19th Century Concepts Hold True

Associating with some of the best minds in naval mine warfare can make one forget how people outside of the community conceptualize mining. With that in mind, I carried out an informal survey, starting with someone who would have no experience in mining and worked my way toward professionals. I asked my wife what a mine is. She described a floating black ball with spikes (“Hertz horns”) that is attached to a chain that blows up to sinks ships—deadly, but early 20th-century design and technologies. I thought it was a good description and guessed the general civilian population would provide the same description, perhaps extending to other types of mines, depending on their exposure to history and entertainment. It is time to redefine a naval mine that acknowledges its potential in seabed warfare, a definition that suits Joint Forces. 

Many U.S. Navy professionals would describe mines in the same detail that Scott Truver discussed in “Taking Mines Seriously: Mine Warfare in China’s Near Seas.”[i] While the accuracy of the descriptions might vary, the concept of “form and effect” remains constant. When attempting to divert from traditional concepts of form or effect, I am met with disagreements that ultimately devolve into “that’s not a mine.” This limiting ideology seems to linger despite well-crafted articles that introduce the asymmetric and affordable mines of tomorrow.[ii] The concept of naval mines has been relegated to one that is more than a hundred years old and has not evolved; it sadly has devolved since the World War II. 

Weapons Still Waiting?

Mining and mine counter-measures traditionally account for less than 1 percent of the Navy’s annual total budget.[iii] I do not have the insight to celebrate or critique budget decisions, nor the authority to make a change. In the absence of expertise in such matter, I offer critiques of German mines that former Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance Vice Admiral G. F Hussy Jr. made in 1946, which may seem familiar to those who have studied modern naval warfare.

The German Navy focused on guns and torpedoes in the beginning of the war, with little interested in mines despite the recognition of their potential effectiveness because they were “likely to be discredited by injudicious use.”[iv] Nobody in the mining command could successfully present the High Command with an argument to elevate mining from its second-rate position. High-speed vessels were not built with the intention to mine, and while various vessels, from cruisers to submarines to merchant ships, were fitted to mine, there were never enough at once to meet the mine group requirements. Submarines prioritized the torpedo, thus there were no effective German western Atlantic minefields to disrupt ships to Europe. “Initially, mine lays were designed to sink merchant tonnage in order to make better press-release material for the sake of elevating morale, but by the time this policy changed, it was too late.

While the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) could deliver mines, naval mining had no influence over the Luftwaffe. Although the German Navy owned the minelaying operation, the Luftwaffe insisted on its independence. Instead of using mines to effectively blockade England after the fall of France, the Luftwaffe continued to use bombs, allegedly because Goering wanted to show Hitler pictures of burning English cities, rather than rely on the invisible and often immeasurable results of naval mine warfare. The Luftwaffe’s influence extended to production: it ordered a bomb-mine—designed by technical staff with no mining expertise—to replace the Navy’s parachute mine. Eventually, mine expertise was included, though by the time production started, the Luftwaffe and Navy disagreed about the principles and design and they manufactured their own versions of the same mine. Later, they disagreed on how it would be used with other units. Service divisions occurred with the Army as well, as the Navy was not involved in any beach defense mining plans.[v]

 Getting Mines Out of the Box

An updated definition of mining may increase the U.S. Navy’s mining budget, though attempts to expand the definition often meets conceptual roadblocks. The response to a cutting-edge mining concept is usually “that’s not a mine.” One should view the mine by focusing on an unmanned delivered effect. The concept of a mine, then, is no longer a ball with horns that goes boom (though even antique versions can still be effective). Like other weapons, the mine is a means to deliver an effect to shape the battlespace and destroy the enemy. However, unlike other weapons, the mine has been able to deliver unmanned effects since the Hertz horn was invented in 1866.[vi] The McGeehan and Wahl concepts describe the next phase in “smart” maritime mining capabilities, which are capable of effects ranging from non-kinetic data collection to kinetic-effect explosions. They might be prepositioned and provide a persistent threat while adapting and reconfiguring when necessary.[vii]

Regardless of the warfare area, the question is, what effects do the component commanders require to support the intent of the Joint commander? How can these effects, whether kinetic, electronic, or informational be delivered autonomously? If we can find a way to deliver that effect by sea, we have a new concept for a mine. The current definition for a mine is “in naval mine warfare, an explosive device laid in water with the intention of damaging or sinking ships or of deterring shipping from entering an area.”[viii] It is time to move beyond that constrained definition.

