Navy

Return Crozier to the Roosevelt, Restore Faith in the Navy

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I began a recent op-ed I wrote with a nod to then-Lieutenant General George Washington’s thoughts on good order and discipline. In a 1757 letter to his Virginia Regiment captains, Washington commented on the importance of good order and discipline when he wrote that, “Discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures success to the weak and esteem to all.”

Discipline is critically important, a position retired U.S. Navy Captain Kevin Eyer makes clear in his recent USNI blog post when stating his belief that Captain Brett Crozier, the recently relieved USS Theodore Roosevelt commanding officer, should not be reinstated.

I have long respected Captain Eyer and his writings. He makes another fair assessment when he writes that, “to quell the noise, the Navy may be forced to take actions which may be contrary to either the ‘good order and discipline’ so vital to an effective fighting force or decisions which lead to unintended, unwanted other consequences.”

This, however, is where my agreement ends.

Contrary to Captain Eyer’s belief, the Navy should absolutely restore Captain Crozier as the Theodore Roosevelt’s commanding officer for three reasons: to restore faith with the ship’s crew, to restore trust and faith in senior Navy leadership, and to heal the breach of faith his firing created with the American public.

But first, a recap of the situation that brought us here.

Then-Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly, like Eyer, no doubt considered good order and discipline to be his primary rationale when announcing his quick decision to remove Captain Brett Crozier from command of the Theodore Roosevelt, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier with an active—and growing—coronavirus outbreak.

Crozier had crafted a four-page memorandum to memorialize his concerns about the coronavirus spreading throughout his ship, a memo he emailed to his chain of command. Unfortunately, the memo subsequently made its way to the San Francisco Chronicle—who promptly published it—setting off a tumultuous week of intense scrutiny for the Navy as members of the media descended to scrutinize coronavirus response efforts for the Theodore Roosevelt and the fleet.

Modly undoubtedly intended the firing to signal a restoration of good order and discipline by holding Crozier accountable for circumventing the chain of command. As Facebook videos and countless social media posts demonstrated, Modly’s decision had the opposite effect, with sailors visibly cheering Crozier as he departed the aircraft carrier.

Since then, we’ve borne witness to Modly’s profanity-laced speech to the crew of the Theodore Roosevelt, learned that more than 650 sailors from the aircraft carrier’s crew have tested positive for COVID-19, and that one sailor has tragically passed away. Captain Crozier himself tested positive after his relief and remains in isolation in Guam.

Some, like Eyer, point to Crozier’s leaked memorandum as proof his relief is warranted, as “Captain Crozier precipitated the removal of one of the Navy’s few, most strategic assets from the playing board.” Unfortunately, this is a false and misleading narrative.

Navy leadership in the Pentagon and in Pearl Harbor already had approved sidelining the Theodore Roosevelt in Guam. On 26 March, UPI—among other news outlets—released an article stating, “The Navy has ordered the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt to pull into Guam and have its 5,000-strong crew of sailors tested for the novel coronavirus, according to acting Navy secretary Thomas Modly.” The San Francisco Chronicle did not report on Crozier’s letter until 31 March 31, five days after Navy leadership removed “one of the Navy’s few, most strategic assets from the playing board.”

Then, yesterday, the Washington Post published a story containing a copy of Crozier’s original email. Modly cited Crozier’s gross neglect as part of his relief, claiming Crozier emailed his memorandum of concerns to “dozens” of other people. According to the email obtained by the Washington Post, Crozier addressed the email to only three people, all in his chain of command:

  • Admiral John Aquilino, Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet
  • Vice Admiral DeWolfe Miller, Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific Fleet
  • Rear Admiral Stu Baker, Commander Carrier Strike Group 9

Crozier also, per standard practice, copied a small group of immediately relevant captains for their awareness:

  • Captain Dan Keeler, USS Theodore Roosevelt executive officer (on board)
  • Captain Michael Langbehn, Commander Carrier Air Wing 11 (on board)
  • Captain Jeff Heames, Commander Destroyer Squadron 23 (on board)
  • Captain John York, on board the Theodore Roosevelt
  • Captain Marc Miguez, executive assistant to Admiral Aquilino
  • Captain Robert Westendorff, executive assistant to Admiral Miller

As this list of ten people demonstrates, Crozier’s letter was hardly addressed in a manner that unduly highlighted the aircraft carrier’s plight (not withstanding my previous point that official U.S. Navy channels had already done so). Rather, these are exactly the right people to send this email to. Unless a smoking gun suddenly appears, it would seem Crozier took the right steps, acknowledging in his own email that, “I believe if there is ever a time to ask for help it is now regardless of the impact on my career.”

