
Every foreign hostage killed or executed by ISIL since August 2014 shared something in common: they were marginal figures operating in the precarious environment faced by aid workers and journalists working in Syria.
Just over one year ago, the first Western hostage, James Foley, was executed by ISIL. The American journalist was executed on 19 August 2014, the very day designated[i] by the General Assembly to recognize those who face danger and adversity in order to help others. The date coincides with the anniversary of the 2003 bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad, Iraq.
These hostages fit a broader, shared profile. Universally described by their families, friends, and in their own words as giant-hearted and tireless in their commitment they sought to “show the world how bad it is” for the Syrian people enduring their fourth year of a devastating civil war. This war has now become a regional conflict with far-reaching impacts. Most immediately the humanitarian crisis emboldens desperate refugees and those who exploit them alike, and as autocratic governments target their own citizens they empower their opposition: chaotic, reactionary, anti-establishment groups seeking to impose their own extreme rule.
All three journalists executed by ISIL were freelance. Translation: All worked on shoestring budgets largely personally funded up front. They operated without the preapproved expense accounts from the larger media outlets to hire the serious fixers who are the most well-connected and best guarantee of their safety. This is the sad reality and result of foreign news bureaus being drastically cut over the past several years. Warzones that are fundamentally critical to Western national security interests are now perennially under-reported due to fact that mainstream news outlets have cut budgets for forward deployed journalists. Coverage is now largely dependent on freelance journalists whose security is individually negotiated. This grievous vacuum daily feeds the mainstream US news sources’ dependence on domestically sourced, too often self-appointed, so-called “authorities.” Meanwhile, the freelance journalists with the courage to uphold the principles of their profession, have to rely on individual instincts, relative experience, relationships formed on the ground and most of all, sheer luck.
Of the individuals taken while supporting humanitarian aid, only David Haines from the UK had a professional record as an aid worker beyond Syria. Haines was abducted just ten days after he arrived, having made the risky decision to live with another aid worker in the Syrian village of Atmeh where no other aid workers were based. Alan Henning, unwilling to stay home and not respond to the crisis, was a taxi-driver unaffiliated with a professional aid organization and was kidnapped while travelling with an informal convoy supported by fellow British citizens. Peter Kassig was equally unwilling to stand by, and had formed his own charity funded by his personal savings and the donations of family and friends. Kayla Mueller had worked for a few different aid organizations in Turkey and was taken after crossing the border into Syria, accompanying a technician friend who had been contracted for repairs in a clinic.[ii]
By their affiliation or personal decisions, none had the benefit of the political and security analysts employed by the professional humanitarian and media organizations. Or they chose to disregard this information. Their security was ultimately up to them. Haruna Yakawa fits neither category of journalist or aid worker, but his own tragically misguided presence proves the marginalized, ill-connected and poor decision-making point in the extreme.
The case for what unites these foreign hostages as naïve is sound, but not yet the complete picture. Significantly, all hostages identified here apart from Kenji Goto, were in ISIL custody prior to the first execution video of James Foley on 19 August 2015. The security situation had rapidly changed in the months preceding Foley’s execution as ISIL consolidated its leadership structure and published its case for establishing a Caliphate. By June, ISIL surged out of Anbar Province and seized control of Mosul, Iraq’s second city. By September, the United Nations estimated that ISIL controlled up to a one-third of Iraq, and up to 40% of the country’s annual production of wheat.[iii]
As security and policy analysts, family members and friends of the victims, it is important to acknowledge that the accusation of the victims as naïve civilian operators in a well-established warzone is relative to the fact that the operational environment had completely changed in a short amount of time.
Each of the foreign hostages took tremendous personal risk in responding to the humanitarian crisis. Their deaths at the hands of ISIL are a tragedy to be mourned and their humanitarian spirit should never be forgotten. It is equally important to accord them the dignity they deserve. None were conscripted into their service, they all volunteered to go. If they disregarded their personal safety, it was for their personal ideals. In the words of James Foley, “I believe that frontline journalism is important. Without these photos and videos and first-hand experience, we can’t really tell the world how bad it might be.”
[i] Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 11 December 2008 63/139. Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/63/139
[ii] http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/doctors-without-bordersmédecins-sans-frontières-msf-statement-about-kayla-mueller
[iii] http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/09/30/ISIS-Now-Controls-40-Percent-Iraq-s-Wheat-Crop