The United States already is receiving enemy fire in the next major conflict and is sorely unprepared to face the near-peer threat in the information environment. However, not for the reasons that have plagued the services in past conflicts. The Navy and Marines Corps’ deficiencies here cannot be measured with quantities of people and things. They possess the personnel and equipment needed to stand toe-to-toe with digital foes. This is a conflict of leadership and lack of adequate skill management. The Marines and sailors of the force are capable and willing to take the fight to the enemy, but planners and strategists must be prepared to adapt current techniques and procedures, lifted directly from private industry and individuals of influence, at speeds incompatible with current planning methods. Only then may the services out-cycle their opponents in the ongoing contest for the most complicated terrain the military can be tasked to secure—the hearts and minds of friends, allies, and enemies.
This requires decentralization of current approaches, democratization of the necessary authorities, and incorporation of the natural talents of the youngest personnel in the arena of social media. They must be enabled to begin training for that fight today and provided with the conditions to hone their tactics, techniques, and procedures in garrison. Information operations planners, enabled by commanders, must allow these Marines and sailors to engage the enemy directly in the social spheres of the internet and protect them from potential threats by advising shifts in their communication methods accordingly.
Preparing Information Warriors
The solution to current threats in the information environment could echo the expensive and logistically intensive efforts employed in the Manhattan Project, but there is an alternative more readily available that does not require building new facilities or assembling new teams of highly educated professionals, nor the total and complete government control which enables such efforts.[1] “Generation Z” or “Gen Z,” sometimes referred to as “Net-Gen,” are those in the ranks who are age 23 and younger. They are digital-natives the likes of which the military and the world have never had to contend. In the United States, they have grown up with internet-connected devices and social media as readily accessible as television and radio were to previous generations. The current planners and strategists of operations in the information environment (OIE), by contrast, are “immigrants” to the digital world, so they must learn the tactics, techniques, and procedures to sustain effects in that domain. Closing the knowledge gap requires time, and enemies are taking advantage of “prep-time” and acting against U.S. intentions. Were the Sea Services to empower these younger generations to take swift action, based on best practices already well-understood by them, Marines and sailors conducting operations in the information environment could move from observation to action with the fluidity necessitated by the nature of information warfare, which moves as fast as the speed of a tweet—sometimes faster.
‘Locate . . .’
Members of Generation Z has seen approximately 200,000 targeted messages by age 15. They are extremely critical of the information they receive and can recognize when they are being “sold to.” They prefer real people to traditional celebrities. They openly deride most organizational messaging, including that espoused by the U.S. military. One group of Gen Z Marines even rebuked the Marine Corps values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment, telling one researcher “Don’t even say those words to us. We hear that phrase, and we know what’s coming next is just more . . . propaganda.” If they can so adeptly detect propaganda from an organization they have been indoctrinated into, it stands to reason that they would be able to easily detect enemy propaganda, and its necessary enablers—disinformation and misinformation—as it targets friendly forces and operations.
‘. . . Close With and Destroy’
Information warriors do not just detect the enemy. They also must close with and destroy the enemy and may train to this end from garrison. Public affairs authorities belonging to commanders can enable young Marines and sailors to hone their techniques for positive purposes at home. Social media is not foreign to anyone in this environment. Members of every unit use social media to some extent, and form communities in which they share information. Commands create official social media pages to attempt to broach this space. Given the reluctance of the current generation to engage with what they see as propaganda, this tactic is likely to be met with questionable success.
A 2014 study commissioned by Variety determined that the most influential figures among Generation Z were YouTube stars. Among the traits they identified that drew those surveyed to these personalities were approachability and authenticity. P. W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking expand upon these traits in LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media to say that successful information warriors win by wielding “narrative, emotion, authenticity, [and] community . . . to provoke responses that impel us to action, to connect with us at the most personal level”.[2] What Generation Z understands about the social aspects of information warfare is that the “new winners are those who have mastered the power of narrative and primed their audiences with emotion . . . again and again and again.”[3] Singular actors in the information environment cannot achieve what thousands of members of a unit can by simply taking an authentic and direct approach. While every member of a unit is not capable of waging a cyberattack or conducting a psychological operations mission, they can participate in community building and disseminate command messaging.
Information operators must be permitted to document their lives as they are, blemishes and all, and be empowered to create open communities in which these conversations are habitual. A Marine who posts a live video divulging their anxiety about an upcoming fitness test reaches his audience in a way no command video ever could. By sharing the emotions of the audience, and by telling a familiar story, with a messenger who looks, sounds, and acts like the audience, military organizations might achieve more effective communications with key audiences and their stakeholders.
Entrepreneur Barrett Wissman posits that the future of communications on behalf of organizations belongs to micro-influencers—social media personalities with relatively few followers, but who are approachable and relatable, and thus highly engaged with their audiences. The first step, according to Wissman, is to analyze the organization’s followers and ask who is already interested in telling the brand’s story and talking about it? By applying this approach, units can find their own micro-influencers quite easily, as it is likely that members of the unit are already talking about the unit, service, or mission. By formalizing that relationship, one is simply weaponizing a presence that already exists.
