Following U.S. Fleet Forces Command’s “Comprehensive Review of Surface Fleet Incidents” of 2017’s collisions and grounding, recommendations for more schoolhouse training, assessments, and crew rest have been discussed and implemented. Yet, relatively little has been discussed or implemented regarding the review’s recommendations on shipboard on-the-job training (OJT) and the Personal Qualification Standards (PQS) programs. The saying “trust but verify” comes to mind, but no amount of training, assessments, and micromanagement from outside a ship’s lifelines will restore the culture of trust in officers and enlisted training one another within the lifelines.
Therefore, the fleet should consider applying the same rigor to the shipboard OJT and PQS process as ships do with maintenance. The surface force dealt with maintenance deficiencies with ashore and afloat efforts culminating into today’s highly regarded, effective, and measureable Planned Maintenance System (PMS) and Maintenance and Material Management (3M) program. Adapting maintenance practices to individual OJT, with its own appropriate form of qualifications, periodicities, record keeping and spot-checks, would help restore the trust in training, and help redefine the surface force.
The poor level of knowledge, training, and supervision reported in Fleet Forces Command’s findings are more reason to urgently address OJT. For instance, Fleet Forces found that poorly trained and hastily qualified officers and sailors contributed heavily in the collision involving USS John S McCain (DDG-56).1 Specifically, personnel were deficient in knowledge and skills that strictly reside in OJT rather than schoolhouses. A more rigorous process is needed to ensure individuals are ready for qualification, and are knowledgeable and capable of providing OJT to other crew members.
Adopting parts of the meticulous and paperwork-intensive 3M program into shipboard OJT is a sobering prospect. Few crews would eagerly embrace another set of schedules, trackers, and spot-checks based on the 3M program to plan, supervise, and verify OJT. But perhaps adhering to a more formal process for individual training is the intervention ships’ crews need to rekindle the OJT and PQS programs that contributed to last year’s mishaps. The key is to merge the 3M process with the training admin already in place.
Applying aspects of the 3M program would improve the planning, supervising, and verifying OJT and individual level of knowledge. Different levels of qualifications can help supervisors differentiate between individuals who are qualified to stand watch and those who are qualified to train others for the watch station. Individual logbooks for all qualifications—not just ship driving—can place more accountability on the individuals providing OJT and certifying the completion of PQS tasks. A formal system of spot-checks can help supervisors track level of knowledge and plan remediation training to maintain proficiency. Unlike the 3M program, the current individual training process is largely left up to each commanding officer and is not uniform across the fleet; PQS is typically not maintained after individuals qualify; and capability to perform and train others is not rigorously scrutinized.
Implementing an OJT version of the 3M program is no small feat, but Fleet Forces Command’s recommendations to improve the surface fleet’s readiness may be futile without a reinvigorated culture of shipboard training in place. The alternative is fleet commanders and type commanders employing new tools to verify readiness while commanding officers proceed without new tools to stoke the fires of professional development, measure progress, and ensure the integrity and trust of shipboard OJT and PQS. The question is whether training can be verified before trusted.
Endnotes
- U.S. Navy, U.S. Fleet Forces Command memorandum, “Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents,” 26 October 2017, 35-64.
