As some information is leaking out concerning the upcoming release today or tomorrow of the initial report in to the collisions of the FITZGERALD and MCCAIN, 
it is a good time to review some larger implications of a horrible year for our Navy.
Lyle J. Goldstein, a professor of strategy in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the United States Naval War College, does a solid job outlining how China is taking advantage of our problem in support of their larger Strategic efforts;
Part of the reckoning, of course, concerns the strategic fallout of these accidents. That must be counted, of course, among allies, but perhaps most importantly with respect to strategic competitors. It will surprise no one to learn that Chinese military commentators, who watch U.S. Navy operations with utmost attention, have formed some preliminary conclusions regarding the meaning of the incidents for the larger geopolitical struggle in the Asia-Pacific.
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Two articles (from 25 August and 1 Sept) in the Chinese military newspaper China National Defense [中国国防报] reveal the rather disturbing conclusion that they view the U.S. Navy as comprised of “men [that] are weary, [with] their steeds spent, helmets askew, and armor bent” [人困马乏盔歪甲斜].
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A subhead in one of the Chinese articles puts forward some rather blunt hypotheses: “The Result of Excessive Self-confidence and Crudeness?” [过于自信和鲁莽所致]
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This broader line of attack becomes a major theme of the Chinese analyses. Describing the situation of the U.S. Navy as “awful” [糟], Chinese military analysts highlight in the 25 August article what they perceive to be a “real and structural contradictions.” [现实与结构性矛盾]. It is observed that the U.S. is seeking to maintain a naval presence in eighteen crucial sea areas, but that the necessary force requirement to meet that strategic imperative is at least 300 to 355 ships. Yet, “today there are just 272 ships,” the analysis states. These Chinese military commentators might make a valid criticism in suggesting that the U.S. Navy is genuinely lacking a low cost workhorse [工作驽马] vessel of the light frigate type.
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Such discussions among Chinese strategists are not surprising, but are still disturbing, of course. Undoubtedly, these attitudes could cause Beijing to challenge Washington ever more stridently in the Western Pacific, and could even lead to the grave misperception that the U.S. Navy is a “paper tiger” [纸老虎]. Such a risk must inform our collective urgency to “right the ship.”
No question we have lost face. Time up take steps as an institution to bring back our reputation.
No bandaids or excuses.