It is in this spirit that the U.S. Navy should immediately reinstate Captain Crozier as the Theodore Roosevelt’s commanding officer, a possibility left open by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Gilday and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper.

No, this is not an impassioned plea for justice or a call to action. Rather, it is to highlight the positive strategic outcomes the Navy would benefit from by restoring Crozier to command—a decision that would also restore faith with sailors fleetwide. Acting Secretary Modly’s resignation on 7 April offers an opening . . . and the Navy should take it.

So, how can restoring Crozier rebuild faith with the crew, the Navy, and the American public?

First, restoring Captain Crozier would demonstrate unequivocally that even senior leaders make mistakes, learn from them, and are willing to acknowledge and correct them when the situation warrants. Senior leaders in the Pentagon routinely claim that this is the case, but actions speak louder than words ever can, and decades of swift reliefs prove otherwise.

Modly’s resignation provides senior Navy leaders room to maneuver, as they can rightly point to his ouster as proof that the decision to remove Crozier was rash, irresponsible, and tone deaf. His restoration to command would close the “say-do” gap with sailors, confirm that the Navy is a learning organization, and reinforce the desire for commanding officers to make difficult decisions under incredible pressure regardless of the consequences.

Second, placing him back in command sends a signal far and wide that we’ve begun to learn the lessons of the tragic 2017 USS McCain (DDG-56) and Fitzgerald (DDG-62) collisions, when commanding officers were blamed for being too passive when it came to making tough decisions surrounding readiness shortfalls, a passivity that led to deaths of 17 sailors. Following the collisions, then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson famously walked into a meeting with ship commanding officers to proclaim that “they” [the COs of the McCain and Fitzgerald] were to blame for the collisions, not the Navy senior leadership who had consistently underresourced and overutilized Seventh Fleet (a point that then-Seventh Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Joseph Aucoin made after having raised the flag regarding readiness on numerous occasions.)

Third, the Navy now has an opportunity to restore faith with nearly 5,000 sailors on board the Theodore Roosevelt. It would go a long way to demonstrating that the Navy’s actions align with its stated principles of “Honor, Courage, and Commitment,” which would in turn inform sailors as they consider their “stay” versus “go” decisions as enlistments and commissions expire. Placing Crozier back in the captain’s chair also helps narrow the wide rift generated between the Navy and the American public it serves following years of misconduct: the multiyear “Fat Leonard” scandal, pushing out nascent-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Bill Moran, and Navy SEAL Eddie Gallagher’s misconduct.

Finally, as a student of history, I like the signal Admiral Gilday would send by restoring Crozier to the Theodore Roosevelt. As a three-star admiral elevated to serve as Chief of Naval Operations, Gilday started his tenure with a fleet perception that he is different. Why else would he jump so many eligible four-star admirals to take the Navy’s helm?

Clearing Crozier and placing him back onboard the Theodore Roosevelt is an elegant solution for Gilday. He can free Rear Admiral-select Sardiello, Roosevelt’s interim commanding officer, to resume his career. He can fill the seat by restoring a proven leader (and one the crew obviously embraces). He leaves unaffected the rigid and carefully orchestrated career pipeline of aircraft carrier commanding officers. Above all, restoring Crozier cements Gilday’s legacy as a CNO willing to challenge the Navy’s status quo—doing what is right over doing what is easy or expected.

The downside to restoration? Navy leadership would have to admit they made a mistake.

But rarely are lessons more powerful than when leaders demonstrate humility and a true love for the organizations they lead than when they say, clearly, “We were wrong.”

Then they correct the error.

Return Captain Crozier to the Theodore Roosevelt. There are hundreds of good reasons to do so . . . and only one bad reason not to.

One thing is certain: Gilday’s actions will speak far louder than his words ever can.

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