The following is a roundtable discussion that took place during the summer of 2021, addressing problems related to toxic leadership in the U.S. Navy. The transcript was provided by Jim Bastian.

Jim: This is an interview with three former or retired naval officers to investigate the topic, “A Critical Examination of Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Navy.” The idea of addressing this topic belongs to our featured commentator, John Cordle, and offering support and insight are panelists, Kirk Benson and Nicole Waybright.

Dr. John Cordle served 30 years as a surface warfare officer and retired from the Navy in 2013. He commanded the USS Oscar Austin (DDG-79) and USS San Jacinto (CG-56). In 2010, he received the U.S. Navy League’s Captain John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership, and he was the Naval Institute’s Proceedings Author of the Year for 2018.

Kirk R. Benson retired from the U.S. Navy in 2007 after 20 years of active duty service as a Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) and command of an ashore training command. He is currently a senior Navy civilian employee in the Information Warfare Community.

Our third panelist, Nicole Waybright, is a former naval officer and author of the book Long Way Out.

John, you have an extensive longstanding interest in leadership topics, fatigue, and human factors in performance. When did you become interested in the problem of toxic leadership and can you give us your definition of it?

John: My interest in leadership started very young; you look at leaders in your life, whether it’s coaches, teachers, parents. In the Navy, you meet people who are solid positive leaders, and you meet people who are negative leaders. And I was exposed to a pretty wide array of them. I saw the effects of what I would call toxic leadership in some of my experiences in the Navy, but it wasn’t until I read Nicole’s book [Long Way Out] that I really began digging into this topic a little deeper and looking back at my own experiences in the Navy through her lens. And then through that I met Kirk [Benson], who was mentioned in her book and who really rounded out the discussion.

A toxic leader takes advantage of the attributes of leadership (which is sometimes either positional or authoritative power), and misuses those attributes, to the advantage of the individual or the organization, and to the disadvantage of the people who work in that organization. And to really be defined as toxic, I would say it would have to have destructive effects on the individuals who are subjected to it. Those effects can go on for a lifetime, but also generationally. It can affect an entire generation of crew members or officers on a ship.

Jim: [to John] Nicole’s book, Long Way Out, deals in part with a high-profile case of toxic leadership [the history of Holly Graf]. You have commented that you found that difficult to read. Could you talk a little about your reaction, especially to the long-term effects of Graf’s command and how she rose through the ranks unchecked?

John: I actually had had some interactions with that individual [Graf] in both the schoolhouse environment and in the waterfront. I had certainly heard some troubling reports and rumors from people who had served with her or under her, and at the time I didn’t feel like I was in a position to do anything about it. Looking back, I still wonder if I was not part of the problem in that I could have acted, but didn’t.

It is well known that in the final weeks of an 06 command tour [in 2010], Graf was relieved, but never really punished. So that got me thinking about what could have been done earlier in that person’s career. How can we put safeguards in place to recognize people who have that negative leadership style, and find a way to remove them from leadership so that they don’t inflict that sort of damage on other people?

Jim: Kirk, regarding Holly Graf’s command, I know you have written that the Navy failed in dealing with her and her problems and that you had some regrets along the way, wishing that you had done more to address the problem as it was happening on your ship. Can you tell us what you would have done differently in hindsight? Can you start by telling us a little about your role in her command and what that experience was like?

Kirk: I was the combat systems officer aboard USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG-45) in Yokosuka, Japan. Then Lieutenant Commander Graf was our XO. I served under her for about 18 months, along with Nicole, who was our gunnery officer. And as the senior department head and senior watch officer, I dealt with Commander Graf directly on a daily basis. She definitely, in my opinion, was a toxic leader. Her leadership was very destructive not only in the wardroom and the chief’s mess but also with the crew; our morale was rock bottom. As career SWOs we were always taught that you don’t take your problems outside the lifelines of the ship, and I stuck to that because I thought that was the right thing to do. Looking back, it wasn’t.

I do believe that the Navy leadership all the way up the chain of command, starting with our commanding officer, failed by not addressing her toxic leadership. There is no way, in my opinion, that she should have ever been promoted to commander or captain and have command of two warships.

Nicole: A central topic in play here is the culture of surface warfare. SWO terms like “screamers” or phrases such as “SWO eat their young” are born of this culture.

Kirk: Graf was two years ahead of me at the Naval Academy. In my observation of her back then in 1983–84 —she was a screamer, a term we use in the SWO community. I also knew that when she was in command of the USS Winston Churchill (DDG-67)—I knew her XO—she did not change. On the USS Cowpens (CG-63) she was relieved for physical and mental abuse. It wasn’t just a one-time thing, but rather throughout her career.

John: I think it’s important to note that she was convicted of cruelty via formal Navy process, so it’s on the record. I’ll tell you what drew my attention to Kirk —and I didn’t know him at the time—was an episode in Nicole’s book where he literally got to the point where he had to be taken off the ship because he was under such pressure. It was that story that really drove home the personal nature of this, and the long-term impact of the toxic leader.

In my current job as a human factors engineer, there’s always questions we ask, such as: what was the cause of that emotional reaction or stressful reaction? In the case of Kirk, we’re not talking about someone being weak or inexperienced . . . we’re looking at the destructiveness of the stress that is placed on them. At some point you break. We’re human, right? So, empathy must be required somewhere to be a leader.

Jim: This subject of toxic leadership . . . has it ever been dealt with successfully by the Navy, and has there been improvement in the last 20 years?

John: I don’t know of a single case in which an officer has been relieved for this and subsequently punished and downgraded. Dr. Michael Junge wrote a book called Crimes of Command that gets into this with some case studies.

