The U.S. Marine Corps proudly says every Marine is a rifleman. But what happens if even enemy insurgents and militia fighters are just as accurate? New technologies are hastening that day of reckoning. Marines must cope by developing new training priorities, technology, and tactics to maintain their competitive advantage.
Science Fiction author Arthur C. Clarke in a 1973 publication coined a “Third Law” regarding technology that states, “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”[1] The “magic BB” of military lore—the seemingly random but deadly single shot that comes out of nowhere—is about to be based on technology.
The skill level needed to be a marksman will drop, with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) already attempting to develop a sight that shows where the operator should aim.[2] That was an early prototype too bulky and primitive to be used by infantry. But the path is clear.
The technology to assist shooters has reached the point where it has entered the civilian market. The TrackingPoint rifle introduced in 2013 goes beyond aim assistance, refusing to discharge the weapon when the trigger is pulled until the weapon is aimed to strike the target after factoring in variables that require aiming at a point other than center-of-mass.[3] Such weapons have been pitched to the Marine Corps and Army.[4]
The pairing of simple bullets with smart sights and automatic firing protocols must change the way Marines prepare for infantry combat. Dumb-but-controlled (DBC) firing employed by even ill-trained forces will revolutionize infantry combat.
When Everyone is Special
A signature feature of the post-9/11 battlefields has been the contrast between U.S. forces using single, aimed shots and enemies opening up on full auto to “spray and pray.” Indeed, the very designs of the M-16 versus the AK-47 highlight the value placed on trained marksmanship versus volume of fire by less trained soldiers.[5]
Marksmanship is prized in the Marine Corps. Even though only a small fraction of Marines have the primary job of closing with and destroying the enemy, the aspiration is highlighted by the “every Marine a rifleman” expression. The Commandant of the Marine Corps reflected this sentiment in a broader context, stating, “We are warfighters within a warfighting organization.”[6]
The Marines will field new rifles, the M27, designed to maximize Marine marksmanship training to provide superior individual aimed fire. One Marine designated as the squad marksman will use the M38 version which will “allow [the] Marine infantryman to engage targets at 300-600 meters,” according to Barbara Hamby, Marine Corps Systems Command spokeswoman.[7]
The use of DBC rifles by enemies could be as disruptive to the superiority of American infantry as the introduction of firearms was to the well-trained knight of Europe who found their training advantage with swordsmanship nullified by technology:
“What is the use, any more,” asked the biographer of the sixteenth-century warrior Louis de la Tremouille, “of the skill-at-arms of the knights, their strength, their hardihood, their discipline and their desire for honour when such [gunpowder] weapons may be used in war?”[8]
It is dangerous to discount the threat of automated marksmanship to the Marine competitive advantage because factors other than marksmanship are required to make a good Marine. Knights were more than just skilled with blade weapons. But when that skill was devalued by technology, their superiority evaporated.
Fortunately, the technology may be better suited to bringing out the best in a trained marksman rather than allowing green recruits to be super shooters.[9] For now.
A guided round that DARPA envisions may change that by moving beyond DBC.[10] DARPA’s .50-caliber self-steering round has potential to allow even “novice shooters” to be deadly accurate because with that round, “now you don’t even have to be a good shot to hit the mark.”[11]
Employing this technology, the soldiers of peer competitors will start with marksmanship a given and have the resources of a state military force to multiply the effects of that purchased accuracy. When virtually self-aiming rifles are common and affordable, one prized factor in the Marine competitive advantage over enemy insurgents and militia, or even other infantry, will erode.
Insurgents or militia fighters with DBC rifles who fire once and escape may not even need “complex” attacks to inflict casualties. Nor will they need to resort to the laborious and lengthy process of building and emplacing IEDs (improvised explosive devices) as an alternative to enduring casualties in what have been largely futile firefights with well trained Marine riflemen.
The commandant of the Marine Corps has urged Marines to adapt and train before reaching the battlefield:
We must have a boresight focus on warfighting and train the way we intend to fight. We must incorporate the lessons learned from our training and experimentation, so that mistakes on the battlefield do not cost us the fight. We cannot afford to lose to learn in combat![12]
While the Marine marksmanship advantage will be nullified, Marines will continue to have an advantage in training time. To maintain the competitive advantage over enemies whose untrained shooters are capable of one-shot kills, the Marines will need to extend their training advantage in other areas to maintain dominance. If Marines don’t adapt in peacetime, they may be compelled to learn by losing in combat, as enemies with “boresight focus” on Marines because of their precision rifles stalk the battlefield.
