The U.S. Navy is the tool of choice for projecting power abroad, enacting a primacy argument; it is also in a unique situation to advance the problem-set. This article’s argument shifts drastically should the United States’ policy shift to one of the restraint found in Defensive Realism, which would assume the U.S. is satisfied with its security construct and seek a position of less engagement abroad. Professor Barry Posen outlined four options for the United States’ Grand Strategy: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy.1 In recent years there was quite a bit of isolationist rhetoric sans isolationist action, as Professor Posen also explained.2 More times than not, the actions of the United States vacillated between primacy and cooperative security with a heavy lean towards the former. It is clear the United States is skeptical of a powerful China displacing the United States as the preferred partner in Asia, seeking partners to aid where the United States cannot.
Foregoing the implausible outcome of government retrenchment, the Navy must direct focus to three key efforts: ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) via help of the Congress, conducting operational exercises, and engaging with foreign partners. A tough task indeed, but necessary if more United States ships will not be built in earnest. Most importantly, all three of these agenda items must be done with full embracement of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Gilday’s “Get Real, Get Better” initiative.
Ratify UNCLOS
To establish political credibility, the United States Senate should ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Ratifying UNCLOS would assuage Chinese fears of a preemptive attack should they notice increased naval presence in the region conducting freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS). The U.S. Navy should also conduct more freedom of navigation patrols in conjunction with a newly ratified UNCLOS, signaling a resolute stance to uphold international standards rather than a path to war. This would send a clear message that ties FONOPS to policy.
The United States desires to be the rule setter and power preferred by partners in the Indo-Pacific region. Meanwhile, China seeks to undermine the United States in this goal.3 Ratifying UNCLOS would enable the U.S. Navy to operate and support national objectives as a model leader. Furthermore, ratifying UNCLOS could be one step toward bolstering the United States-preferred international order in the region. In a 2016 Senate Hearing, Former Pacific Command Commander Admiral Harry Harris remarked simply that “by not signing onto it, we lose the credibility for the very same thing that we are arguing for, which is following accepted rules and norms in the international arena.”
A Thousand Ship Navy, Again
Admiral Michael Mullen introduced the thousand ship Navy concept in 2007 at the Naval Sea Power Symposium, and Admirals Jonathan Greenert and Foggo echoed this sentiment in 2014. However, the United States Navy hovers around a little less than 300 ships at any given time. Out of the ten aircraft carriers, only about three are available for operational use.
The United States’ geographic positioning begins on the far extremes of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, granting a tremendous advantage in terms of world shipping and general access to the sea. However, it suffers from extreme tyranny of distance should any surface combatant start from the continental United States. Ocean transits range from a week to three weeks, depending on tasking, from their operational requirements. Forward deployed forces, Hawaii-based ships, and Guam activities help alleviate distance fatigue, but are limited in response and suffer from the same time-consuming maintenance requirements that continental U.S. ships face.
The Navy leans heavily on the forward deployed forces in Spain and Japan, which highlights the very reason why they exist. This distance relief scheme is often the crux of most forward presence and Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) debates. Furthermore, the Navy’s preference of forward deployed assets to meet distance requirements is the very reason why a thousand ship navy must be an end-state. The Center for a New American Security’s Chris Dougherty wrote about China’s temporal advantage and how the United States must address it over A2AD concerns. Mr. Dogherty’s shifts the A2AD paradigm from black-and-white denial by the Chinese to one consisting of shades of limitation or delay imposed upon U.S. forces to place time on China’s side in order to achieve a fait accompli. He does this to highlight windows of opportunity for U.S. strategists to evaluate risk decisions that live within degrees of imposed limitation, rather than accepting flat-out denial. Notionally, the forward deployed U.S. forces are poised well to combat China’s attempt at limitation or delay due to their concurrent geographic placement. Whether or not the U.S. strategy shifts, what if those handful of U.S. ships are not enough to offer senior decision makers executable operations with acceptable levels of risk? The Navy can complicate China’s temporal advantage by leaning on its allies and partners.