I think that’s where this discussion was intended to go: asking, how do you identify toxic leadership and what could be some firebreaks and policies that could be put in place that might, on one hand, be fair to people who are tough leaders, but also on the other, identify those who maybe shouldn’t go on to higher positions.

Jim: Are there particular psychological characteristics or personality traits that a toxic leader has that you can name? Such as, showing a need to engage in cruelty and maltreatment . . . there is an environment of fear and hostility created, they’re often incompetent . . .

John: Or maybe insecure in their competence.

Jim: Abusive. Lacking emotional intelligence or social intelligence. Lacking insight.

Kirk: Definitely

Nicole: Makes command decisions and prioritizes management goals based on personal career advancement.

Kirk: I would add unreasonable.

John: Also, lacking empathy.

Kirk: Selfish.

John: Focused on a career and how the ship looks to the outside, as opposed to their actual positive performance as CO.

Jim: John, in your writing, you have listed some ways the Navy might address toxic leadership. I would like to read through those:

Leverage peers, pulse the CMC, establish a mentoring program, be intrusive, be transparent, educate chaplains, have some kind of hotline, expand awareness, publish a book of stories of toxic leadership to help get this information out there, make use of DECOS [command climate survey of the crew], make use of senior leadership, modify FITREPs, place books about toxic leadership on the CNO required reading list, conduct mandatory annual training for officers and CPOs [which would include how to identify and report toxic leadership] . . . are there any of these that you want to talk about in more detail?

John: I’d like to start with formally “defining the problem”— getting assigned officials together to literally write out what these [toxic leadership] traits are. That’s an education piece—with the goal of helping people understand the traits and effect of a toxic leader.

Secondly, there has to be some sort of engagement at the peer and subordinate level because those are the only people that can really attest to an existing problem, so they have to be trained to recognize it; but they also have to be asked in the first place, and that’s where I think the idea of a more intrusive or active approach comes in—such as presenting a survey of the traits of a toxic leader, the environment of fear, abuse, things like that…“are you seeing these things?”

Thirdly, there has to be some sort of monitoring at certain touchpoints in a career before that person moves on.

Kirk: Education is the key. I think in commissioning programs—ROTC, the Naval Academy, OCS—there needs to be some study of examples of toxic leadership . . . whether it be Nicole’s book or other examples. And not only officers, but in the chiefs mess as well. I really think the 360 review is valuable . . . before someone gets selected to become an XO, go back to the division officers, go to the CO and XO, and go to their peers, and get information.

Nicole: It also needs to be in the air, established from the top, that this sort of leadership is not tolerated and not acceptable. When I got out of the Navy and then worked in industry for a large corporation that had tens of thousands of employees, it was just known that this sort of behavior wouldn’t be tolerated

John: Kirk, regarding what agent would be investigating allegations: is it the random person who does an investigation or is it someone who’s actually been through some training that would make a professional assessment? You said you talked to chaplains and doctors [about Graf] who saw the signs of this behavior and the results of this behavior, but they either weren’t willing or weren’t prepared to put that picture together and take it up some other chain to leadership.

Maybe the caregivers, the chaplains, the doctors, the corpsman—a number of levels of contact—need to be prepared to contribute to a given case. The Navy is making changes, putting a lot of effort into the whole mental health aspect—including educating leaders—so addressing toxic leadership could be a part of that.

Kirk: I think there is another important aspect in the area of education. We should identify what is the impact of a toxic leader . . . yes, it’s going to hurt people, it definitely does that, but it could kill sailors. Looking back on my time on board the ship with Nicole, people had an attitude—because morale was so low—they didn’t want to be there. Sailors and officers alike really developed an “I don’t care what happens” attitude, so you get complacent with safety. I’m sure there was definitely higher risk. I do think that some who could have said something chose not to, so maybe there is an education piece.

Jim: As we approach the end of our discussion, I wanted to summarize a few points I have heard from the contributors:

I was struck that the three of you mentioned several times over the course of this discussion, the importance of

(1) Defining the problem,

(2) Educating the community / raising awareness,

(3) Defining the traits of a toxic leader and their impact on others,

(4) Implementing strategies to assess a situation [which includes input from many levels, including peers and subordinates],

(5) Determining a direction for the resolution of an active toxic leadership situation [which might include some type of intervention], and

(6) Arriving at a resolution or legal disposition that addresses the needs of all the parties involved.

So, let’s say in the future all of these things are in place and you’re doing a good job defining and educating, raising awareness, and you intervene in a person’s career because you’ve identified them as a toxic leader. What happens to that person? Are they moved to a different track, are they relieved of command again, are they asked to leave the Navy? What are the options at that point?

John: I think the most important thing is to remove them from that situation where they can do harm, stop the damage, and re-look at our post-damage control actions, with consideration for what the impact was. If we have structures in place, that makes that second decision much easier as to the disposition of that individual. What you don’t want to have is that they get put in another place where they are in charge of people—and that’s a distinct possibility if it’s not handled properly. That said, they are still in the Navy and are people and deserve a humane treatment, as I wrote about in another article.

Jim: In the case of Holly Graf, if these things had been in place, one would hope that there would have been an intervention far sooner with people being able to openly talk about it rather than just keep moving her up the chain of command until there’s a real crisis.

John: Absolutely. There was an opportunity at the XO level, at the O5 command level, and then as an 06 as well! So, there were at least three possible intervention points.

Jim: John, I know it’s hard to find an end to this, but you inspired the interview and the discussion. Do you have any closing thoughts?

John: Thanks, I think the most important one is to thank Nicole, first of all, for putting this story [Long Way Out] out there, right?!

And also, to thank Kirk—who out of the blue reached out to me after he read my review [of Long Way Out]—and really left me with the impression that there was more to this then just something that happened in the past. We put this article together in the hopes that it would generate conversation and perhaps change things for the future.