Aircraft Carriers’ Drama

There is absolutely nothing new in the discussion on the fate of aircraft carriers in modern times. The number of publications dedicated to this issue is huge and the discussion is as emotionally charged as ever. There also is nothing new in naval doctrine-mongering and trying to learn and apply lessons from the past, most of which are inapplicable and become dangerous since they fail to adequately respond to new strategic, operational, and technological realities. The same goes for generalizations, which often use wrong criteria in identifying strategic, operational, and tactical constants. As Arnold Toynbee noted in, War and Civilization: “In our human military history the analogue of the biological competition between the tiny soft-furred Mammal and the massive armored Reptile is the saga of the duel between David and Goliath; and if take this legendary Syriac combat as our starting point, we shall find the same drama acted and re-performed in a continuous series of matches between new fangled and old-fashioned military techniques.”¹

Toynbee’s “techniques” are directly related today to the technological dimension of warfare—a dimension that places technological advances as the main driving force behind doctrines, strategies, operational art, and tactics. Nowhere is this dimension is more important than when trying to foresee and forestall the future of aircraft carriers. The rationale behind this effort is obvious: aircraft carriers are the most potent power-projection weapon system, they are symbols of national naval power, they provide excellent “visuals,” and are the most expensive weapon system in the history of warfare and the most difficult to protect. At issue is not the existence of the carrier as a platform. Carriers as floating air strips are not going anywhere and will remain one of the principal naval platforms and weapons system, but only as one of many. This brings up—for dedicated proponents of carrier airpower as the main strike force in any large navy—the horrifying specter of carriers being relegated to niche weapon systems. It also begs the question of what kind of carriers, and at what cost. The issue is the viability of a carrier-centric navy within the modern technological paradigm of antiship cruise missile and of littoral combat.²

This viability was put into question when three major technological conditions for antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) were met:

1. ASCMs ranges became comparable to those of carrier aviation
2. ASCMs became capable of underwater launch
3. ASCMs became supersonic

All three of these conditions were met in the mid to early 1970s with the early maturing of ASCM technology embodied in the ultimate Soviet, primarily anti-carrier, weapon the P-700 Granit (NATO: SS-N-19 Shipwreck), carried by Soviet nuclear battle cruisers of the Kirov class and the enormous Oscar-class missile submarines. In combination with the Soviet Naval Missile-carrying Aviation (MRA), which by the early 1970s was deploying a Mach 3 capable AS-6 Kingfish missile, cost effectiveness became central to the viability of carriers since they now had to face the possibility of a massive and coordinated ASCM salvo both from underwater and from the air. ³ Losing an enormously expensive ship to a salvo of weapons which constitute a minute fraction of this ship’s cost did finally drive the point home. This scenario became Elmo Zumwalt’s major concern when he realized the strategic and psychological effects of the loss of even a single nuclear aircraft-carrier would have on the U.S. Navy.⁴ By that time, U.S. nuclear carriers not only became the U.S. Navy’s main strike force, they became prohibitively expensive, generating inevitable questions of risk aversion and risk avoidance. As retired Navy Captain Jerry Hendrix noted: “The carrier has been operating in low-threat, permissive environments almost continuously since World War II. At no time since 1946 has a carrier had to fend off attacks by enemy aircraft, surface ships, or submarines. No carrier has had to establish a sanctuary for operations and then defend it.”⁵

While the argument could have been made about the problems with targeting the Soviet Navy faced when “hunting” for the U.S. Navy’s carrier battle groups (CBGs) in the 1970s or even the 1980s, and the eventual improvement in, improvements in targeting were predictable. Sailing undetected 70-80 nautical miles off the coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula, as was done on couple of occasions in the 1970s and even early 1980s by the U.S. Navy’s CBGs, is not an option today. By the mid-1990s, with new, deadlier ASCMs and more capable sensors emerging, the necessity for aircraft carriers to adapt to new technological realities could not be denied. In Toynbee’s parlance, a new-fangled technique finally arrived. By the mid-2000s, this technique fully matured and offered a combination of threats which dramatically exposed the vulnerability of carriers and with it raised a serious doubt about the whole concept of a carrier-centric navy. As Douglas MacGregor recited Marine Major General James L. Jones: “All it takes to panic a battlegroup is seeing somebody dropping a couple of 50 gallon drums into the water.”⁶ Defending against the salvo of six, eight, or even 16 supersonic ASCMs is practically impossible and makes deployment of even the most advanced and defended CBGs within the range of modern supersonic ASCMs extremely risky.⁷ Getting within the range of hypersonic ASCMs will spell the doom of any naval force.

