As a former surface warfare officer, now a civilian pursuing a merchant mariner license, I recently had the opportunity to serve onboard the State University of New York (SUNY) Maritime College’s training ship, the Empire State VI. I was assigned as a deck training officer and lab instructor, but I also received an immersive education in how the Merchant Marine trains its officers and operates its ships. The Merchant Marine has a great deal that it can teach the Navy, and the Navy has much to offer its civilian counterparts. Surface warfare officer school (SWOS) should work with the seven maritime academies to explore possibilities to interact with their programs, as well as opportunities to offer training for civilian deck and engine officers in return.
The Empire State is not an ultra-modern cruiser or amphib; at 57 years old she hails from another era. Steam driven, with yard and stay rigs, she once served as a freighter in commercial service. The Maritime Administration used her as a troopship before converting her to train cadets. For someone with only experience on Navy surface ships, putting to sea on a civilian vessel is an education by itself.
Some differences were minor, like nomenclature. Others were more profound. Each was a challenge to assumptions and the idea of a “one right way” of doing business. While naval officers would expect scores of sailors on deck for mooring and unmooring, they would instead only see a handful of able seamen and licensed deck officers (mates) working lines on capstans.
Working with the mates was educational too. Uniforms were more a concept than issued garments. Mates were hands on. Whether it was taking in the brow or tying stoppers on mooring lines, mates were a part deck evolutions; they did not just oversee them. I found my knowledge did not measure up to a civilian mate’s in many areas; I knew how to anchor, but a mate could also operate the windlass. The mates had diverse backgrounds and experiences; some sailed from union halls, others were nominally retired, and still others had or did work for Military Sealift Command. The mates ranged from 22 to 72 years old—generations of knowledge rubbed elbows with recent graduates to great effect.
As much as the mates were pleased to pass on knowledge about their profession, they had an equal number of questions in return. Some were related to the collisions involving the USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) and USS John S. McCain (DDG-56), but others were more probing and asked about surface warfare, career paths, and how the Navy trains its officers. Like the mates, the cadets also had questions about the Navy. Some were participating in the Strategic Sealift Officer Program and asked about active-duty service. Others were NROTC midshipmen and interested to get outside opinions about surface warfare and other communities.
As the Navy works to continuously improve its training program, there are aspects which could be borrowed from training ship like the Empire State. The mates modestly agreed with this assessment, but they also believed that the best training occurred when the cadets shipped out with industry partners and got away from the school environment.
My time on the Empire State convinced me that a closer relationship between the Navy and Merchant Marine would be mutually beneficial. SWOS would be the ideal lead for this effort. It should reach out to the maritime academies and inquire about offering a small contingent of active-duty surface warfare officers to serve on annual training cruises. Two junior officers who had completed their initial division officer tours (one to work with deck, and the other engineering), plus an officer with CDR Command (for a senior officer perspective) would be more than enough. Ideally these officers would have no previous civilian experience—the maritime academy graduates already in uniform need no convincing of the training ships’ value. Sending different officers each year would maximize the surface community’s exposure to merchant mariners. In exchange, these officers would bring back to SWOS a new approach to officer training and add diverse experiences to the school’s body of knowledge.
Exposing more merchant mariners to the Navy would be challenging, but far from impossible. The Strategic Sealift Officer Program already creates a sizable number of reservists each year, and these officers would be good candidates for orders to Navy warships. They could ably lead a division, but even a short activation—to assist with midshipmen summer cruises perhaps—would be good training for those officers that are actively sailing in industry. Military Sealift Command, one of the largest employers of merchant mariners in the nation, should take every opportunity to cross-deck officers to and from their ships.
Finally, the Navy should begin an outreach program, providing training to merchant mariners about what they may expect in convoy ops, potential minefields, piracy, or other matters related to providing sealift in times of war. These sessions would also allow mariners to pick the brains of the officers conducting them, and put a face to the Navy that even most mariners only know though stilted conversations on bridge-to-bridge radio.
In 1874 Admiral Stephen Luce pushed the legislation that authorized what would become today’s SUNY Maritime College. He helped secure the training ship for that school, the USS St. Mary’s, the first of many Navy warships that enjoyed a second life with a maritime academy. Luce would go on to found the Naval War College a decade later. It would honor his legacy to have all those with a role in training seagoing officers work more closely together to build a stronger Navy and Merchant Marine.