The Role of Commander’s Intent
Release authority with respect to information about military activities is a power delegated to only a few senior commanders. Delegating this power to their lowest-ranking subordinates is a decision that gives commanders at all levels pause. This stems from the reality that information may quickly rise from the tactical level to the strategic level. A tweet about a helicopter operating in Pakistan garners little interest, until it is revealed that it landed at the compound of Osama bin Laden. Instances such as this, while notable, are exceedingly rare. Clear communication about what will and will not be discussed is sufficient to protect operational security. It is imperative to treat these communicators as trusted partners, not as potential risks. This requires articulation of what will be communicated from commanders and planners. If the United States intends to fight the enemy in the information venues in which they operate, Generation Z information warriors must be enabled at the tactical level, informed by commander’s intent.
An approach adapted from the public relations (PR) field can enable commanders to communicate intent clearly and efficiently to their troops, in a way that gives them latitude to creatively cultivate relationships with key audiences, while mitigating the risks of information activities. Two of the Barcelona Principles, rules designed to guide PR evaluation, can inform commanders how to frame intent for operations in the information environment, specifically “social media can and should be measured” and “measuring outcomes is preferred to measuring . .. results,” results referring to metrics such as likes or shares. These outcomes, according to the Defense Information School, include: reputation, behavior, engagement, attitude, and awareness. Commander’s intent for subordinates engaging in OIE should be limited to an increase, decrease, or sustainment of the current levels of these outcomes.
The Enemy and Gen Z’s response
The approach recommended here draws a justifiable criticism, that while this is an acceptable risk in garrison, the threat of enemy actions against personnel is too great. The reality is that this threat exists at home as readily as in northern Europe or southeast Asia. Russian agents have “friended” military personnel on social media, posing as attractive young women. These relationships provide the enemy a way to inject disinformation or other targeted messaging into the social media feeds of service members. Who better to counter these questionable bots, trolls, and sock puppets than a trusted spokesperson of the U.S. military who already has cultivated an authentic relationship with the audience?
Marines and sailors already are developing their own strategies to fight back. One threat I have observed them counter is the duplication of the social media pages of military members by fake accounts, in a method that mirrors “catfishing.” Generation Z military personnel in these engagements often follow the same procedures. First, they receive “intelligence”: they are contacted by a follower, who informs them about the name and platform of the fake profile. Next, they post on their “story” that the account is fake, framing the problem for their community. Finally, they pass orders to their followers, typically: “Report this account, it is fake.”
Without formal tasking, organization, or orders development, these individuals can defeat enemy actions in the information space. Their approach is wholly democratic and decentralized. They rely on a common purpose, share only facts, and allow their task-organized teams to self-select, another strength of Generation Z. They provide only the intelligence necessary and provide clear intent—limited to realistic and attainable information environment outcomes.
Personal Electronic Devices: Threat or Opportunity?
Clearly, Generation Z possesses an inherent ability to maneuver in the information environment, so the hurdles of training and manning that aspect of the force are less of a consideration. When it comes to equipping them, the only obstacle to employing their know-how in forward-deployed, near-peer environments is the Generation Z social media weapon of choice: the personal electronic device. An exercise conducted by II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) forced Marines to simulate such an environment in a scenario “not unlike Russia’s effective annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014.” In this campaign, the Russian military apparatus used social media to effectively foster dissent against the United States and NATO. In the exercise, known as MEF Exercise 21.1, electronic signatures were a major planning factor. The commanding general told reporters that cell phones were banned within operating spaces, and indicated that he would ban mobile devices across the MEF when facing a real-world adversary. This approach, favored by many, warrants serious reconsideration. Is a personal electronic device only a threat? Or is it, in the hands of a well-tasked and practiced operator, a weapon system for the information environment? Lieutenant General Robert S. Walsh promoted the Marine of the future as a “sensor-shooter-sharer.” A cell phone is the most accessible way to achieve this for most of the force. Given the immense advantage a personal electronic provides to the information warrior, it would be prudent to incorporate them into the information operations plans for these campaigns.
Units can enable information warriors with actionable intelligence and mitigation plans with consideration of the enemy electronic warfare threat and provide signal defilade to enable them to operate. Are commanders willing to sacrifice ground in the minds of NATO allies and the host-nation populace to enemy to reduce their signature? Or is more gained from establishing relationships with vast networks of influencers, and weaponizing those relationships against enemy OIE a greater advantage?
Singer and Brooking remind their readers that “social media now forms the foundation of commercial, political and civic life” and that “just as the threat of cyberwar was . . . prepared for, so, too, must this new front be addressed.”[4] The manpower, skills, and equipment exist today to take the fight to the enemy. The longer one cedes this valuable ground to the near-peer enemy, the closer one comes to losing the next major conflict.
Planners and strategists seeking to use organic information warriors must not limit their abilities with a centralized leadership structure. Leadership must embrace a decentralized approach to command and control of operations in the information environment, providing only commander’s intent—and then getting out of the way. The natural ability of the digital-native warrior to engage authentically with these audiences is an asset that must be accounted for in planning. These Marines and sailors will soon dominate the force. Just as every Marine is a rifleman, so should every Marine be an information warrior.
Endnotes
[1] Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan, the Army and the Atomic Bomb (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1985).
[2] P. W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media (Boston: Mariner Books, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2019).
[3] Singer and Brooking, LikeWar.
[4] Singer and Brooking, LikeWar
