that is how it reads from the cheap seats

Are We Fooling Ourselves in MIW?

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Now and then we see answers to one question by seeing attempts to answer another.

In trying to understand why we had the problems in our Navy that manifested themselves in the events in WESTPAC in 2017; unqualified personnel knowingly assigned to bridge watches, incomplete watch bills, broken and inadequately functioning surveillance equipment, etc – you have to understand how this mindset becomes the norm. It does not emerge at the unit level on its own. Junior personnel frame their professional actions by what they see their seniors do. They rank their priorities by what is set above. They provide incentives and disincentives based on the same ones they receive.

The summary of the DOD IG’s report on Acquisition of the Navy’s Mine Countermeasures Mission Package is instructive in this regard. Let’s poke around a bit. First, we need to define our terms. In this case, Initial Operational Capability (IOC);

According to DoD Instruction 5000.02, IOC is achieved when the selected user has been equipped and trained and is determined to be capable of conducting mission operations.

Seems clear, yes? Well, evidently not in execution.

N95 used the results of a technical evaluation and previous test events to justify its IOC decisions without demonstrating that it had corrected known performance problems. … N95 declared IOC for the COBRA Block I to avoid requesting a sixth change to the IOC date that would further delay the delivery of the system’s capabilities to the fleet.
As a result, the Navy delivered units that have known performance problems to the fleet for use aboard the Littoral Combat Ship and other platforms.

Consequently, if the Navy proceeds as planned it will spend money on ALMDS, AMNS, and COBRA Block I production units that cannot fully perform their mine detection and neutralization missions.

It is almost as if we believe, by simple force of will and hope, things will magically work.

Of course, that isn’t really it. You push things until it becomes a crisis so Congress will throw bags of money at it, while you grease the skids with Sailor sweat and the belief that we won’t actually have to go to war until you PCS in to a better set of orders or retirement.

At least, that is how it reads from the cheap seats.

One can try to defend it. There is a chance that this is all a misunderstanding. That is another option.

The Assistant Secretary further stated that the testing balanced comprehensiveness with speed of delivery to the fleet and is aligned with the national defense strategy tenet of “delivering performance at the speed of relevance.”

Pull the thread on that “relevance.” So, MIW is subjectively assumed to be of low relevance so we can accept low performance? Really?
OK, fine. Everyone take a moment to go over to google and review the combat damage to US warships since WWII. If you don’t know off the top of your head, I won’t do the work for you. Go ahead, take a look and come back.

Does that little review make MIW seem “relevant” or not?

The Assistant Secretary also stated that the procurement must continue to ensure that a capability exists to replace the decommissioning MCM 1 Avenger Class ships and MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopter, thereby saving the Navy operating and production costs.

…and here we are again with another example of the “I will happily trade wartime effectiveness for peace time efficiency” mirage.

For the COBRA Block I program, the production document defines IOC as delivery of one system, new equipment training, initial spares, and support equipment to the unit. While the COBRA Block I program met that limited definition, the COBRA Block I system does not meet DoD Instruction’s 5000.02 definition for declaring IOC. Specifically, the Navy has not yet demonstrated that the COBRA Block I system is able to conduct its full portfolio of mission operations.

There you go. We fudge, we skirt, we ignore risk. All for what again?

If we don’t follow our own instructions at the highest levels, how do we expect them to be followed at the unit level?
At the unit level, we simply have collisions and kill 17 Sailors. When we ignore instructions at the most senior levels, we set the conditions to kill hundreds to thousands, prevent access to entire ocean areas, and put our nation at Strategic risk.

That is, of course, only a problem if we go to war.

Pray for peace.

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