Foreign navies are visible, and China sees them. The Japanese, Singaporeans, Malaysians, Indonesians, Filipinos, and many others operate on a daily basis within China’s reach, and this complicates China’s calculus. If the United States Navy could operate habitually with partner navies, like the recent Royal Navy’s HMS Queen Elizabeth deployment, it would yield tremendous results. The United States is unable to meet the forward presence demand with its current force structure, but it could find a relief valve in cooperative deployments with foreign navies. These would be deployments that are scheduled in a manner akin to U.S. Navy practices, but first the U.S. Navy has some work to do. In one recent deployment, the Carl Vinson Strike Group operated with Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force units to augment assets. If the U.S. Navy can operate consistently with partner navies, as found in the Queen Elizabeth and Carl Vinson deployments, there may be a portion of the presence solution within sight.
This is not just a numbers game. Aggressive pursuit of increased cooperative deployments not only adds ships to the Indo-Pacific allies and partners’ force, but it also spreads the wealth in the training and tactical knowledge domain. The United Kingdom Strike Group showcased such a phenomenon during its participation in Large Scale Global Exercise (LSGE). The strike group commander highlighted LSGE’s emphasis on capabilities and integration in stating that the exercise “afforded me opportunity to test the cutting edge capabilities of the UK Carrier Strike Group while also developing the tactics and procedures that allow us to seamlessly integrate with key allies.”
Exercises
Next, increase the complexity of exercises. The common thought is that every exercise is scripted and an exercise in routine. Indeed, there is value in “reps and sets.” Junior officers benefit from a well-organized divisional tactics (DIVTACS) event. Shiphandling, timing, and signaling become skill sets that a junior officer can pack into their toolbox as they develop their professional repertoire. Moreover, exercises forge important relationships with foreign partners.
Get Real, Get Better
Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lescher has championed an embracement of the “red.” Embracement of the “red” is an honest appraisal of the naval force, and it forces decision makers down to the deckplate sailors to be professionally curious and to find solutions. This concept should be married with Secretary Work’s argument. Bluntly, go to sea with purpose, present exercises that challenge our warfighting acumen, and do them in the South and East China Seas. Embrace the lessons identified and learn from them.
The embracement of the “red” is now a codified mantra set out by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Gilday—Get Real, Get Better. Amongst the many highlights of Get Real, Get Better, the CNO charges leaders to experiment, learn, and get better. This calls for a review of the merits of exercises of learning in the contested waters. The Royal Navy updated the name of their premier training event, Flag Officer Sea Training (FOST) to Fleet Operational Sea Training (FOST), reflecting this concept. Focus on the fleet operational sea training—operational training—and plan an exercise where it matters, conduct the exercise, and learn from it.
The watchteams and commanding officer and executive officer teams would gain tacit knowledge of the geography, hydrography, and general feel of contested waters. Being on the bridge or in the combat information center is an entirely different understanding than a simulation. Should deterrence fail, current commanding officers would have first-hand knowledge of the environment. Should it fail later, the executive officers of past, and now commanding officers, would be that much more ready.
Let the fleet planners get to work and put together challenging exercises in the South China Sea. Adjust fires and direct energy to find ways to challenge assumptions of how the Chinese will fight and take it a step further to find ways they could advance their warfighting capability by learning it firsthand. Then, conduct thorough after-action reports. Use the Lessons Learned process and use it with vigor. Conducting honest exercises with partners could reveal new tactics based upon observed PLAN responses. Deficiencies in administrative items, such as manning and organization, might be uncovered. For example, an anti-submarine task group could discover that the hydropraphy in a particular part of the East China Sea provides a critical PLAN weakness previously not identified. Most importantly, grant latitude to test educated assumptions and reward a ship or staff that finds errors, poor performance, miscalculation, and then challenge them to get better.
Looking Forward
The current defense priorities and strategies call for a global U.S. Navy, which requires either more ships or an embracement of bold and cooperative options. The United States would benefit from enhancing legitimacy in the maritime commons via ratification of UNCLOS, investing in exercises that challenge assumptions and deliver learning moments, and to plan cooperative deployments as if U.S. national security depended upon it. This is easier said than done. The pure workload of a fleet staff is enormous, but a refocus from the top-down could reveal unknown benefits. Russia’s recent invasion into Ukraine has revealed that the future of the U.S. Navy is not solely in east Asia, but also in the European theater, which will require aggressive naval planning, maximum leveraging of partner navies, and the ability to do so as the model legitimate global power.
- Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, vol. 21, 3, (Winter 1996/97): 5–53.
- Barry Posen, “The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony,” Foreign Affairs vol. 97, 2, (March/April 2018): 20.
- Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power. (United States Navy, Dec 2020), 3, www.defense.gov.
