The Second Battle of Fallujah holds a unique prominence in Marine Corps history. The ferocity of the fighting encountered by Marines draws almost certain parallels to past campaigns which are steeped in legacy and lore. Further, this battle contributed decisively to the strategic objectives and priorities of the Iraq War. Here, Marines shifted focus from pursuing the remnants of the Hussein regime to the engagement of a numerically significant and decentralized insurgent network that was operating throughout the state of Iraq. An analysis of this battle—characterized by intense urban warfare and elusive enemy forces—reveals many practical wisdoms which relate to the study of warfighting in the Marine Corps. While the Second Battle of Fallujah was a highly chaotic event that can explain many examples of warfighting doctrine, it ought be best remembered for its connection to the combined arms approach. This battle serves as a practical model by which air, ground, artillery, and information assets can be applied to achieve a desired end state in a highly dynamic and complicated scenario. While the Second Battle of Fallujah may have occurred more recently than other historical engagements, it still affirms a sacred value of Marine warfighting doctrine—the combination of all resources to combat efforts will most effectively achieve desired outcomes.
The combined arms approach to warfighting is a simple concept that contributes decisively to a unit’s combat effectiveness. This fundamental component of Marine Corps doctrine operationalizes the concepts of efficiency and complimentary parts. Every asset used by a military force has inherent strengths and weaknesses. Some forces or assets may be able to more effectively deal with specific situations than others. A combination of different assets and forces could potentially serve the purpose of correcting weaknesses and improving overall strength. Where one is weak, the other is strong. MCDP 1-3 defines combined arms as, “The tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by a force to integrate firepower and mobility to produce a desired effect upon the enemy.” In the 21st century, this usually usually taken the form of a dutiful integration of artillery, aircraft, and ground units for the purpose of collectively engaging enemy units. New questions also have emerged about the role of information operations and how a collective communication or cyber strategy could contribute to the physical fight. James Farwell’s Information Warfare: Forging Communication Strategies for Twenty-first Century Operational Environments suggests that information operations may play a key role in the combined arms approach, as they directly influence enemy behaviors and can assist the main effort in achieving combat superiority. In the Battle of Fallujah, Marine units applied an array of capabilities to accomplish their intended objectives. These capabilities consisted not only of artillery, air support, and ground units, but also a coherent information strategy.
The role that air support played in the Battle of Fallujah affirms the relevancy of a combined arms approach. Throughout the battle, Marines on the ground used close air support to clear potential threats while advancing on foot. The Battle of Fallujah was defined by rigid urban combat against a heavily entrenched enemy force. As such, physical units of Marines were often at the disadvantage against the fortified insurgents. The Marine Corps expertly applied the principles of the combined arms approach by coordinating highly precise air borne munitions with the tactical realties observed by commanders on the street. Throughout the conflict, units of Marine Corps infantry relied on air support to gain the combat advantage over the insurgents who may have possessed superior cover or positioning . This displays a combined arms approach to warfighting because it paired the strength of one asset—aircraft—with the perceived weakness of infantry units. The infantry in Fallujah was the main effort, and they had to use all available resources to ensure that they accomplished the mission at hand. Urban close air support is a difficult task with costly implications if performed improperly. The Marine Corps’ integration of air assets within the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and unified command-and-control structure ensured the effective use of aircraft. As detailed by researcher Rebecca Grant’s Fallujah Model:
From the start, the air component was able to focus on the urban area and provide major advantages scarcely seen in urban warfare. These included expanded situation awareness down to the tactical level, rapid precision strikes, and airlift support.
As displayed by the evidence, the Marine Corps’ use of air support in tandem with the infantry on the ground presented keen benefits for this unique feat of urban combat. Alone, the air support may not have adequately struck insurgent forces where necessary. Together with the infantry, the air support provided a critical benefit to the main effort. The Battle of Fallujah displays the benefits of a combined arms approach through the precision and efficiency by which the Marine Corps was able to secure the city.
Artillery and other forms of indirect fire observed in Fallujah also show the ability that a combined arms approach has in improving the overall combat power of an advancing force. Marine Corps ground units in Fallujah were able to coordinate in-direct fire from a safe distance in order to expose insurgents operating within heavily fortified buildings. The tactical decisions made by units pinned down by insurgents focused all aspects of available firepower to regain control of the situation and ultimately the city. Marine artillery units in Fallujah fired a total of 5,685 155mm artillery rounds into the perimeter of the city during the duration of the battle. This appears to confirm the degree to which infantry units relied on the combined arms approach—the effective use of artillery and ground support—to overcome the unique challenges presented by this form of urban combat. Testimony of unit commanders within the city reveals that Marines would often stage within the safety of certain buildings while artillery support neutralized threats in their immediate vicinity. At the conclusion of the bombardment, the Marines would move forward and continue to clear out the significantly weakened insurgents strongholds. This total use of all firepower available ensured the rapid destruction of the enemy with reduced Marine casualties. A combined arms approach uniquely tailored to the urban environment secured significant benefits for the Marine forces while mitigating the avoidable risk of using only infantry units to clear buildings.
A final aspect of the combined arms approach which altered the outcome of Fallujah was the comprehensive usage of a strategic communications strategy. This may appear esoteric in comparison to the previously mentioned examples. The classic pairing of infantry units with direct and indirect fire has usually dominated discussions surrounding combined arms engagements. However, as new attention is given to the use of information operations to shape the tactical picture, it becomes clear that any combined arms strategy ought to also integrate information as a form of warfare. Perhaps ahead of the times, this integration already occurred in Fallujah in 2004. To fully grasp the significance of this idea, one must understand the history surrounding the first Battle of Fallujah. There, insurgent forces employed an especially effective propaganda campaign which essentially broke the political will of the U.S. to continue its initial attack. Insurgents were actively fighting with U.S. forces in the city while also producing doctored images to depict atrocities that Americans were allegedly committing against civilians. The American forces were heavily affected by the political fallout from these images and adjusted their tactical and operational behavior accordingly. In the Second Battle of Fallujah, the Marine Corps applied an aggressive communication strategy which focused on embedded journalists and the framing of the attack as a coalition effort. Here, insurgent propaganda held no weight due to the comprehensive and tailored narrative presented by U.S. forces. This communication strategy did not contribute physical rounds or fires to the infantry on the ground. It did, though, directly affect the tactical environment by adjusting civilian perspectives and weakening the total efforts by the insurgents to stop U.S. advances. In the age of information, the deliberate framing of communication is as much a part of the combined arms approach as artillery rounds or laser guided munitions. The dual analysis of the First and Second Battles of Fallujah proves as much.
The Second Battle of Fallujah was a decisive military engagement that placed the Marine Corps in a highly complex, urban environment. Despite facing a determined opposition with significant defenses, Marines were able to secure the perimeter from the insurgent population. The credit for success in this battle is owed to the application of a combined arms approach.
Such an approach pitted the disciplined and well trained infantry on the ground with a wide array of direct and indirect fire assets. This support, combined with a well defined communications strategy, focused the sum total of American power to defeat the enemy.
