reconnection than some other spheres; navies, since they’re mobile sovereign territory in international waters, can be the fastest of those–especially when the U.S. is acting as an honest broker. To pull off that kind of multinational reintegration is not solely a military function, but can utterly depend on the military aspect. If the U.S. really wants a whole-of-Executive-Branch (much less whole-of-government) approach to a policy problem, DoD’s mass has to be subordinated to the overall effort, even when it might not necessarily make short term military sense.
The example above isn’t perfect. Security assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan has been far from the standard situation seen by a security cooperation office, and special authorities in the law made security cooperation in these countries much different than in other countries. A more forceful example would be where the host nation is paying for every penny of the asset, since feelings about “what ‘we’ are giving ‘them'” emotionally colors the discussion, and it’s worthwhile to emphasize that foreign military sales is not necessarily coming from the U.S. taxpayer. On the other hand, the nonmilitary effects of this ship and crew, and the regional effects of what this ship does and the separate bilateral relationships that navy has with regional navies and the U.S., are pretty clear and useful to bring out the challenge of thinking about security cooperation as more than arms sales or exercises.
Many folks seem to miss the nonmilitary and regional effects of the military-to-military relationship built out of security cooperation, or even that the process is heavily structured in U.S. law. This post about security cooperation misses important considerations about what security cooperation is and what it’s supposed to do (this one by the same author is better, though of different focus). A comment of mine on that War On the Rocks post identifies structural problems in the argument, and there are other opportunities for quibbling, but that post proves that it’s worthwhile to outline some basics of SC with a view towards those regional and extramilitary effects.
Security cooperation (SC) is not very familiar to most operators in the Department of Defense. SC’s a difficult skill set. SC can pay off not only as a force multiplier, but also to provide diplomatic effects which can be game-changing. DoD personnel may only experience SC once, as an exercise or engagement event, or by doing a tour that includes a collateral duty associated with foreign military sales (FMS). More experience is in the foreign area officer (FAO) commmunity, whose officers can wind up doing SC from several angles over multiple tours, but there aren’t many FAOs around. Because the skills needed are relatively obscure inside DoD, understanding of what SC is becomes fragmentary and often misses the point. American SC can suffer from that bad understanding. (The way U.S. government agencies in the Executive Branch staff and train for SC missions doesn’t help the problem, either.)
DoD isn’t the agency where SC initially gets defined—because SC is not solely a DoD mission; it’s a State mission for which Defense is the executive agent.
Let’s define some terms here. SC includes
- security assistance (SA), which itself includes
- foreign military sales (FMS) weapons sales,
- International Military Education and Training (IMET),
- a multi-page list of other programs that somehow fit or get shoehorned into the process, and
- security cooperation (Sc), a confusingly named subset of the bigger SC which mainly deals with exercise events with host nation or meetings between military personnel.
The first one, SA, is covered under federal law. (Note: IANAL and doing this off the top of my head.) U.S. Code Title 22 is the main law that covers diplomatic and consular functions and is for the Department of State what Title 10 is for DoD. The second part of security cooperation, the non-FMS part also called security cooperation, has rules under Title 22 but is more under a section of Title 10. That part of title 10 used is different from what you might expect, and it’s administered by personnel working under a different rule set than those under the full operational command of a COCOM. DoD personnel in country doing SC serve under the direction and supervision of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission to that country (usually the U.S. ambassador to that country). Security cooperation, including security assistance, is a diplomatic function, under the Ambassador’s control in country. FMS cases and IMET and exercises have significant State Department approval and coordination–and additional coordination and approval by other agencies, and in some cases White House/Congressional approval–even though DoD has the mass and the executive agent role. The effect can sometimes be that the poor bureaucrat in the other agency is either like Horatius at the bridge or Niedermeyer in the riot, trying to get the massive influx of DoD people to go a different direction. It also can become counterintuitive, since American businesses might be fighting for the contract, or if one player–even a host nation–decides it’s worth lobbying for their interests more effectively to Congress than another player.
Note here that the Security Assistance Management Manual, the reference used in the War On The Rocks post, isn’t the controlling document. The law both trumps one agency’s manual and also highlights the diplomatic and interagency nature of SC. It also implies that the SC function is something we do as an ongoing and sustaining function of a country team, rather than something switched on once a COCOM has commenced large scale operations.
