The Chief of Naval Operation’s Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority outlines guidance intended to enable U.S. naval forces to fight and win in an ever-shifting potential battle-space—one where geopolitics, technology, shifting trade relations, and budgetary limits operate to create a moving target of opportunities and risk for our sailors.[1] The limitations the Design considers include:
- An increase in maritime traffic globally, which tends to increase the scale of the potential battlefield, as well as the potential for confusion.
- The rise of global information systems aligned with accelerated adoption of new technologies, which tend to increase the vulnerability and exposure of forces at sea.
- Budgetary constraints, which may limit the size, and capabilities of U.S. forces at sea.
Looking back, the United States’ 1942 Solomon Island campaign featured a series of night surface engagements that clearly demonstrate the limits the Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority outlines. It was only when U.S. naval leadership overcame these factors that the Navy could achieve victories in the Solomons.
Heavy Traffic, Strange Waters, Tight-Quarters: Savo Island
The Battle of Savo Island (8–9 August 1942) shows the first of the Design limitations: confusion resulting from increased maritime traffic in an unfamiliar and distant region. In late 1942, “The Slot” (Map 1) became an extremely busy sea line. This corridor, the New Georgia Sound, was the main route for Japanese supplies and reinforcements bound for Guadalcanal from their bases near New Guinea.[2] Increased traffic in the tight maneuvering room of “The Slot,” bad charts, poor nighttime visibility, and reliance on early radar created confusion and increased the risk to U.S. and Allied ships.
Map 1 – The Solomon Islands and “The Slot”
On the evening of 8 August, a Japanese cruiser squadron under Rear Admiral Mikawa sortied to attack the Guadalcanal invasion fleet, engaging two separate groupings of Allied cruisers and destroyers stationed as a cover force (Map 2).[3] Rear Admiral Crutchley (RN), commanding the covering Australian-U.S. forces, divided his forces north and south of Savo Island in an attempt to cover several possible approaches.[4] In separate engagements, Mikawa’s ships were able to defeat both Allied groups.
Map 2 – Savo Island – 8-9 August 1942
Captain Bode, commanding the southern group, believed the Japanese could detect the ship’s radar and ordered it turned off. Radar’s early technology sometimes confused land masses with groupings of ships, adding to the Allies’ uncertainty.[5] At this stage of the war, Japan had a significant advantage in night surface engagements, and with superior night optics, outstanding torpedoes, and better training in night action, Mikawa was able to sight and close with Bode’s force in the dark south of Savo island.[6] Canberra (DD-33) was suddenly illuminated and immediately hit by a fusillade of gunfire that knocked out all but one gun.[7] Chicago (CA-29), also illuminated, was badly damaged by a torpedo. Bode then took Chicago on a 40-minute detour chasing imagined ships sighted in the dark to the west—and away from the action. At the same time, Bode failed to radio warnings about the attack to the rest of the Allied force, actions for which he was later transferred to a shore command in the Panama Canal Zone.[8]
Mikawa’s force continued counter-clockwise around Savo Island, targeting the northern blocking force under Captain Reifkohl. Once again, Japanese superiority in night tactics and optics were critical. The Japanese force pinpointed Quincy (CA-39) and Astoria (CA-34) with searchlights and hit them hard with gunfire at the outset. Additionally, none of the U.S. cruisers had cleared their decks of highly flammable scout aircraft, which as they burned aided Japanese gunners.[9] Vincennes (CA-44) was able to fire back, but was almost immediately hit by torpedoes.[10] Reifkohl misread the situation and blinkered “We are friendly” to the Japanese—highlighting the confusion resulting from the mass of ships in such constrained waters.[11]
Over 1,000 Allied and U.S. sailors were killed in the engagements around Savo Island.[12] The battle confirmed Japanese superiority in night fighting and torpedo tactics, but it also highlighted the issues of heavy traffic and strange, poorly charted waters—the CNO’s first set of limitations in the Design.
Information Overload: Battle of Cape Esperance
As U.S. forces consolidated their hold on Guadalcanal, Henderson Field became a bulls-eye for air, naval, and ground attack by the Japanese.[13] Japanese ground forces failed twice to recapture the island. While Yamamato focused on a third attempt, Admiral Ghormley, the theater commander, agreed to reinforce Marine defenders with Army units sailing from New Caledonia. Rear Admiral Scott’s TF-64 defended these transports, illustrating the second of the Design’s limitations on maritime superiority: an increase in information systems risks potential data overload.[14]
Night steaming in close-quarters and at high speeds was risky and required extensive training, coordination, and communication between ships—none of which were U.S. Navy strengths at the time. Radar was still something of a mystery for many senior leaders, who questioned its technology because of reliability and accuracy issues with early radar sets.[15] Onboard the San Francisco (CA-38), Scott ordered the SC radar turned off, fearing the it could be detected by the Japanese, which made him dependent on data from ships equipped with the newer SG radar.[16] Voice radio transmission between ships (TBS) was also relatively new, and protocols to minimize transmissions and keep channels and information clear and concise were not well followed. Some TBS reports called out radar sightings based on ship heading, others based on compass heading.[17] The lack of a dedicated commander’s data-fusion CIC center accentuated the issue Scott faced as he tried to draw a picture of the battlespace. The volume of data Scott had to filter was confusing and overwhelming. Rather than clarifying the commander’s picture of the battlespace, the flood of data clouded it.
