“Captain, We Are Not Prepared For This Manner Of Engagement!”
—Mr. Spock, Star Trek Beyond
While there is a great deal of talk about innovation through unmanned systems (UxS) and improving acquisition timelines, the Navy is postured to deliver new, uninformed technology to an uneducated fleet that will not have the authorities or basic know how to effectively employ it. Recent advances, such as control of a drone swarm using a brain-computer interface, provide testament to the growing gap between technology and the traditional curriculum taught in the Navy’s schoolhouses. Additionally, the Navy’s overreliance on deckplate leaders and sailors to compensate for the missteps of the institution will further hinder the realization of any advantages gained by advances in UxS technology.
However, it is not too late—acquisition processes can be better informed with fleet input, warfighter experimentation. Education in UxS employment can begin. Issues related to authorities and rules of engagement (ROE) can be identified and tackled with the use of mixed reality or gaming systems already available and with little investment, the Navy can recover. Otherwise, life will imitate art and, just as the USS Enterprise (NCC-1701) is quickly dispatched in 2016’s Star Trek Beyond, so too will some USS in the near future meet a quick and grisly fate.
With a nod to Sun Tzu, the battle in Star Trek Beyond is over before it begins with the adversary, a highly trained human-machine system, quickly overwhelming the easily recognizable, tried-and-true Enterprise. You might expect Captain Kirk, his crew, and the Enterprise to pull out a nail-biting, inspiring win. However, in the first 60 seconds, what appeared as an unknown ship transforms into a swarm of smaller, lethal vessels that destroy the Enterprise’s shields and amputate her warp drive nacelles. Sixty seconds after that, the alien vessels begin slamming into the Enterprise to create openings in her hull from which boarders deploy. The crew of the Enterprise attempts to respond, but it is too late, and in only two minutes they have been overwhelmed and defeated.
Now, consider that the Enterprise represents a U.S. Navy ship in the not-too-distant future and the adversary is a near-peer competitor. If we are to believe a portion about what we are told about future warfare , the one-sided Enterprise battle could be a prologue to a future engagement. More specifically, if the Navy’s revolution in UxS does not include a simultaneous and holistic revolution in tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs), training, command-and-control (C2) concepts, planning, and authorities, then the future acquisition of UxS will not allow the future human-machine fleet to meet its fullest potential.
There is an example of art imitating life in the 2016 movie, one between Star Fleet’s and Navy’s leadership, in the scenes before the battle—senior leaders have to come to rely on their crews to compensate for institutional inflexibility, which results in a lack of innovation in technological developments. Similarly, both are put at risk as leadership assumes the successes of the past ensure successes in the future. Lauded for their experience, agility in unknown situations, and adaptability as they “explore the unknown,” both the modern sailor and the crew of the Enterprise are believed by their leadership to be up to any task based on previous performance. For Star Trek’s Enterprise, it seems true, until they run up against an adversary who has studied them, developed systems and disruptive technologies to exploit their and their systems’ weaknesses, invested in high-tech human-machine solutions, and planned and trained for the engagement. One can begin to understand how Spock’s statement begins to sound prophetic and seems doomed to be repeated on the bridges of Navy ships as they put to sea in platforms with capabilities that have not changed significantly in decades against a motivated, well-equipped, modern, and learned adversary.
Just as important as the people and their training is the feedback from trial and error and the experience gained from using these systems. This plays out online in “Giant Robot Wars.” U.S. assumptions and inexperience (and hubris) result in predictable failure during a simple human-machine battle. Two giant robots, one manned by two Americans and one manned by a lone Japanese, square off to do battle against each other. The Americans have weapons that they are overly confident will succeed at range, like a high-pressure paint ball gun, while the Japanese uses a large bludgeon, or fist. It is clear at the outset that the two Americans are winging it and the lone Japanese has a well-thought-out strategy. To no one’s surprise, the Americans are bowled over by a punch they see coming from yards away (and it only took 90 seconds). A similar prologue to a conflict in the not-too-distant future? Possibly. If the Navy fails to simultaneously develop the talent (tactical to operational) necessary to employ the future human-machine fleet, and instead continues its stove-piped development and uninformed acquisition processes in pursuit of a quick and high tech answer, it could easily find itself surprised at sea. The question becomes whether or not the Navy can adapt quickly enough during a conflict to overcome its adversary. Or, is an initial knock-out punch enough to bring us to the diplomatic table to negotiate from a weakened position? Regardless, using the US Navy’s human diversity to holistically develop its future human-machine fleet architecture should start now to prevent such an outcome. And, for a small investment in current mixed reality and/or gaming technology (the backbones of which are already developed by and for the Navy), warfighters can get in the game.