Realigning the Boresight Focus
The response to this technologically pushed development must take place in three realms:
- Revised Marine boot camp training that exploits the Marine training advantage, without wasting time on marksmanship.
- New technology to protect Marines and to better identify and target enemy super shooters.
- Exceptional small unit leaders who exploit revised tactics based on revised training and new technology to nullify enemy super shooters and allow Marines to shoot first.
Revised Boot Camp Training
Marine boot camp must shift the focus from training every Marine to be a rifleman to teaching every Marine by virtue of their rifle a marksman how to maximize that technology on the battlefield.[13] Marines must be taught early how to move and position themselves, to avoid being targeted, and to find enemies first to shoot first in order to counter DBC-equipped enemies who can shoot as accurately as Marines with similar equipment.
Examples of revisions to initial training at the expense of marksmanship include:
- Tactical prowess in finding and using cover and concealment.
- Choosing and constructing superior fighting positions whether on defense or when advancing.
- Fire suppression that is proactive and not reliant on the enemy missing their first shots to allow reactive fire suppression. But reconnaissance by fire that could panic less trained troops to open fire from cover or concealment will not work as well against troops whose rifles won’t allow them to fire until they are aimed and are likely to hit their targets.
- Moving beyond simple fire and movement skills that teach short dashes to cover while a buddy provides overwatch must be pushed down to boot camp. Superior maneuvering skills to prevent poor quality but super shooter enemies from counting on a frontal assault will break enemy morale. Even super shooters running away can’t hit their targets.
A thorough exploration of what Marine boot camp should include when marksmanship training no longer dominates must be carried out to keep the Marine training advantage.
New technology.
In addition to adopting the new shooting technology and improving it for Marines, such as the DARPA self-steering round that would be superior to DBC rifles, the reaction to enemy shooting technology of necessity must include other new technology to cope.
Some aspects to consider for coping technology include:
- Better body armor. But if DBC and guided rounds prove effective in delivering single shot accuracy, the firearm of choice for enemies may evolve away from small caliber automatic fire that allowed spray and pray to single shot large rounds able to punch through armor or to stun with even non-penetrating impact. What beyond passive body armor will counter that?
- Means of reducing enemy concealment through better sensors even if enemy cover can’t be affected will tip the balance back. Armed aerial, ground, and subsurface intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) drones will need to blanket a battlefield to provide data to individual Marines.
- Fusing incoming ISR data into actionable views of the battlefield at the level of the individual Marine is needed for superior situational awareness to enable superior maneuver and to enable information-driven fire suppression.
- Cheap disposable sensors that can be fired ahead of troops could replace recon by fire to provide timely ISR capability at the squad level.
- Mobile smart mines could “take point” ahead of Marines to seek out armed enemies and either initiate kinetic suppression with reliable programmed rules of engagement; or remotely by actual Marines interpreting what the mobile smart mines discover.
- Camouflage that alters or suppresses the signature of Marines designed to confuse the sensors of DBC rifles or of guided rounds to prevent being targeted rather than concealing Marines from being seen by enemy fighters may prove superior.
Means of preventing an enemy from shooting first, surviving being hit, and reducing the number of Marines exposed to enemy fire should be explored to cope with enemy DBC rifles or guided rounds. The Marine Corps is committed to experimentation to identify technology useful for future battlefields.[14] Secretary of Defense Mattis has ordered the creation of a Close Combat Lethality Task Force to make equipping infantry a high priority.[15]
Exceptional Leaders and Revised Tactics
Marines with higher level boot camp skills and better equipment are just part of the solution. Such Marines must be led on the more deadly battlefield by leaders with superior tactical prowess to avoid being targets on a precision-dominated battlefield of tomorrow, where “to be seen is to be targeted, to be targeted is to be engaged, to be engaged is to be killed, at range and with precision!”[16]
Are the Marines prepared to ramp up their individual and unit tactical proficiency to overmatch enemies who may have parity in marksmanship?