Based on an earlier aircraft sighting, Scott ordered a poorly executed turn that put three destroyers out of position just as radar on several cruisers located the approaching Japanese force.[18] Scott believed the radar reports were the three wayward destroyers. At the same time as the U.S. force crossed the Japanese in a perfect setup for a gunnery action (Map 3), Helena (CL-50) asked Scott in a confusing TBS transmission for permission to open fire.[19]
Map 3 – Cape Esperance – 11-12 October 1942
Helena, believing they had received permission, opened fire, quickly followed by the rest of the force and, for once, the Japanese were taken by surprise. The lead Japanese cruiser was heavily damaged, and Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto was killed.[20] Scott, shocked at the “unauthorized” fire, and believing his cruisers were firing on his own destroyers, ordered a cease-fire that lasted a decisive four minutes.[21] As the situation clarified, U.S. forces re-engaged, and Japanese forces turned away.[22] In the end, one Japanese cruiser and a destroyer were sunk and one cruiser was badly damaged in exchange for a U.S. destroyer and damage to one cruiser.
Japanese night torpedo tactics were unsuccessful in this engagement, as Goto was completely surprised.[23] Considered a victory at the time, in the light of history it should be considered a failure on three counts: First, the Japanese squadron could have been totally destroyed, but confusion and data overload on the U.S. side saved them. Second, the Japanese were able to land significant reinforcements on Guadalcanal while the surface engagement was underway. Third, emboldened by their success, U.S. naval leaders remained complacent about the effectiveness of Japanese night tactics and weapons. That effectiveness—aided and abetted by confusion and information overload—would lead to disaster in battles to come.
Advancing Technology: First Battle of Guadalcanal
Yamamoto continued his struggle to reinforce and resupply Japanese forces on Guadalcanal through early November. Nightly runs of the “Tokyo Express” could not supply the tonnage of arms and supplies required, so he devised plan that included bombarding Henderson Field with several battleships, permanently reducing Marine air cover in “The Slot.”[24] At the same time, Admiral Halsey, who had replaced Ghormley as theater commander, decided to reinforce the Marine and Army units on Guadalcanal.[25] In a repeat of earlier engagements, the two sides collided in “The Slot” on the evening of 12–13 November. This time U.S. forces were decisively defeated by the well-trained and well-armed Japanese naval forces—and a failure to understand or effectively utilize the latest technologically advanced radar was one of the biggest reasons for the defeat.
A Japanese squadron under Vice Admiral Abe opposed Rear Admiral Callaghan’s TF-67. Of the ships under Callaghan’s command, five had the new SG radar. Callaghan commanded from San Francisco, one of the heavy cruisers that carried the older SC radar—which was his first mistake (Map 4).[26] Callaghan was an unfortunate choice to command TF-67 because he led as if radar didn’t exist and seemed not to understand the “stand-off” capability radar gave his ships, which should have allowed his ships to fire accurately at near maximum range. Callaghan’s second mistake was his force organization: none of the lead ships in his deployment were equipped with the more advanced SG radar, and his command ship was far back in the line, leaving him out of touch with events.[27] Finally, despite TBS alerts from SG radar–equipped ships, Callaghan persisted in trying to put together a visual picture of the battlefield, a nearly impossible task absent dedicated data-fusion capabilities.[28]
Map 4 – First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal – 12-13 November 1942
Both forces sighted each other visually at approximately the same time, and both commanders hesitated until the forces essentially overlapped at ranges of less than 3,000 yards. The battle became a chaotic melee.[29] Confusion was so great that at one point San Francisco put 19 shells into Atlanta (CL-51), wrecking her.[30] The Japanese, with far heavier guns, superior training, better night optics, and their “Long Lance” torpedo, were able to kill Callaghan in San Francisco, while Scott in Atlanta was also killed. The United States lost two cruisers and a destroyer, with two other cruisers and a destroyer heavily damaged. Japanese losses were limited to damage to several of their ships, though bombing attacks the next day sank one of the damaged battleships.[31]
Far more was wrong on the U.S. side than a simple failure to understand how to best employ the new radar. Callaghan was vastly out-gunned, and Japanese night training, optics, and torpedo tactics gave them a significant advantage. Critically, Helena’s radar picked up the Japanese ships at over 30,000 yards. Callaghan delayed the engagement to near point-blank range—a lost opportunity for torpedoes and long-range gunnery.[32] Twelve of thirteen U.S. ships engaged were sunk or damaged, and over 1,400 sailors and Marines died.[33] Radar worked, but the commander failed to integrate radar and take advantage of a technological advance. [34]
Budgetary Constraints: Battle of Tassafaronga
By late November 1942, the Japanese were starving to death on Guadalcanal.[35] Resupply in daylight with cargo ships was impossible absent control of the air. Submarines lacked the capacity to supply the volume needed ashore. In the end, the “Tokyo Express,” high-speed destroyer night-runs up “The Slot,” was the only option that would work.[36] The U.S. campaign on Guadalcanal had started as a shoe-string side show and throughout the campaign U.S. capabilities remained weak, with bad equipment, faulty training, and questionable ships—a result of budget constraints dating back nearly 20 years and a strategic focus on Europe.