From Low Tech Training to The Battle Of The Narrangansett (And Beyond!)
Ender’s Game, the movie, provides a simple blueprint for warfighter training and flushing out TTP—start simple, make it competitive, and maximize the use of technology to enhance the training experience. The Navy does not need to invest in a costly new training facility in space. It could modify current virtual- or mixed-reality systems to introduce theories of UxS employment and quickly mature the fleet’s understanding, while better informing developers and the acquisition process.
First, start in a virtual, 2D environment, using capture-the-flag scenarios to teach the fundamentals of UxS safeguards, autonomous weapons control, and targeting autonomy. Introduce increasingly complex levels of automation and increasing numbers of UxS to allow warfighters to establish a foundation of understanding for basic concepts such as swarming. Levels of safeguards, which are used to reduce the risk of collateral damage due to system malfunction or physical damage, could include concepts such as:
- Abort RTB (when communications links are lost)
- Abort to Loiter Station (to reestablish link with the human)
- Abort Scrap Safely (may require planning for “scrap baskets” where collateral damage and environmental impact is minimized)
- Abort Self-Destruct (presents some risk of potential collateral damage)
- Abort to Nearest Target (another planning factor)
Similar to current weapons controls whereby authority to engage is controlled, autonomous weapons controls could include concepts such as:
- Sacrifice (defend manned units)
- Hold (only engage predetermined targets, no self-defense)
- Tight (engage predetermined targets, defend manned units and self)
- Free (engage all emergent enemy targets of opportunity, defend manned units and self)
Beginning with the simple and building to the more complex levels of UxS safeguards and weapons controls, future tactical action officers, ship commanding officers, and strike group and fleet commanders and staffs could begin thinking about TTPs and how to employ future capabilities before the UxS are delivered to the fleet. In turn, UxS development and acquisition efforts could be better informed and refined before full-scale production.
Second, provide a variety of interfaces with which to plan, execute, and control UxS to determine the best interface or combination of interfaces. Touchscreens, current game, the telepathic interface pioneered by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), or some combination of interfaces should be part of effort. The Navy’s current, primary focus on the “machine” with little focus on the “human” ignores exploration of their interface such that the most synergistic possibilities of any future human-machine fleet will not be realized.
Third, add the third dimension (air/space) in the virtual environment to further develop warfighters’ understanding of how to fight when there is nowhere to hide. In addition, the challenge of refining targeting algorithms to improve target selection and avoid collateral damage could begin.
Fourth, round out virtual training with the introduction of undersea unmanned vehicles (UUVs) to introduce the fourth dimension—time. As UUVs are slower—to produce less noise to maximize sensor effectiveness and remain undetected—their employment would require these planning considerations. Whether for data collection or future weapons deployment (or both), UUVs also would require operators to delve into the subject of authorities. As a result, this phase would mature the understanding of planning and start the education of authorities.
Fifth, using the facilities and real estate in the vicinity of Surface Warfare Officer School, conduct a simulated, real-world capstone event— a full human-machine maritime battle (to-scale) in the Narragansett Bay, between Coaster’s Harbor and Gould Islands. This capstone would introduce the uncertainty of weather, tide and equipment failures. The Narragansett makes a the perfect choice because you can easily bring together the various entities working in and around Newport, such as SWOS, NUWC, NWC, NSCS, NJS, NLEC, etc., to collaborate, learn and provide feedback to the various processes.
Finally, building on a recent trilateral agreement among the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force’s Maritime Command & Staff College, the UK’s Development, Concepts & Doctrine Centre, and the U.S. Naval War College’s Institute for Future Warfare Studies, which includes direction to cooperate on such subjects as UxS and the implementation of augmented and virtual reality robotics into training and education, the depth and breadth of the myriad issues could be more thoroughly explored and matured with our allied partners.
Intended Consequences
To avoid the negative effects of unintended consequences, the U.S. Navy must start a deliberate learning process as it develops UxS to facilitate parallel development of warfighter experience, better inform UxS development and acquisition, and discover and resolve tangential issues related to employment of UxS with lethal autonomy. Otherwise, the US Navy will force the future fleet to figure this out at sea, potentially during conflict.
