History

Culture Contributes to Collisions

Twenty-eight years ago feels like déjà vu all over again. I reported on board a destroyer immediately after a collision and stepped into the billet that had been filled by the officer-of-the deck (OOD). The USS Kinkaid (DD-965) collided with a large merchant ship in the early hours of 12 November 1989. One crew member was killed on impact and five others were pulled through an opening into the sea.

That collision that happened in the same busy traffic lanes as the more recent USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) incident. Similar to both the John S. McCain and USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62), the Kinkaid’s collision occurred in the pre-dawn hours within high-density shipping. While the official findings for the Kinkaid’s event focused on training and procedures, there was an undeniable culture aspect to the tragedy. During my three-year tour, witnessing the transformation of a crew and ship, so many relevant lessons could still be applicable today.

  • You can’t do it all. Even three decades ago, we were besought by a thousand requirements every day, of which even the best delegation and most efficient crew could reasonably only complete 800. The key isn’t to eliminate requirements, most of which came about from some other misfortunes. The key is to focus on what’s important today and what’s important for tomorrow. If you get bit for deciding to skip one of the 200 things you couldn’t get done, that’s leadership. Own it and be thankful the bigger things got done well.
  • Sleep is important. Life at sea is demanding and doesn’t leave much time for the rack. I didn’t care how much guff I caught for taking a nooner most days after lunch. My productivity increased in the p.m., and my ability to think clearly improved. Catching naps whenever possible is essential to maintain performance. There’s only one time of day you can pretty much guarantee no drills will begin: lunch.
  • Haze gray and under way are best. But you can still learn a lot and gain experience with realistic scenarios and simulators. Unfortunately, realism in scenarios is often lacking; usually missing is the part of the scenario that creates the confusion for which problem solving must begin. Almost every canned training situation I experienced during my 25 years began with clarity. That’s not reality. The Navy is trying to fix that with the Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class, but there’s an entire fleet with unrealistic simulation scenarios and a generation of watchstanders to retrain. See retired Navy Captain Gerry Roncolato’s “Fitzgerald Delivers Damage Control Lessons and Questions” in Proceedings Today.
  • Technology isn’t the answer. That’s a strange assertion coming from a futurist, but it’s 100% true. Technologies always will have their flaws and their vulnerabilities. Humans remain the decision makers on our ships today. So we must know what we see and be able to interpret the visual information to confirm the instruments. Surface Warfare Magazine has published several articles over the decades that teach quick math for the OOD that remain relevant today. Your eyes and your brain are your best tools if you train them properly.
  • Quantity doesn’t matter. On the Kinkaid, there was unmistakable confusion among the key watch standers. Don’t count on one of the other 15-30 people watching the same situation unfold to sound the alarm. Call 911. Be that person. Wake up the CO. Speak up!
  • You’re not alone. Corollary to #5. We all like to think that we know how to handle a situation. That’s human nature and a big part of Navy culture. No matter how much you value your own abilities, however, there is somebody else with more experience or a different perspective that can provide useful instruction.
  • Don’t eat your young. That’s a life lesson for any career. In a busy and stressful underway environment, it’s all too easy to pass on your stress. Ship driving should be demanding and fun. I wrote about this in Proceedings 20 years ago. The surest way to ensure you are all alone is to shut down the communications of your team.

These are some of the most salient lessons I learned in my first assignment as a junior officer. They were born by the death and injuries of several shipmates. Accountability actions and official findings still didn’t fix some of the culture problems listed above, but they were definitely obvious to me in the context of relieving the guy that was driving the ship during that collision at sea.

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Editor’s Note: See then-Lieutenant Capen’s “Here Is the Fun,” October 1996 Proceedings, pp. 32-34, winner of the Surface Navy Association Annual Literary Award.

 

 

 

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