On the morning of 13 January 2018, panic engulfed the state of Hawaii when an emergency management employee hit the wrong button and issued a real-world inbound ballistic missile alert. The negligence in this case is egregious, especially considering the employee was conducting routine turnover and he had to select the alert from a dropdown menu and then confirm he wanted to issue it. Still, this error highlights the immense power of operator errors in missile defense, and begs the question “Does the employee deserve sole responsibility for this failure?”
In considering this question, I was reminded of another case of a wrong button impacting missile defense. On 22 June 2017, USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53) failed a ballistic missile intercept test, and from the press report, it came down to a single Sailor pressing the wrong button, with no further comment from the Navy. When I first read the headlines, I recalled memories of sitting in the tactical action officer (TAO) chair in my ship’s Combat Information Center, heart pounding, trying desperately to focus on what I should do next amid the deluge of data flowing into my eyes and ears. I could imagine being that Sailor pressing the wrong button. I could not imagine, however, why Navy leadership allowed this Sailor to take sole ownership of this failure.
The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) system is one of the most advanced and complicated, warfighting technologies. Operating the Aegis BMD system requires incredible technical acumen and persistent, intensive focus. Even the most highly trained operators make mistakes when under extreme pressure. The key to executing effective missile defense not only is training the warfighter, but also fielding systems that can overcome operator error, and artfully designing layered defense operations that can be resilient to single points of failure.
Fortunately, Aegis BM was developed to function in the face of many Sailor mistakes—but not all. At some point, Aegis will catastrophically fail when a Sailor presses the wrong button, as evidenced on 22 June. That does not mean the blame falls solely on the Sailor and his wayward finger. Part of the blame also falls on the admirals and staffs who crafted the concept of employment of the ship’s BMD system, for relying on a plan that could crumble at the push of a button. Part of the blame falls on the Department of Defense acquisitions community and defense industry for not integrating adequate “failsafe” mechanisms into the system design. Part of the blame falls on officers like me for failing to cultivate a warfighting force that eliminates mistakes. Of course, these objectives truly are not achievable, but it does not excuse us from trying. I am not saying that the Sailor in question is faultless, just that we all share in the blame.
Perhaps most important is taking care of our shipmates. Since when does the Navy allow the public shaming of junior Sailors for well-intentioned tactical mistakes? Granted, it is not surprising that the narrative in the media focuses on the individual Sailor’s errant button push. Given the current nuclear standoff with North Korea and the staggeringly high stakes inherent in ballistic missile defense, it makes sense that defense contractors would want it known that their system was not at fault in failing to intercept the target. Test failures have sunk contractors in the past, and the investment in Aegis has been immense. What does not make sense is the Navy’s complicity in this narrative. Neither the Navy, nor the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) that oversaw the test have spoken in the Sailor’s defense. In fact, some have expressed relief that the failure was not a technology issue that would require investigation.[1] I do not share this sense of relief. Does anyone believe that operator errors will be less likely under the stress of actual combat, as opposed to test scenarios? In the case of Hawaii Emergency Management Agency, do the chances of an employee hitting the wrong button go up or down when they have just been told a ballistic missile is inbound to the island?
I understand the need to reassure the U.S. public of the integrity of our missile defense systems, but not at the cost of letting a single, Sailor take the fall. In a widespread effort to avoid the crosshairs of blame for failing a critically important test, we left one of our shipmates alone, high and dry. Our Sailors deserve better. So, on behalf of all of us, I offer to the thankfully-still-unnamed Sailor: my fault, I’ll do better next time. Hopefully, officials in Hawaii will similarly strive to improve their systems and processes to prevent a single employee from being able to negligently ignite a nuclear war, rather than taking the easy approach and laying the blame solely at that employee’s feet.
Footnotes
[1] “Sailor error led to failed US Navy ballistic missile intercept test,” Defense News, 24 July 2017, www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/07/24/Sailor-error-led-to-failed-us-navy-ballistic-missile-intercept-test/.