Hobbyists in UxS who pit their “battle bots” against one another battle worldwide, developing experience and refining their bots and tactics between bouts in the arena. Each team of hobbyists comes to the arena with what it thinks is a winning design, including the teams human-machine interface and a set of tactics. Each battle gives each team experience which they take into the next round. That is the first intended consequence for beginning a training regimen now—experience.
To better inform top-down acquisition efforts rather than expect them to meet future warfighters’ needs, input from future “end users” (the fleet) should be sought before and during development. Current expectations are formed using today’s paradigms and do not have an adequate feedback loop from the deckplates. The Navy is assuming that unmanned undersea vessels with modular capability will meet the warfighters’ needs. Hoping that modules will be designed at a later date has not proven to be a successful strategy. That is another intended consequence—refining designs and developing capabilities (including modules) using the fleet’s input.
Only in the hands of its highly resourceful and talented sailors will the Navy discover the fullest potential and reveal unknown issues of future UxS and their employment. One may be able to argue whether or not Aegis was designed with ballistic-missile defense (BMD) in mind. Regardless, a lot of time elapsed between when the first Aegis ship was commissioned and when the first Aegis ship was upgraded to perform BMD. By bringing the warfighter into the discussion earlier, there is another intended consequence—discovery of potential and accelerating that potential. In this case, not only the fullest potential of a human-machine team, but also discovering potential issues, such as those related to ROE or authorities, that will require rigorous analysis to determine their impact in areas such as the law of armed conflict. As a result, these issues may require changes to current legislation or authorities, something which can take time. These issues need resolution to prevent warfighters from having to ask in the middle of a conflict, “Mother may I?”
Traditional, Foreseeable, Predictable . . . Obstacles
A mixed reality solution to begin parallel training and education of planners, decision makers, and warfighters in the employment of UxS (and subsequently feed the lessons they learn back into the development and acquisition process) is available if only the funding resources are, too. In the May 2017, MS&T, the Director of the Navy’s Battle Space Exploitation of Mixed Reality (BEMR) Lab was asked what kind of support she has received to develop “mixed reality as a tool/resource/solution to certain needs of the Service?” While she does not provide an answer to the question, the her response is predictable, especially when she states, “it is going to be difficult to move that [innovation, rapid prototyping and acquisition] forward, because of too many foundational obstacles.” However, if given the funding, the BEMR Lab could develop a mixed-reality training system that includes UxS with a range of safeguards and weapon controls and allow warfighters to start learning, providing feedback on needed capabilities, and identifying tangential issues.
If mixed reality is not the path the Navy wants to take, MIT’s Lincoln Labs, partnering with the gaming industry’s Metateq, created a video game, Strike Group Defender: The Missile Matrix, to train today’s Sailors to better defend against missile threats. Adding UxS to Strike Group Defender also could be developed by Lincoln Labs with little investment and in a short timeframe.
Not only would either or both methods be cost effective, they would be well received by the Navy’s young warfighters, who are increasingly learning through gaming and virtual means. For example, a 14 September 2017, article in Business Insider written by John Lynch, focuses on how the rapidly increasing viewership of esports and online games is overshadowing actual sporting events. Gaming and virtual systems are the way future warfighters (and future decision makers) increasingly interact and learn. The Navy should make the leap and invest.
Funding resources probably will not be the only obstacle. And, while improvements in acquisition timelines have improved, other processes have not. For example, should the funding be secured and the training system(s) be developed, one could foresee additional curriculum requirements and processes requiring development and certification, further slowing the process. Suddenly, Spock’s statement to Captain Kirk seems even more real.
Conclusion
OODA loops are tightening at unfathomable speed and scale. If the Navy continues doing business in the same manner, then there is a future ship that will meet the same fate as the Enterprise in the latest Star Trek movie–life will imitate art in a dire way. Some UxS platforms are being developed or even funded while policy, doctrine, training, TTP, manning, and facilities lag. With little investment, a virtual- and/or mixed-reality training and experiment system can be brought online. Doing so would better inform all other lines of effort, improve development and acquisition efforts, and help ensure the future human-machine fleet carries on the Navy’s tradition of maritime superiority.
