We continue to watch China stretch her wings and test her boundaries. We are fully briefed on the South China Sea; we know about the growth of her economic influence; we see the chart on her growing navy; we see the goals of the Belt-and-Road, we note her roots setting down in new soil through South America and Africa … but … is there another side of China we should be keeping an eye on?
Nectar Gan over at the South China Morning Post provides a few quotes from Peking University economist Zhang Weiying that is worth a ponder or two;
The economist’s rejection of the “China model” comes as debates about the country’s economic future are heating up. The world’s second largest economy is losing steam – growth is at its slowest pace since 2009 – as it marks 40 years since its market reforms.
At home, it is grappling with a mountain of debt, plunging stocks and an ailing private sector. Abroad, tensions over the prolonged trade war with the United States appear to be spilling over into defence, diplomacy and politics.
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A strong believer in the free market, Zhang said China’s rapid growth in past decades stemmed not from the “China model” but a “universal model” which relied on marketisation, entrepreneurship and three centuries of accumulating technology in the West, as in the success stories of other developed economies.Promoting the “China model”, he said, was misleading the world into hostility towards China.
“In the eyes of Westerners, the so-called ‘China model’ is equal to ‘state capitalism’, which is incompatible with fair trade and world peace, and therefore must be contained,” he said.
Moreover, it also risks hampering China’s own future, Zhang warned.
“Blindly emphasising the ‘China model’ would lead us onto a path of strengthening state-owned enterprises, expansion of state power and overly relying on industrial policy, which would lead to a reversal of reform progress, wasting previous reform efforts, and the eventual stagnation of economic growth,” he said.
I’ve been on the “China will get old before she gets rich” team for awhile, but modern China’s new middle and higher classes have yet to experience significant economic challenges – must less the mass of people and its government.
As a military funds itself from the economy it serves, how many different models for the growth of the Chinese military take in to account a possible slowing of her growth? Do we base predictions on the best, worst, or most likely?