The naval mine could be defined with elements that include an autonomous, semi-autonomous, sensor-controlled, or directly controlled seaborne device capable of defeating the adversary, providing means to overcome adversary influences, or collecting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Mines should be able to deliver effects at sea to assist submarine, air, surface, and ground forces to defeat or overcome the enemy. Mines should have a variety of delivery methods to keep the adversary off balance. Somewhere, somebody is working on an effect that can be or should be delivered by an unmanned device acting autonomously, semi-autonomously, sensor-controlled, or directly controlled from the sea. Unfortunately, they are probably not thinking of it as a mine.

If the mine were properly defined, the mining budget might be larger. A number of warfare concepts have been developed as technology has advanced. In the U.S. Army’s 1st Calvary Division, warfare has evolved from soldiers on horseback to soldiers in helicopters and armored vehicles. The Navy should also expand the definition and concept of naval mines to keep pace with advances in technology. Mines should not be considered competition for traditional platforms, but rather as asymmetric solutions that will free traditional platforms to focus on the missions for which they were designed.[ix]

Benefit of Breaking Out of the Box

As autonomous devices or systems emerge, there will inevitably be legal restrictions and questions. A device or system defined as a mine must adhere to the Convention (VIII) relative to Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines.[x] There are also considerations that would guide mining concepts based upon the San Remo Manual of 1994, which was “prepared during the period 1988–1994 by a group of legal and naval experts participating in their personal capacity in a series of Round Tables convened by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law. The purpose of the Manual is to provide a contemporary restatement of international law applicable to armed conflicts at sea.”[xi]

Adhering to regulations that are more than 100 years old provides several interpretations nestled safely under mining law. There are mining concepts that call for modular effectors that can be deployed autonomously by unmanned undersea vehicles, which would provide commanders with an awesome weapon under mining stipulations in The Hague.[xii]

Mining has impacted outcomes at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. It has acted against or preserved military, economic, and political interests. Despite innovation in mining, German leadership took too long to grasp the value of mines, causing operational and strategic mistakes that could have changed the outcome of World War II. The U.S. Navy must recognize and avoid the German Navy’s mistakes.

Redefining what a mine is, across the services, is an important step to ensure that the wealth of creativity and expertise in the technical and operational community are taken advantage of. Ensuring that new effects are meet the commander’s intent while adhering to Convention VIII will provide flexibility to keep America’s military the bes

Endnotes

[i] S. C. Truver, Taking Mines Seriously: Mine Warfare in China’s Near Seas, Naval War College Review, Vol. 65(2), 2012.

[ii] S. Pratt, D.E. Everhart, “Asymmetric and Affordable,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June Vol.138(6), 2012.

[iii] S. C. Truver, “What ‘Weapons that Wait?’” SEAPOWER, June 2011.

[iv] G .F. Hussey, “German Underwater Ordnance: Mines,” Ordnance Pamphlet 1673A, 1946, 10.

[v] Hussey, “German Underwater Ordnance: Mines.”

[vi] “Chapter 2: Mine Warfare, an Overview” in Oceanography and Mine Warfare, Ocean Studies Board, Commission on Geosciences, Environment, and Resources, National Research Council, Oceanography and Mine Warfare (Washington, DC: National Academy Press), 2000, https://www.nap.edu/read/9773/chapter/4 on 16 July 2019

[vii] C. T. McGeehan and D. Wahl, (2016). “Flash mob in the shipping lane!” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 142/1/1355

[viii] Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington DC: The Joint Staff May 2019), 147.

[ix] J. J. Edwards and D.M. Gallagher, “Mine and Undersea Warfare for the Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1, 2014 at https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2014/august/mine-and-undersea-warfare-future.

[x] Convention (VIII) relative to Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, The Hague, 18 October 1907.

[xi] San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 1994, http://www.jag.navy.mil/distrib/instructions/San_Remo_Manual[1].pdf.

[xii] Edwards and Gallagher, “Mine and Undersea Warfare.”