Was it willful ignorance of history wrapped around clever word smithing, or just misty-eyed optimism in the face of experience hoping for another buzz-phrase to lay a smoke screen around an elegant decline?

Was it something as good as informed desire, or something closer to a sweet little lie we all agreed to?

What ever the reason so much institutional, professional and personal capital was invested in selling former CNO Admiral Mullen’s “1,000 Ship Navy” (AKA Global Maritime Partnership), I think we have a nice example how it is at best a peace time indulgence, and not a serious way to plan contingencies. It is mostly dead, but you see the concept still twitching now and then. Time to get the holy water & a few stakes.

It isn’t just a USN issue, our European allies consistently deploy with each other, developing fleets in the last few decades that in many ways cannot operate in a hostile environment alone if needed.

We need to stop thinking we can’t do it along – we need to be able, no we must be able to do it alone.

Let’s time travel a bit first. Back in January of 2007, a younger yet equally dashing Bryan McGrath did his best to put some coherence to Mullen’s idea;

The 1,000-Ship Navy (more formally known as the Global Maritime Partnership Initiative in recognition that not all participating nations have established navies) represents a new way of thinking about international naval and maritime cooperation and collaboration on maritime security. Never intending to imply establishment of a powerful international combat fleet, the 1,000-Ship Navy more appropriately fosters a free-form collaborative environment in which all components of the maritime domain come together to share information for the benefit of all. Enlightened self-interest, low barriers to entry (especially technical), and respect for national sovereignty all underpin this notion. The 1,000-Ship Navy will have no leader, no task group commander. Using commonly agreeable standards of information-sharing, nations would participate or not participate as their interests dictate.
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the 1,000-Ship Navy … reflect(s) the CNO’s oft-stuted (sic) maxim that no one nation can do it all alone.

No, perhaps not … but the United States Navy needs to be prepared to do it alone. It is one thing to come and go in peace – when it becomes a habit and you can’t replace an allied capability at war – you have an issue. That is the danger.

Allies have their own national priorities and, while they expect us to be by their side when they need us – the track record going the other way is spotty at best. I don’t hold that against them, really. They are sovereign nations with under-capitalized navies and most with fragile coalition-dependent parliamentary governments with feet of clay.

Their internal political risk cannot be allowed to be our strategic risk.

Just two datapoints to show how one nation can leave the other quickly at sea, first from the edge of living memory, the second now.

One when a world was at war and American servicemembers were under fire while our neighbor … well … let’s just go visit the HMCS Uganda off Okinawa;

The spring of 1945 found the Allied forces advancing against the Axis powers on all fronts. With victory in Europe only a matter of time, Prime Minister Mackenzie King announced on 4 April that the Canadian Government no longer intended to deploy personnel, other than volunteers, to the Pacific Theatre. The “Volunteers Only” policy, as it was called, required that all naval personnel specifically re-volunteer for service in the Pacific Theatre before they would be dispatched to participate in hostilities. Unaware of the impending policy change, HMCS UGANDA had already set sail to augment the British Pacific Fleet (BPF).

The Canadian cruiser arrived on station on 8 April. Lacking precise direction, she engaged as planned in operations and soon earned quite a reputation. UGANDA was attached to the Fourth Cruiser Squadron, and participated in radar picket, anti-aircraft and shore bombardment duties. Of particular note is her participation in Operation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa, for which she was awarded a Battle Honour, and Operation Inmate, where she acted as the Flagship for Rear-Admiral Eric Brind in the British Pacific Fleet’s assignment to destroy air installations throughout the Truk Atoll in the Pacific (now part of Micronesia).
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The issue came to a head when the ship’s company was required to decide on whether or not they wished to re-volunteer, while simultaneously voting in an advance poll on 2 June for the general election. By nightfall, 344 members of the ship’s company had re-volunteered, while 556 of their shipmates had not. As a result, and due in no small part to the logistical nightmare of trying to send home personnel who opted not to re-volunteer, the Admiralty decided that UGANDA should return to Esquimalt to disembark the non-volunteers. Still, it took some time to organize this, and she continued on operations until relieved by HMS Argonaut on 27 July, when UGANDA departed the Pacific Theatre.

Remember at the dawn of this decade we were told that the USN did not need frigates? That if we did, our allies could fill that gap?

Today, we have the Spanish Navy’s Álvaro de Bazán-class frigate frigate Méndez Núñez (F-104).

Spain has withdrawn a frigate from a U.S.-led naval group in the Gulf because it was now focusing on alleged threats from Iran rather than an agreed objective to mark an historic seafaring anniversary, the Spanish government said on Tuesday.

“The U.S. government has taken a decision outside of the framework of what had been agreed with the Spanish Navy,” acting Defense Minister Margarita Robles told reporters in Brussels.

That led to the temporary pullout of the 215-sailor Mendez Nunez from the group led by aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln

That is fine – I guess – but we should plan accordingly. If you think friends get hard to find in a quasi non-standoff with Iran where we can’t get our message in synch, what do you think it would look like going against the Chinese?