The majority of current Marine infantry squad leaders are not sergeants and have not received the professional military education or the advanced infantry training associated with the duties of an infantry squad leader according to Plans, Policies and Operations, Headquarters Marine Corps. Only 72 out of 1,416 infantry sergeants in the operating forces have completed [Infantry Small Unit Leader Course] and Sergeants Course.[17]
The Marines do not appear ready to fully extend tactical proficiency to overcome precision technology pushed down to the individual enemy fighter:
[Only] 19 percent of the Marine Corps’ 648 active-duty infantry rifle squads are led by the appropriately trained, sergeant squad leader that they are required to have. No, that wasn’t a typo. Only 19 percent of what are, in theory, the most important units in the Marine Corps are led by someone with the currently required training and experience.[18]
Yet simply running more sergeants through existing courses is insufficient. The leadership development courses themselves must be more relevant as technology changes the threat.[19]
This process must be institutionalized. A retired Army general and two serving Marine officers argue that American infantry need a Top Gun or Red Flag type program (that the Navy and Air Force used to make air crews more lethal) to intensively train infantry leaders to the same standards. They argue for a Joint Close Combat Leader Training Center:
This center’s primary mission should be to certify America’s joint close combat leaders. This should be done by providing annually three 14-week long certification courses. This is slightly longer than Top Gun and almost half the length of the Air Force’s Weapons School. … The center’s secondary mission should be to lead joint close combat experimentation efforts.[20]
Marines with more individual tactical proficiency equipped with better weapons and equipment need proficient leaders to exploit their areas of superiority to overcome technology-based marksmanship. This would be the ultimate testing ground to defeat enemies with DBC rifles or guided rounds.
As part of this, Marines should establish an opposition force (OPFOR) battalion for exercises, as well as fielding simulators, that assume uniform enemy marksmanship in order to develop through experimentation and experience the tactics, equipment, and leadership needed to prevail on the future battlefield.
Boresight Focus on Tactical Dominance
A broad Marine Corps response to overcoming new technology that will enable even poorly trained enemy fighters to shoot accurately is supported by the challenge the National Defense Strategy places on the United States military:
Modernization is not defined solely by hardware; it requires change in the ways we organize and employ forces. We must anticipate the implications of new technologies on the battlefield, rigorously define the military problems anticipated in future conflict, and foster a culture of experimentation and calculated risk-taking. We must anticipate how competitors and adversaries will employ new operational concepts and technologies to attempt to defeat us, while developing operational concepts to sharpen our competitive advantages and enhance our lethality.[21]
The May 1972 “Battle of the Bridges” in which U.S. aircraft destroyed targets that had long resisted dumb munitions announced the arrival of a new precision method of waging war that promised “If you can see it, you can hit it. If you can hit it, you can destroy it.” That was described as the first phase of a revolutionary change in the nature of warfare.[22] That battle won with expensive but effective “remotely piloted munitions” fired from expensive planes by expensively and extensively trained air crews has filtered down to the level of rifles carried by even ill-trained individual fighters. Will U.S. Marines be prepared to win on such a battlefield of tomorrow?
Yes, technology will still give U.S. Marines a competitive shooting advantage if Marines have expensive guided rounds while enemy combatants have cheaper DBC rifles. But the relative edge based on technology will be smaller than the current advantage produced by trained soldiers firing single aimed shots versus ill-trained enemies firing full auto with little thought to aiming. Just as air crews, ship captains, and tankers have adapted to precision fire capabilities, Marine infantry must now adapt to the same challenges to ensure battlefield dominance.
Endnotes
[1] Arthur C. Clarke, “Hazards of Prophecy,” Profiles of the Future: An Inquiry into the Limits of the Possible (1973). Popular Library. ISBN 9780330236195, cited in “Clarke’s three laws, Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clarke%27s_three_laws. Accessed January 20, 2018.
[2] Rebecca Boyle, “Darpa’s Self-Aiming “One Shot” Sniper Rifle Scheduled for Next Year,” Popular Science (October 1, 2010. https://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-10/aiming-help-snipers-lockheed-develops-one-shot-solution. Accessed January 20, 2018.
[3] Mark Dewey, “A New ‘Smart Rifle’ Decides When To Shoot And Rarely Misses,” all tech considered (National Public Radio, May 15, 2013). https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2013/05/15/184223110/new-rifle-on-sale. Accessed January 20, 2018.
[4] Matthew Cox, “Tracking Point’s New Squad-Level Rifle,” Military.com (20 April 2016). https://www.military.com/kitup/2016/04/tracking-points-new-squad-level-rifle.html. Accessed January 21, 2018.
[5] Fritz W. Ermarth, “Firearm Fact: The One Major Difference That Separates the AK-47 and M16,” The National Interest (December 6, 2017). http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/firearm-fact-the-one-major-difference-separates-the-ak-47-23535. Accessed January 20, 2018.