Since SC is a diplomatic function, one has to consider SC less like a military operation and more like a diplomatic operation. Results will be diffuse. They will have “one step forward two steps back” aspects. Results will be hard to measure in many respects. The effort will be like a coalition effort, with occasionally immense frustration on the ground and in the staff paying off strategically, but in different spheres than expected, or with effects long after the staffer is gone. For a planner looking for consistent positive results with a focused engineering-style goal oriented mindset this is anathema. A DoD planner or operator wants to get from point A to point B in a direct and uncluttered manner. Diplomacy, especially the work performed by Department of State colleagues on the country team on ground in country, is more chaotic and messy. If done right, SC advances the national interest of the United States; builds networks, access and relationships beneficial to the U.S.; eases stresses among and between partners; provides a common operating framework in the field; and provides a useful diplomatic tool as part of an embassy country team.
(Oh, by the way: There’s no Title 10 “command” in security cooperation organizations. There is no sheriff’s badge, no salad fork, no “forces”, even though the responsibility can weigh heavily, and DoD personnel could be in remote and dangerous locations. You’re a part of the embassy country team. There’s not even an organic Article 15 or medal-awarding authority, unless you’re a general for whom a COCOM has specifically delegated it in writing.)
For representatives of either agency to best advance U.S. national interest in the long term, both Defense and State have to be able to restrain some of their agency-level cultural impulses to achieve SC most effectively. Training, both in State’s A100 class for their newly commissioned officers, and at the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management or similar venues for DoD personnel interacting with a country team, helps introduce the cultural difference to each agency. Other agencies with a hand in SC, such as the Departments of Commerce or Treasury, have a much smaller presence and make do with corporate knowledge and help from the larger groups interacting around them. (Homeland Security mainly interacts through Coast Guard personnel, who are more acquainted with DoD’s foibles and when in theater interact often with country teams with and outside the security cooperation office in the embassy.) Some aspects can cause real friction without planners realizing its source, such as when a J5 officer assumes there’s a J5 in State, or that a Post’s plan is written with the same process as DoD’s, or that the plan is followed as closely as a DoD plan would be. On the ground, people on the country team have to make it work through force of effort and personality.
The benefits of SC have national influence, not just military, from public affairs/public diplomacy to changing policies in a country. SC also has a regional influence: in the ability to use the U.S. effort as a go-between between two partners unhappy with each other, in the ability to build regional ties with the U.S. invited to play, and in the ability to influence regional decisions based on a calculation from a nation that has to deal with what the U.S. has done in the neighborhood. It could well be that host nation has no culture of maintenance and the equipment they paid for is failing. It could be that the country’s using the military to dispense largesse domestically, and the U.S. interest in improving capacity isn’t perfectly aligned with that national desire. It could be that there’s a Red Queen effect, where the security cooperation guys are running as hard as they can to stay in place capacity-wise. It could also be that those frustrating efforts pay off in unusual ways. The military planner will do well to reach out to those other American agencies, to actually listen and adjust planning based on that reaching out, to see the role of SC as more than military capacity building, and to plan for a long and difficult but rewarding SC effort.
For a maritime power with global requirements, what is the role of the small ship in times of peace and war?
What are the tradeoffs between quantity and capability, size and range, survivability and affordable?
Does the US Navy need a high-low mix or a Strike Group-Flotilla mix?
Where do our national requirements influence how we build our Fleet vs. the process other nations build theirs?
Do we have a sustainable path towards a balanced Fleet, or are we sailing on based on outdated charts?
To discuss this and more for the full hour will be returning guest U.S. Naval War College Center for Naval Warfare Studies Dean, Captain Robert C. Rubel, USN (Ret.)
15 Dec 13 at 5pm. Join us live or listen to the show later by clicking here
Senator Kelly Ayotte (R-NH) addresses the attendees of Defense Forum Washington.
Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus speaks at Defense Forum Washington.
- On Midrats 19 Feb 2017 -Episode 372: Andrew Jackson’s Navy; Now More Than Ever?
- SECDEF Mattis to NATO: Sober Up
- On Midrats 12 Feb 2017 – Episode 371: Rice Bowls, Silos, & Firewalls – the National Security Bureaucracy
- China Sees Our 350, and Throws Another 150 on Top
- On Midrats 5 Feb 2017 – Episode 370: The SECNAV’s In Basket With James Holmes