Russia has been carefully observing the activities of the U.S and British navies in the Black Sea region. It protested through diplomatic channels that the main thrust of Sea Breeze 2018, a Black Sea exercise with Ukraine, was anti-Russian. And according to the Russian Institute of Strategic Research, it was not a coincidence when after Sea Breeze 2017, the United States revealed plans to build a maritime operations center in Ochakiv, a small city located between Crimea and Odessa at the mouth of the Dnieper River.1
When news first appeared that the United States was going to build the facility for the Ukrainian Black Sea Navy on Ochakiv Naval Base, the Russian reaction was prompt and belligerent.2 Russian politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky publicly stressed, “We’ll drown you there, in the Black Sea! And we will destroy the Kiev government; this is Russian land – Ochakiv.”3
Despite the official response from the commander of Ukrainian naval forces in Ochakiv that the facility would be for the Ukrainian Navy only and for use in the annual Sea Breeze exercise, Russia seemingly felt the situation was getting out of control and was meant to strangle their presence in the Crimean peninsula. Admiral Igor Kasatonov, former commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, said the maritime operations center “could be interpreted as an outpost aimed with surveilling Russia’s forces in Crimea” and could pose a threat to Russian security.4
In fact, with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Ukrainian Navy has shrunk tremendously, as many of its vessels were blocked by Russia and left in Crimean bays. The remainder is located mostly in Odessa. Given that the Azov Sea is now under Russian control, the only ports Kiev possesses without any restrictions are Odessa and Yuzhny on the Black Sea coastline, and Nikolayev and Kherson, both riverine ports. None of these ports have well-developed naval facilities. (Odessa has developed port infrastructure but for the merchant fleet.) Thus, Ochakiv has strategic importance for Ukraine and its naval forces.
The importance of Ochakiv Naval Base was highlighted by the November 2018 events in the Sea of Azov, when Russian forces shot at and seized three Ukrainian warships attempting to pass through the Kerch strait, which links the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.5 With the annexation of Crimea, Russia controls both sides of the strait and thus Ukraine’s access to its own ports. Preventing passage to the Sea of Azov could strangle economic activity in the east of Ukraine. In addition, in August, Russia closed the Black Sea near Odessa and Crimea allegedly for naval drills, which blocked Ukrainian and international shipping traffic in the area. More likely, this was a test of Ukrainian reaction.
History suggests that Russia rarely attempts territorial expansion without first establishing conditions that could lessen resistance among the local population. It is long-range strategy. In these circumstances, Ochakiv as a naval and military coordination center could play a crucial role in securing Ukrainian territorial integrity.
Historical Importance
The strategic importance of Ochakiv was recognized long ago. The ancient Greeks created an effective system of colonies in the northern Black Sea region, but the most crucial three all were around Crimea. It seems they established a strategic defense chain that played well against barbarians. The eastern stronghold in the Kerch peninsula controlled the Caucasia region, Azov Sea, and Kerch Straits. In the northwest, Olbia played a crucial role in keeping the barbarians out of Crimea and controlling two big river estuaries. Finally, in the south, there was the heart of the Greek’s colony system: Chersonesos.
Geographical imperatives have not changed since the ancient Greeks, and many nations have understood the importance of controlling this strategically vital area. Possession of Crimea allows for further advance into the Pontic Steppe; if control over Crimea is lost, control of chokepoints in the region is difficult.
Contemporary Implications
Ochakiv plays an important role in Russian history, but it would be wrong to assume that historical sentiments are playing a crucial role in Russia’s hostility toward construction of the operations center. That nation’s concerns generally arise from four security and geopolitical issues:
- In recent years, NATO has made critical and concrete geopolitical advances in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia—or Russia’s “near abroad.” According to the Russian media, the building and development of operations centers is happening not only in Ukraine, but also in Moldova and Georgia. As Vice Prime Minister Dmitriy Ragozin has commented, “Americans are starting trainings of saboteurs and special forces in Moldova in case of a new armed conflict with Transnistria.”6 Transnistria it is the most vulnerable and weakest element in Russia’s glacis defense, and this is gnawing at Moscow. The Georgian case is worrying as well for the Kremlin, particularly when the Georgian government invited NATO to build a Coast Guard base in the Black Sea city of Poti.7
- The facilities could be used by NATO as a stepping stone for a more advanced military presence in the Baltic States. Admittedly, the Ochakiv naval base could constrain Russian activities in southern Ukraine, and a military presence in close proximity to its Crimean military units would have an element of containment for Russia. All explanations provided by U.S. and Ukrainian officials that the main user of the facilities will be the Ukrainian Navy, with foreign vessels only during Sea Breeze, have not satisfied the Russian Federation.
- Russia fears Ochakiv will be used as a strategic foothold for Ukrainian sabotage missions in Crimea, the Sea of Azov, and around the Kerch Bridge and for reconnaissance in western territorial waters of Crimea and beyond. In the future, it could provide a jumping-off ground for aggression against Russia in the Black Sea.