[6] General Robert B. Neller, “Message to the Force 2018: ‘Execute’,” United States Marine Corps (26 January 2018), 3. http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC%20Message%20to%20the%20Force%20_180116%20Final.pdf?ver=2018-01-29-073519-627. Accessed February 5, 2018.
[7] Shawn Snow, “Modernizing infantry Marines: Big changes coming as grunts take on more special ops-style missions,” Military Times (January 22, 2018). https://www.militarytimes.com/news/marine-corps-times/2018/01/22/modernizing-infantry-marines-big-changes-coming-as-grunts-take-on-more-special-ops-style-missions/. Accessed January 23, 2018.
[8] J. Hale, Renaissance War Studies (London, 1988), 396; cited in John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 333.
[9] “US Army tests TrackingPoint smart-rifle scopes,” BBC (12 February 2014). http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-26158016. Accessed January 21, 2018.
[10] Jerome Dunn, “EXtreme ACcuracy Tasked Ordnance (EXACTO) (Archived),” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (undated). https://www.darpa.mil/program/extreme-accuracy-tasked-ordnance. Accessed January 21, 2018.
[11] Don Melvin, “No more dodging a bullet, as U.S. develops self-guided ammunition,” CNN (April 29, 2015). http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/29/us/us-military-self-guided-bullet/index.html. Accessed January 21, 2018.
[12] General Robert B. Neller, “Message to the Force 2018: ‘Execute’,” United States Marine Corps (26 January 2018), 2. http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC%20Message%20to%20the%20Force%20_180116%20Final.pdf?ver=2018-01-29-073519-627. Accessed February 5, 2018.
[13] Speaking from Army experience, basic training came down to just two absolutely necessary objectives: physical training and the ability to shoot an M-16. All the rest, of varying importance, paled in comparison to the focus on producing a soldier physically fit and with the ability to meet shooting standards. With these attributes, a soldier would be trained for any task. That focus will be insufficient in the face of DBC rifles.
[14] Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Marines Inserting New Technology into Forces,” National Defense (January 8, 2018). http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2018/1/8/marines-inserting-new-technology-into-forces. Accessed January 20, 2018.
[15] Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Mattis Upguns Infantry: Task Force To Invest Over $1B,” Breaking Defense (February 21, 2018. https://breakingdefense.com/2018/02/mattis-upguns-infantry-close-combat-lethality-task-force/?_ga=2.10410743.359030068.1519296931-1149088378.1519039184. Accessed February 22, 2018.
[16] General Robert B. Neller, “Message to the Force 2018: ‘Execute’,” United States Marine Corps (26 January 2018), 3. http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC%20Message%20to%20the%20Force%20_180116%20Final.pdf?ver=2018-01-29-073519-627. Accessed February 5, 2018.
[17] Lance Cpl. Remington Hall, “Corps Formalizes Infantry Squad Leaders with New Program,” USMC Life, March 13, 2015. http://usmclife.com/2015/03/corps-formalizes-infantry-squad-leaders-with-new-program/. Accessed January 24, 2018.
[18] Robert H. Scales, Scott Cuomo, and Jeff Cummings, “When Dauntless Isn’t Enough: The Moral and Strategic Imperative to Fix America’s Close Combat Units,” War on the Rocks, January 23, 2018. https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/dauntless-isnt-enough-moral-strategic-imperative-fix-americas-close-combat-units/. Accessed January 24, 2018.
[19] Robert H. Scales, Scott Cuomo, and Jeff Cummings, “When Dauntless Isn’t Enough: The Moral and Strategic Imperative to Fix America’s Close Combat Units,” War on the Rocks, January 23, 2018. https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/dauntless-isnt-enough-moral-strategic-imperative-fix-americas-close-combat-units/. Accessed January 24, 2018.
[20] Robert H. Scales, Scott Cuomo, and Jeff Cummings, “When Dauntless Isn’t Enough: The Moral and Strategic Imperative to Fix America’s Close Combat Units,” War on the Rocks, January 23, 2018. https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/dauntless-isnt-enough-moral-strategic-imperative-fix-americas-close-combat-units/. Accessed January 24, 2018.
[21] Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (United States Department of Defense, 2018), 7. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. Accessed January 20, 2018.
[22] Drew Middleton, Crossroads of Modern Warfare (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1983), 255-265.
