A little observation from David Larter this AM reminded me that we find ourselves in a very different place in 2020 than we thought we would be two decades ago.
At the dawn of a new century coming out of the post-Cold War consolidation glow, our best and brightest decided that a new people with new ideas could bring us in to a new century of dominance. We could transform past all the historical standards, challenges, and practices holding us back in to a bright, sparkling fleet of paradigm breaking technology, concepts, and efficiencies.
A new century required new thinking. Inefficiencies were to be found everywhere, and “new” technology – made flesh through undaunted will and superior management expertise of a fresh generation of leaders.
We know how that worked out. Does the above sound familiar? It should, as we are hearing similar things again.
If we are to learn from the past, we must be vigilant. There is no amount of good will left to allow the benefit of the doubt to pixie dust promises delivered on the back of unicorns. Any use of the phrase “transformation” or “efficiencies” needs to be met with multiple, hard, and confrontational follow-on questions – if not outright hostility.
There is a cult-like expectation by some that “transformation” or “efficiencies” are some sort of talisman that have powers that command acceptance by everyone. That demand faces a deep and dark forest of two decades of experience that those using the magic words expect everyone to pretend doesn’t exist.
If the advocates of transformation and efficiency continue to wield these discredited buzzwords, then they should expect no quarter given in the follow-on questions. At every juncture, especially on the surface side, they need to be reminded where this path brought us.
As China already has rough regional parity in the Western Pacific and is moving to additional strength with new designs in serial production, what do we have to face them through mid-decade?
When it comes to our surface battle force, we have built a fleet of 2nd choices, substitutes, and band-aids. We did not do this by direct choice, but because our own institutional incompetence gave us no other choice.
The Transformationalists failed with DDG-1000, so we’re getting the post-restart DDG-113+ Flt IIA/III instead (planning to be built until the crack of doom).
The program & acquisition community failed with CG(X) so we’ll try again with more humility via the tone deafly named Large Surface Combatant (LSC) … not to be confused with LCS. (we might see ready by the mid-2030s, perhaps not)
Everyone failed with LCS so we’ll try not to screw up with a derivative of the existing and mature Franco-Italian FREMM FFG. (I&W shows concern with the engineering plant proposals)
All that evidence and the embarrassing results yet … what real reform have we done with the processes and mindsets that gave us this fleet?
We are hearing in places that we have learned our lessons, but it is not time to assume that the old system – never held to account – will not step in to pick up where it left off.
Keep a weather eye.