- The Kremlin considers events in Ochakiv as part of a broader geopolitical Russia-NATO rivalry in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. This is based on several assumptions, including: (1) the West desires permanent control over the Black Sea; (2) a crucial element of that is establishing a constant presence in the Crimean Peninsula, particularly in Sevastopol, where the Russian Black Sea Fleet is located; (3) since the annexation of Crimea, the West has felt outfoxed and wants to reestablish the status quo or at least test Russian capacity to address challenges; (4) the first operational unit armed with the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic air-launched ballistic missile is operating in the Southern Military District—which includes Crimea—and this will allow Russia to cover the entire Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean regions and counter the West’s advantage in aircraft carriers; (5) the United States will abide by the Montreux Convention, which regulates the transit of naval warships in the Bosporus Straits and Dardanelles; (6) the United States recognizes that the Black Sea region is “a zone of our rule.”
Russia is nervously observing U.S. activities in the Black Sea. The general assessment is that the Americans are ready to take serious steps to advance their presence in Ukraine and are moving from words to deeds and NATO’s presence will be increasing. Kasatonov noted the worst scenario for Russia would be if the United States uses Ochakiv as a base for deployment of missile defense system components, since they could be directed not only against Russian strategic missiles, but also against coastal missile systems, such as Bastion.8
The United States and Great Britain together with NATO are looking for an approach that would prevent further Russian advances into Ukrainian territory but not escalate the security situation in the region. For example, British Minister of Defense Gavin Williamson stressed in December 2018 that Britain understands the Russian threat to Ukrainian Black Sea ports and is ready to make further naval commitments to Ukraine and increase its own activities in the Black Sea.9 In addition, the European Union adopted a resolution and sent an assessment mission to the Sea of Azov to better understand the current challenges and determine what preemptive measures might be taken to maintain social and economic resilience in the Black Sea region in general. Both the European Union and the United States are working to secure Ukrainian sovereignty over these territories. U.S. specialists, for example, helped Ukraine write the Ukrainian Strategy of the Naval Forces.10
Now it is a question of Russian response. Activities around Crimea are intensifying, increasing chances for direct confrontation. The region’s maritime zone is becoming dangerous in terms of naval confrontation, with a high density of naval powers—Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, and rotational NATO forces—operating in a narrow space. Either side could be inspired to bolder actions, whether or not the West is ready.
Endnotes
1 Riss.ru, August 2017, https://riss.ru/smi/43109/. “’Amusing Navy’ Ukraine Goes to NATO Standards,” Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 August 2017.
2 Construction is being done by Naval Mobile Construction Battalions with support from U.S. contractor KVG. The project, for which U.S. government allocated $750,000, was anticipated to be completed at the end of 2018 but now has been postponed until spring 2019. It likely will not be final such project in Ukraine.
3 A translation of Zhirinovsky’s remarks on a Russian talk show. See “This is Russian land—Ochakov: Zhirinovsky commented on the construction of a U.S. military base,” http://timer-odessa.net/news/eto_russkaya_zemlya_ochakov_jirinovskiy_prokommentiroval_stroitelstvo_voennoy_bazi_ssha_482.html.
4 “U.S. Starts Building ‘Maritime Operations Center’ in Ukraine. Here’s Why,” Sputniknews.com, 13 August 2017.
5 Alexander Smith and Yuliya Talmazan, “Ukraine-Russia Sea Clash: Sea of Azov Incident Raises Tensions—and Questions,” NBCnews.com, 27 November 2018.
6 “Rogozin on Shipbuilding in Ukraine: They Are Only ‘Service Coffee’ to American Marines,” in Russian news agency, https://ria.ru/20170820/1500711343.html.
7 Joshua Kucera, “Georgia Offers NATO to Build a Black Sea Base at Poti,” Eurasianet.org, 9 March 2017.
8 “U.S. Starts Building ‘Maritime Operations Center’ in Ukraine. Here’s Why,” Sputniknews.com.
9 “Gavin Williamson: UK Ship in Ukraine ‘Sends Message to Russia,’” BBC News, 22 December 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-46657470.
10 Naval Forces of Ukraine, “Strategy of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 2035” https://navy.mil.gov.ua/en/strategiya-vijskovo-morskyh-syl-zbrojnyh-syl-ukrayiny-2035/.
Sidebar
Recently, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko initiated constitutional amendments aimed at bringing Ukraine into Euro-Atlantic institutions.1 In the official proposal was an amendment to remove from the Ukrainian Constitution paragraph 14, which states, “The use of existing military bases on the territory of Ukraine for the temporary stationing of foreign military formations is possible on the terms of lease, by the procedure determined by the international treaties of Ukraine ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.” This paragraph was added to legalize the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, because according to the Article 17 of Constitution, “foreign military bases shall not be permitted on the territory of Ukraine.” Thus, in the law adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament, paragraph 14 was quietly removed, without public discussion.
Paragraph 14 was the legal “loophole” that would have allowed U.S. or other NATO states to station forces on Ukrainian territory and would have enabled quick intervention, should that become necessary. It seems Ukraine is self-fulfilling Russia’s goal of halting the expansion of NATO to Ukraine.