Hypersonic Change

The U.S. Navy’s carriers are the ultimate power projection weapons and they work well against an underdeveloped and unsophisticated enemy’s shore. This is not the case anymore for any near-peer or peer nations. Not only are the ranges of modern ASCMs impressive, such as the P-800 Onyx’s (SS-N-26 Strobile) more than 600-kilometer range, but hypersonic missiles change naval warfare completely, as these missiles are not reliably interceptable by modern air defense weapon systems. The mathematics is not there for potential targets, among which carriers are the most prized. Far from being merely a tactical and operational change, hypersonic technology is having an impact that has strategic (and doctrinal) ramifications globally.

While much is being made, and justly so, about the 3M22 Zircon ASCM, whose Mach 8 speed and low flight profile make it impervious to any air defense missile, Russia’s Air Space Forces already procured the almost hyper-sonic (M=4.1+) X-32 ASCM which has a range of 1000 kilometers with a trajectory that makes it nearly impossible to shoot down.^{8, 9} These weapons specifically designed for “killing” large surface targets, and with the advent of new materials and fuels even near-peer littorals will become a fearsome obstacle course. In the case of near-peer or peer’s littorals, carriers also will have to deal with the opponent’s air forces, complicating such a hypothetical battle even more. This raises an inevitable question: what are the chances of carriers to survive such a power projection operation? The answer is simple—not very good, nor are they good for escorts which provide carrier defense. Unless radical new technology is introduced, such as lasers, which are decades away from becoming a viable weapon system capable of dealing with the salvo of hyper-sonic ASCMs, the fate of carriers in the enemy littoral or near it is not enviable. But even with the introduction of such hypothetical weapons, new-fangled techniques will still appear to raise the issue of modern CVNs survivability and costs. It is the latter which finally reached both its economic and psychological limit—modern CVNs are simply too expensive and too huge to use. Thus it becomes not only reasonable but inevitable to ask the question: if power projection against fairly weak and obsolete opponent justifies moving more than $20 billion in hardware when the same could be done for less?

Russia’s Naval Paradoxes

The Russian Navy doesn’t have a classic CATOBAR aircraft carrier not just because of economic reasons, despite popular western opinion. Russia is capable, even under economic sanctions, to pursue such a goal. The construction of the Zvezda shipyard in Russia’s far east which, when complete, will be able to build ships up to 350,000 tons of displacement and a length of up to 360 meters, is a clear indication that, despite some issues with Russia’s shipbuilding industry, the development of Russian aircraft carriers is impeded by more than money.¹⁰ The Zvezda shipyard will be more than capable of building large CATOBAR carriers. But will it? While the recent document titled “Fundamentals of Russia’s State Naval Policy Through 2030” openly states Russia’s serious maritime ambitions, the document emphasizes the use of high precision and hypersonic weapons and is ambiguous on the fate of carriers, stating that there are plans for the “creation of aircraft carrying complex” in the future. ¹¹

On 18 July, Russia’s Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov dropped a bomb when he revealed that discussion on the development and production of a brand new Yakovlev STOVL (based on the ideas of the Yak-141) aircraft is in full swing must enter serious production in 2025.¹² For the Russian CVN “trade union” and global navalists the news was devastating. Yet, this announcement by Borisov indicated clearly Russia’s ever intensive doctrinal debate and struggle with the carrier issue because it was the Soviet/Russian Navy that developed and today deploys an array of ASCMs designed precisely to make large, expensive CVNs obsolete. The Russian Navy knows the capabilities of its missiles. It also understands that the U.S. Navy, as well as other serious navies, inevitably will break the hypersonic barrier, as well as develop a genuine distributed lethality, and this will rewrite the rules of naval warfare. Already, the U.S. Navy deploys some long-range subsonic missiles, such as the LRASM, whose salvo is extremely difficult to defend against. With long-range hypersonic technology, in a hypothetical Russian case, something as expensive as the proposed Storm-class carrier in battle is simply providing for a fat, expensive, and prestigious target. In real combat, even damage to the decks of carriers makes them nothing more than a huge pile of metal incapable to launch or land fixed-wing aircraft. Russia’s power projection needs can be met by other means, especially against the background of the mediocre performance of the Admiral Kuznetsov carrier in Syria.

Some of the problems of cost and deck survivability of CATOBAR carriers are mitigated somewhat in STOVL carriers. In the end, the Soviet/Russian Navy has substantial experience operating these type of carriers. The appearance of the Yak-141 (NATO “Freestyle”) STOVL aircraft in the late 1980s heralded a new set of capabilities for aircraft of this type, with it being a genuine supersonic jet with a respectable range and combat load. Only the collapse of the Soviet Union and an extreme economic crisis stopped the Yak-141 program. Considering Russia’s internationally recognized experience with combat aircraft it is only reasonable to assume that the new STOVL aircraft, if it ever goes into production, will be an impressive machine. If launched into production this aircraft very likely will account for the not always commendable experiences of the U.S. Navy’s F-35B program. Moreover, it opens the road for numerous, multipurpose carriers able to meet tactical and operational tasks required by the Russian Navy. To be sure, the Russian Navy was looking attentively at the US Navy’s LHA-6 (USS America) as one of the possible avenues to pursue with its own carrier program. With America-class ships costing around $3.4 billion, financial comparisons, especially adjusted for Russia’s economic realities, are not in favor of the proposed CVNski, let alone U.S. CVNs whose costs reach upward of $13 billion. Operation costs are also immense.