Map 5 – Battle of Tassafaronga – 30 November 1942
On 30 November, Halsey ordered the interception of a Japanese run up “The Slot.”[37] The plan was for TF-67, under Rear Admiral Wright, to use radar-equipped destroyers to detect enemy forces, fire their torpedoes at long range, and get out of the way for a gun engagement by the cruisers.[38] Facing TF-67 was an eight-destroyer squadron under Rear Admiral Tanaka. Six of Tanaka’s ships were laden heavily with supplies, but all were well trained and equipped with the “Long Lance” torpedo.
The radar on Wright’s destroyers pinpointed Tanaka approaching at over 7,000 yards, but Wright would not give permission to fire, thinking the range was too great. By the time Wright allowed the destroyers to fire, their target solution was poor, with the Japanese passing abeam.[39] Compounding the error, the U.S. Mark 15 torpedo suffered from a variety of defects throughout the early war as a result of the failure to conduct expensive “full-up” testing prior to the war. All 20 torpedoes fired missed or failed to explode.[40]
After the destroyers fired their torpedoes, Wright’s cruisers opened fire, concentrating on the lead Japanese destroyer, which sank.[41] U.S. cruisers were not yet equipped with flashless powder, and the remaining Japanese destroyers immediately targeted the flashes with torpedoes.[42] The U.S. “Treaty Cruisers”—designed to carry larger caliber guns, but limited in total tonnage to 10,000 tons, and thinly armored—were terribly vulnerable to torpedo attack.[43] The design of these cruisers, under the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, was intended to avoid a costly naval race—exactly the type of budgetary constraint outlined in the Design. Four of the these cruisers were hit by torpedoes, with one sinking and three so damaged they struggled to make it to drydock.[44] In the end, the surviving cruisers were out of the war nearly a full year, marking one of the worst defeats for U.S. naval forces in the war.[45] Budgetary constraints related to “Germany First” and cost-savings decisions dating back to the 1920s resulted in vulnerable cruisers, propellant that spotlighted ships for targeting, and faulty torpedoes, all clearly highlighting the last of the Design’s limits.
Conclusion
Today’s Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority outlines limitations that were clearly displayed in the night surface actions of the Solomon Island Campaign. The failure to master those limits resulted in the terrible defeats the U.S. Navy suffered in “The Slot” in late 1942. Shifting priorities, new leadership in Halsey, and the realization that Guadalcanal had become much more than a “side show” forced the budgetary issues aside. As these limits were overcome, the Japanese were gradually defeated, and Guadalcanal secured.
Endnotes
[1] Office of the U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0, December 2018, https://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Richardson/Resource/Design_2.0.pdf.
[2] Ronald H. Spector, At War At Sea – Sailors and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 206.
[3] Joseph Wheelan, Midnight in the Pacific – Guadalcanal (New York: De Capo Press, 2017), 57.
[4] Wheelan, 54–55.
[5] James D. Hornfischer, Neptune’s Inferno – the U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal (New York: Bantam Books, 2011), 88.
[6] Wayne P. Huges, Fleet Tactics – Theory and Practice (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 117.
[7] Wheelan, 60–61.
[8] Wheelan, 62–63; Hornfischer, 517.
[9] Hornfischer, 96.
[10] Wheelan, 63–64.
[11] Wheelan, 63.
[12] Wheelan, 68.
[13] Wheelan, 79.
[14] Wheelan, 196 and 198.
[15] Hornfischer, 431.
[16] Hornfischer, 219.
[17] Hornfischer, 219.
[18] Hornfischer, 217–218.
[19] Hughes, 122.
[20] Hornfischer, 221.
[21] Hughes, 122–123.
[22] Hornfischer, 234.
[23] Hughes, 122.
[24] Hornfischer, 314.
[25] Hornfischer, 308–309.
[26] Wheelan, 283–284.
[27] Hornfischer, 334–335.
[28] Hornfischer, 334.
[29] Wheelan, 285.
[30] Wheelan, 286.
[31] Wheelan, 290–292.
[32] Hornfischer, 334.
[33] Wheelan, 290.
[34] Hughes, 117.
[35] Wheelan, 319.
[36] Wheelan, 318.
[37] Wheelan, 317.
[38] Wheelan, 319
[39] Wheelan, 320.
[40] Wheelan, 319.
[41] Wheelan, 320–321.
[42] Wheelan, 321.
[43] Hughes, 204.
[44] Wheelan, 322.
[45] Hornfischer, 486.
