The United States is facing a dangerous world, filled with a wide range of threats from countries such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. These threats have intensified in recent years, presenting new challenges to our National Security Strategy. From the mine warfare perspective, the Navy must examine historical data to understand the effect of mines in prior conflicts and to develop new strategies to ensure U.s. success in countering the threats.
Since World War II, 14 ships have suffered more physical damage and operational interference from sea mines than from aircraft, missiles, and submarines, not including recent events with Iran and the suspected limpet mine attacks on commercial tankers. Mines are inexpensive to manufacture, and can cause major damage to vessels affecting shipping lanes, commercial traffic, and altering strategic planning during military operations. Current strategic areas of interest threatened by mining operations include the Indo-Pacific, Middle East, South and Central Asia.
Admiral Jeremy Boorda, understood this concept during his service a Chief of Naval Operations and he knew the importance of mine countermeasure capabilities within the force. There are three ways the Navy can refocus its mine warfare programs and become an effective force. First, the Navy need to incorporate and reintroduce wine warfare into fleet exercises, and train as we fight. Understand the burden on the sailors within this small community who are expected to operate in a joint environment, yet are isolated to remote exercises. Next, the fleet needs a suitable substitute for the Avenger-class mine countermeasure (MCM) ships. With their current service life surpassing 25 years, plagued with parts availability and funding cuts, the gap between adversary MCM forces and U.S. MCM forces continues to grow. The precipitous decline in U.S naval mining capability follows from the fact that mine warfare in general has had a low budget priority. Last, the Navy must expand the detachments with expeditionary mine countermeasure (ExMCM) forces throughout the world. Having a fast response ExMCM force could help close the gap, however cannot sustain it alone.
Mine Warfare in joint missions and interoperability as sea. The Navy needs to follow the age old creed of “Train like we fight.” We need a well-organized, trained and dedicated mine force equipped to perform at sea within a multilateral battlespace. Most mine warfare exercises and operations occur in remote locations and incorporate only limited surface forces. However, in a real-world operation, an amphibious or expeditionary force may require the support and talents of mine warfare forces. The Chief of Naval Operations says that the most demanding operating environment anticipated for the Avenger- class is forward deployed wartime operations within the littoral battle space supporting amphibious groups in cooperation with designated joint or allied forces. Unfortunately, because joint exercises with mine warfare forces and amphibious forces or rarely occur, these two communities do not fully understand the capabilities and limitations presented while operating in a similar battlespace. Providing more opportunities for mine warfare forces to operate with other surface units can help build the cohesion required for effective operations. These opportunities must include not only surface MCMs, but also hould incorporate Air MCM (MH-53) units, ExMCM underwater unmanned vehicle (UUV) detachments, and even begin to reintroduce EOD units to surface MCM ships.
Second, the Navy needs to incorporate an overview of mine forces into curriculums. During my course at the Combat Systems Senior Enlisted Course, the class spent one, outdated slide on MCM forces, and dedicate two weeks to other composite warfare commanders. This inequality in training, and the insufficient understanding of limitations, only creates challenges within operational forces. How can the Navy build interoperability between forces if the curriculums, which are the foundations of technical training, do not place equal importance in all warfare areas?
Find a suitable surface vessel capable of assuming the surface mine warfare role. The Navy needs to maintain a dedicated MCM force to undertake mine hunting, sweeping, and neutralization efforts. Anyone who has served on board a surface mine countermeasures ship can attest to the challenges presented by design flaws and plant and equipment reliability. Since their involvement in Desert Storm, MCM ships have been criticized for the issues plaguing their engineering plants. Today’s MCMs have been in service for more than 25 years. Their decommissioning continues to be extended as no suitable surface ship has been able to fully demonstrate the ability to replace them.
As these ships continue to age and remain in service, greater funding is required to repair and replace parts that are no longer manufactured. Onboard systems receive routine updates similar to how computers receive software updates, but are limited by design, funding, and the decommissioning period constantly looming. Also, Avenger-class MCMs continue to certify in a variety of warfare areas similar to any other surface ship, with an average crew of 80 sailors, with department heads and chiefs who manage an average of four warfare areas. This does not allow them to focus solely on one warfare area, but rather they must juggle multiple programs with minimal manpower. With systems past their initial service life, and constant struggles, the crews of these ships continue to find ways to keep them operational in hopes of a better solution for the surface MCM force.
Previous projects to assume partial MIW roles, such as the Arleigh Burke-class USS Bainbridge (DDG-96), which had a remote mine system—variously known as RMS or RMMV—on board, along with a crane to launch and recover it. This required a DDG to deploy and recover an remotely operated UUV, and system reliability was a major concern. This required the DDG to remain in the area while the system conducted its search which limited mission availability. The use of a DDG or other surface platforms simply removes and restricts battle group commanders in their use during these periods, whereas a dedicated surface MCM ship has no other primary mission which can limit or strategic and tactical plans.
The littoral combat ship (LCS) project promised to assume this role utilizing mission modules that were interchangeable for the mission assigned. With the 2019 budget for LCS was noted at $1,571.2 million (an average of $523.7 million each), the Navy has paid for a vessel which uses mine warfare as a secondary warfare area and not a primary mission. This can present challenges, such as a lack of use or exercises for that specific mission module, therefore affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the force. In addition, there are concerns about the survivability, designs, and overall effectiveness of these systems. This project also has another flaw, Mine Countermeasures is a secondary warfare area. With MIW as a secondary warfare area, sailors tend to focus on other critical areas and may not receive adequate training required to become technical experts.
The Navy needs to use the lessons learned from the 25 years of surface MCMs, previous Osprey-class minehunters, maritime security operations, and LCS programs to develop an updated version of the Avenger-class MCM. With this option, a dedicated force able to master the field of mine countermeasure will be ready and willing to effectively clear minefields.
Expansion of ExMCM forces. ExMCM forces are using the MK 18 Mod 1 and Mod 2 UUVs to provide an organic MCM force. Their use in increasing and effectiveness is notable; however, the Navy cannot simply rely on an ExMCM force alone to fulfill the mine warfare role. History has shown with incidents such as with the 1991 USS Princeton (CG-59), Tripoli (LPH-10) mine strikes in the Persian Gulf, and throughout the Tanker War in the Strait of Hormuz in 1948–88, ships will be susceptible to mines and the Navy needs an aggressive multilateral force to counter the adversary efforts.
The Navy needs to continue to increase UUV system capabilities to increase effectiveness. Current systems require post mission analysis prior to contact prosecution and neutralization. Simply stated, the user must first allow the system to look for potential contacts, download the data after the system has completed its search of the area (which can take hours), and then the user must review data gathered and prioritize contacts for prosecution. This process requires trained operators, with experience identifying potential targets. This seems to be a longer process than the real-time data received from surface MCM forces, which receive data as it is collected. In efforts to increase the lethality of the MCM force, the Navy needs to increase the number of detachments throughout the world, especially near the strategic areas listed above. Increasing the number of detachments available in these areas will minimize deployment time and availability, and increase operational familiarity within these regions.
