Recently, a brace of articles published in Proceedings and elsewhere have argued that naval aviation is perched on a precipice of impending retention disaster. Aviators, especially those in the strike-fighter (VFA) and electronic attack (VAQ) communities, increasingly eye leaving the service at the completion of their minimum service requirement (MSR). Many of these articles focus on the monetary compensation available for aviators as a way to help solve retention woes.[1] Tracing their roots to Commander Guy Snodgrass’s barn-burner 2014 white paper “Keep a Weather Eye on the Horizon,” these pieces have pointed out that money is not the root of all solutions, but it is a spigot that can be turned on quickly while longer term fixes are put in place.[2]
As a whole, the conversation has yet to offer structural changes to aviation program that might impact retention. (An exception is Lieutenant Commander Anthony Kochanski’s recent output; his two Proceedings articles have some concrete ideas as starting points.) Not to fear, however: a lieutenant commander with an IDEA is here to muddy the waters.
Snodgrass’s work (and those that followed) identified several factors impacting retention that can be addressed through the creation of “white space” in an aviator’s career, including: operational tempo, or OPTEMPO; a need for career flexibility; and quality of life.[3] As a solution to these problems, I recommend the Navy stop promoting aviators.
Before going to general quarters, hear me out. To frame my argument, please join me on a mystical journey into the bowels of naval officer career progression.
Aviation Career Milestones
Generally speaking, career progression is tied to two things: promotion timing and milestone timing. Promotions are pretty straightforward—at certain intervals, officers are eligible for promotion to the next highest grade. Broadly, promotions are governed by Title 10 of U.S. law. Some are more-or-less automatic (i.e., O-2 through O-3), while O-4 and above require a selection board and approval by the Senate.[4]
Milestones are more nebulous, but in aviation they are tied to promotion. For example, the aviation department head (DH) screen coincides with selection for O-4, command at sea with selection for O-5, etc. This means that these milestones occur at relatively predictable intervals.
These wickets can move but generally they occur within a year of the dates that are projected the moment an aviator commissions.
The wrench in this system is flight school. For pilots, flight school takes approximately two years; for Navy flight officers (NFOs) between 16 and 18 months.[5] After earning their wings, aviators report to the Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS, known as “RAG”) for training in their specific aircraft. This takes close to a year. From commissioning to RAG completion, aviators rack up “non-observed” or “NOB” fitness reports (FITREPs).
This makes for almost three years of time wherein aviators are not getting competitive paper. This is not an issue when competing for community milestones (DH, commanding officer [CO], even major command)—every aviator has this gap. But when it comes to promotion boards, aviators start behind their surface counterparts (and slightly behind their nuclear siblings), who have up to two years more time in which to be competitive, while aviators were playing volleyball in Pensacola. As a result, the aviation career path bounces from one milestone tour to the next to provide officers who are competitive within aviation and across the Navy.
Aviators follow a 36-month sea tour with a 30-ish-month production tour (i.e., flight instructor, TOPGUN, test pilot), and then typically roll immediately into a disassociated sea tour prior to DH. This is because DH timing follows O-4 selection, which, if you’re keeping score, happens shortly after the shore tour. The disassociated sea tour and a 24-to-30-month department head tour finish with just enough time to go ashore for a year before screening for O-5 and CO. It is exhausting.
Generally, NFOs, whose flight school process is slightly shorter, may find themselves with a free year in there somewhere to go to Monterey or Newport before jumping back into the jet, but that is not universal, especially if an NFO fails to screen for DH or O-4 on the first look and needs competitive paper to screen on the second try.
Compounding this timeline is the aviation service commitment. Currently, pilots owe eight years of service from their winging date, NFOs owe six. This translates to a major career decision occurring between the end of the production tour (for NFOs) and the end of a disassociated sea tour (for pilots). Faced with going back to sea as a DH in a high OPTEMPO environment while their buddies are trading flight suits for ties, it is no wonder many pilots are choosing to roll the dice with the airlines. This leads to lower DH take rates and higher screen percentages (i.e., the same number of DHs chosen from a smaller pool). The grass may not be greener on the other side, but more and more pilots are deciding that it is worth a try.[6]
Furthermore, many aviators may get just one tour flying gray aircraft before having to decide whether to stay or go. A fleet lieutenant who goes to the training command (“VTs”) after his first tour may follow up with a shooter or staff tour, taking him or her out of the cockpit for two years. After two tours on the dull end of the spear, many of these aviators see no chance to return to the tactical world of combat aviation (or starboard delta, helo guys) because they are not competing against aviators anymore and will be eclipsed by those who are. Instead, they throw in with the civilian world. These are aviators who once dreamed of flying. They were competent, if not stellar, pilots as junior officers but through the vagaries of career timing they got exactly one chance to “live the dream.”
