Following the 2016 election of President Donald Trump there were many news stories, commentaries, and even congressional debates about nuclear command and control, the President’s “finger on the nuclear button,” and whether the President could unilaterally order a nuclear strike. As someone who served within the U.S. nuclear command and control (C2) system, I have concluded that it is important for me to dispel common myths about nuclear warfare and to explain the checks, balances, and system redundancies that are key safety features of America’s nuclear arsenal.
To understand nuclear C2, readers must first recognize its essential components: weapons delivery platforms, weapons release procedures, national command centers, and post-attack recovery operations.
Nuclear weapons are delivered primarily via one of three platforms: long-range bombers (B1, B2, B52), land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (Minuteman III), and missile-firing submarines. They are known collectively as the nuclear triad. Think of it as a three-legged stool: all the legs are necessary and required to work together to be effective. Strategic planners carefully evaluate the capabilities and limitations of each component. The assigned targets are precise and keyed to strategic objectives, the most important of which is national survival.
Targets for the nuclear triad are spelled out in what was once called the Single Integrated Operational Plan, SIOP for short.[1] This document became operational on 1 July 1961, and was intended to ensure that capabilities were carefully matched to targets and that there was no overlap among components of the nuclear triad. In 2003 the SIOP became part of OpPlan 8044, the general war plan, and in 2012 it became OpPlan 8010-12, Strategic Deterrence and Force Employment. Although SIOP is technically not a current term, most senior officers know precisely what it means.
Contrary to popular belief, the President of the United States cannot simply order a nuclear strike on a particular country or strategic target, even though Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States indicates that the President “shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States.” He must first get the Secretary of Defense to agree with him that a strike is warranted. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must then verify the identities of the President and Secretary and determine that the targets and weapons are appropriate to an actual or perceived threat to the United States. Only if all these conditions are met will the Chairman direct the National Military Command Center (NMCC) in the Pentagon to compose and release an emergency action message (EAM) to nuclear-capable forces. The EAM will designate targets, withholds, weapons to be used, and permissive action link (PAL) codes. The PAL codes are necessary to make the nuclear weapon or weapons operational.[2]
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Figure 1 – Chain of command for release of nuclear weapons
When the President and the Secretary of Defense are working on nuclear strike options they are known as the National Command Authority (NCA).[3] This status is consistent with the two-man rule that governs the release and employment of all nuclear weapons. Russia reportedly also uses the two-man rule to govern its nuclear arsenal.
The NMCC is one of only three national military command centers. The second is the Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC), located in a granite mountain at Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania. It is also referred to as Site R or as the Raven Rock Mountain Complex.[4] It is in continuous contact with the NMCC and, if necessary, can issue an EAM to the nuclear triad. The NMCC and the ANMCC are targeted and not expected to survive initial strikes by a nuclear adversary. Their sole mission is to execute the SIOP when the need arises.
The third national command center is the most survivable of the three, mainly because it will be airborne well before hostile missiles begin striking the United States. It is known variously as the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) or as the National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC).[5] There are four of these airborne command posts, collectively known as Nightwatch. Two are always on ready strip alert and two are undergoing maintenance. The NEACP can also execute the SIOP.
The NEACP is based on the Boeing 747 airframe, but with significant enhancements. For example, the entire aircraft, including windows, is shielded against the electromagnetic pulse that accompanies nuclear explosions.[6] Additionally, this aircraft can spool out a five-mile long trailing wire antenna that allows it to communicate with submerged nuclear submarines. The NEACP aircraft that are on strip alert have full crews and can be airborne within minutes of a klaxon alert. The aircraft have absolute priority over all other airplanes on runways, taxiways, or those flying nearby.
Neither member of the NCA is normally aboard an NEACP aircraft. The President and other senior officials will have been taken, in all probability, to a distant military air base deep in America’s heartland on Air Force One. From that remote location these officials will begin the near impossible task of national recovery. After a nuclear strike on the United States, however, NEACP aircraft will play a role in providing communications support to FEMA and others involved in reconstruction efforts.
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Figure 2 – Probable nuclear targets in the United States (source: FEMA)
When two senior officers in the NMCC simultaneously turn keys to release an EAM, 100 million people, 50 million on each side, will, in my opinion, perish. But in the United States 250 million will remain and survive, though under desperate circumstances. In Russia approximately 90 million will survive. Those who survive will face infrastructure in shambles, destroyed power grids, nuclear fallout, critical shortages of food, water, and medical supplies. Americans will have to depend on Canada and Mexico for massive aid shipments, though a wall along the southern U.S. border may be an impediment to much of this aid.
National Guard, Army, and Marine units, though normally tactical forces, will play a dominant role in recovery efforts after a nuclear strike. They can expect to be called upon to enforce martial law; to evacuate and care for injured and burned civilians; and to manage the scarce resources of food, water, and medical supplies. They will work alongside Army medics and Navy corpsmen in many of these important tasks. Additionally, our military forces will work alongside civilian law-enforcement officials to maintain order, to minimize looting, and to disarm civilian groups that may try to impose their own version of law and order.
After a nuclear exchange, the United States and Russia will no longer be great international powers. It will take at least a generation for both countries to rebuild, just as it did Hiroshima and Nagasaki after World War II.
While no sane person would ever advocate nuclear war, the U.S. nuclear triad, and the secure, redundant C2 systems that support it, have deterred threats against the United States and its allies for over 50 years. It might make great movie drama to imagine a President’s finger poised over a button, ready to unleash Armageddon, but the system is more complicated, with multiple checks, balances, and safeguards.
Endnotes
[1] “Single Integrated Operational Plan,” Revolvy, https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Single+Integrated+Operational+Plan.
[2] “Principles of Nuclear Weapons Security and Safety,” http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Pal.html.
[3] Department of Defense Directive 5100.30, “World-Wide Military Command and Control System,” December 7, 1971, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a272075.pdf.
[4] “Raven Rock Mountain Complex – Site R,” http://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/raven-rock-mountain-complex-site-r/.
[5] “E-4B National Airborne Operations Center,” Federation of American Scientists, https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/e-4b.htm.
[6] “E-4B,” fact sheet, U. S. Air Force, September 23, 2015, www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104503/e-4b/.