Borisov’s announcement, coupled with the news of Russia working on new amphibious assault ships and rumors circulating about work proceeding on a Russian version of the V-22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft, indicate serious rethinking of carriers’ role in the Russian Navy. ¹³ An old Russian truism states that everything new is well-forgotten old. We may yet see a return, this time on a completely new technological level, to a not so forgotten concept of STOVL carriers, which will vary both in displacement and in capability and which will be more suited for, due to their much lower costs compared to CVNs and deck survivability, for operations in increasingly deadly, long-range super and hypersonic missile-dominated oceans.

Throughout its history, the Russian Navy had to operate under unfavorable geopolitical, economic, and combat conditions. These pressures often led to unorthodox solutions, from the bizarre looking Popovka to an operational adaptation of Jeune Ecole’ to the new technological realities of ASCMs and to leading the way with drastic expanding of the capabilities’ envelope for STOVL aircraft with the revolutionary Yak-141. A “continuous series of matches between new fangled and old-fashioned military techniques,” in Toynbee’s words, is a never-ending story of technical, tactical, and strategic innovation. One of these matches is between the antiship missile and the large aircraft carrier. This match finally reached a decisive point when the only role left for large carriers will be that of projecting power against weak opponents. But even this role, considering the proliferation of missile technologies may prove to be a bridge too far in the nearest future. Reducing the cost of carriers to levels which offer a compromise between combat performance and acceptable risks for operations becomes increasingly not just a well-meaning wish, but an imperative.

Can STOVL carriers offer a viable alternative? In terms of costs they can. In the end, only these type of carriers and STOVL aircraft can show their real modern combat record against a relatively competent adversary during the Falklands War. Due to their significantly lower costs, such carriers may provide what really counts in combat—numbers. In the end, even massive Royal Navy’s Queen Elizabeth-class STOVL carriers’ costs is estimated to be around $8 billion—not bad for two ships capable of carrying together 80 combat aircraft. ¹⁴ What the Russian Navy can do for $8 billion remains to be seen, but judging by the costs of Russian-made hardware since the mid-2000s, Russia probably will be able to eventually deploy more than two STOVL carriers. Emergence of relatively inexpensive and numerous STOVL carriers and possibly of the STOVL aircraft with characteristics rivaling those of being used from CVNs, coupled with further proliferation of the long-range hypersonic weapon, may write a final chapter for this drama. That is until the new one starts.

^{Bibliography.}

1. War And Civilization, Arnold J. Toynbee, Oxford University Press, NY, 1950, page 112.
2. Fleet Tactics And Coastal Combat, Hughes, Wayne P, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2000.
3. The Soviet Naval Cruise Missile Force: Development and Operational Employment, CIA (declassified report, release 2017/06/14), December 1971, page 11.
4. One Hundred Years of Sea Power, The US Navy 1890-1990, George W. Baer, pages 402-403
5. The U.S. Navy Needs to Radically Reassess How It Projects Power, Jerry Hendrix, National Review, 23 April 2015. http://www.nationalreview.com/article/417306/us-navy-needs-radically-reassess-how-it-projects-power-jerry-hendrix.
6. Breaking the Phalanx. By Douglas A. Macgregor. Praeger, 1997. Page 205.
7. The Hard Math of Hypersonic, http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2016/12/the-hard-math-of-hypersonic.html
8. Russia’s hypersonic Zircon anti-ship missile reaches eight times speed of sound, TASS, 15 April 2016, http://tass.com/defense/941559
9. Russia tests stratospheric missile to destroy fleets, http://www.pravdareport.com/russia/economics/24-08-2016/135419-stratospheric_missile-0/
10. http://dcss.ru/en/projects/construction-of-zvezda-shipbuilding-complex.html
11. Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 20.07.2017 № 327 “Об утверждении Основ государственной политики Российской Федерации в области военно-морской деятельности на период до 2030 года”. (The order of the President of Russian Federation on approval of Fundamentals of Russia’s State Naval Policy Through 2030), http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201707200015?index=18&rangeSize=1
12. Минобороны задумалось о создании самолета вертикального взлета (Defense Ministry Started Thinking about Creation of Vertical Take-off Aircraft), https://vz.ru/news/2017/7/18/879188.html
13. Aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and GEVs key to Russian Navy’s future.
    http://tass.com/defense/958156
14. ALL SHIP SHAPE HMS Queen Elizabeth sea trials – size comparison to other aircraft carriers, location and how to track her journey. https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3883696/hms-queen-elizabeth-sea-trials-royal-navy/