Meanwhile, the hard-charging pipe-hitters are rewarded in true Navy fashion with more work. They flow from fleet tour to weapons and tactics instructor (WTI) duty, to sea duty, to DH, with a chance to breathe finally after 14 years of service. (Make no mistake, the first shore tour for these aviators can be very busy, even if it is comparatively a respite from fleet life.) Many of these aviators burn out and leave the Navy after their second sea tour, depriving the Navy of the kind of “sustained superior performers” needed to command squadrons and air wings.
Revenge of the SWOs: Lessons for the Aviation Community
Contrast this with surface warfare officers (SWOs), who are usually finished with one of two DH tours before screening for O-4 and have approximately seven-and-a-half years of shore tour programmed into their careers before O-5 command (contrasted with aviators, who have about five). SWOs have more built in “white space” in their career track, space they can use to go back to sea, teach ROTC, get a degree, or make other career moves, while remaining “on-track” for CO. Furthermore, with a shorter commitment (five years), SWOs make their stay-or-go calculus earlier, when the detailer has more to dangle as a carrot than “stay in and go to sea as a DH.”
Illustration by the author depicting major milestones for (from top to bottom), pilots, NFOs, and SWOs, against years of commissioned service, with promotions in grade and milestones depicted. Based on BUPERS data. SWO detailer briefings include options in the first shore tour region like: “USNA Instructor” and “Master’s Degree.”
To review: billets are tied to milestones, milestones are tied to promotion. On-track aviation billets are crammed together in rapid succession; off-track aviators may find themselves out of the cockpit after only three years in the Fleet.
There is nothing wrong with hard work when it is rewarding and expected, and part of maturing as an aviator includes learning the importance of “officership,” a ground job, and a broader experience within the Navy. But aviation is structured to give a minority of officers an intense “drink from the fire hose” experience through their DH tour, while others have a scant three years in gray aircraft before being sent to orange-and-whites and then life on a staff before leaving the Navy.
Aviation needs to retool to allow aviators to (a) keep flying in a support or operational role, and/or (b) provide outlets outside of aviation for those who have been ridden hard and put up wet before they jump into a DH tour.
Whither aviation?
The Navy should delay aviator promotions in grade and tie them to their winging date, rather than to commissioning. If the service requirement for promotion to lieutenant was defined as a three years from the date of winging, aviators would spend more time as a carefree JG, but would also slow their inexorable roll towards O-4 and department head. By moving the goalposts for O-4 and DH, there is a waterfall effect on future promotions and milestones; it also creates white space for aviators.
Illustration by the author. The author’s proposal would move promotion to O-2 and O-3 to the right, creating a corresponding shift in screening for follow-on promotions and milestones, creating “white space” or “incentive” tours after the disassociated sea tour.
Under this model, the time in flight school would essentially be recouped later, ideally after a production tour or disassociated sea tour. In this way, the Navy would create options for aviators in their careers. With two years of extra time, aviators could choose to get a master’s degree, instruct out of the cockpit (e.g., ROTC or USNA), or return to the cockpit as a super JO (i.e., a second division officer tour). Imagine the possibilities if a detailer could use that white space to get disenchanted senior lieutenants back into gray aircraft, or get worn down patch-wearers out of them.
That is a simplification; there are many top-shelf JOs who would love to get another tour in a squadron. Others could return for instructor duty at the RAG or in the training command. There are aviators who love those jobs, but who get to do it for two years and then never again.
COs would have more flexibility in extending or rolling their aircrew early. Including options like FRS or super JO duty would also allow people who really want to compete to get back into the mix, while strong early performers could take some time off from the “FITREP 500.” This would also provide a path for aviators to stay in the cockpit longer, a frequently-cited complaint in exit surveys.
It is an easy thing to say “just don’t promote them,” but executing this approach is another. It would take a heavy dose of strategic messaging, something that naval aviation leaders have not done very well lately (the OBOGS fiasco in the training command, and the current flight pay kerfuffle come to mind).[7] But although aviators would find themselves junior to their SWO classmates, the payoff is possibly an extra tour’s worth of time to “explore the space.” I know very few aviators who would trade an extra shot at the cockpit for being promoted at the same time as their SWO brethren. Aviators love to fly and if that means some extra time as a JG, it’s a safe bet that many of them will accept a delay.[8]
There is also the issue of pay. An O-2 with more than four years of service earns measurably less than an O-3 over four years. Aviation would have to take a look at flight pay and other incentives to make aviation financially competitive with other communities, while also clearly communicating the benefits of delayed promotion to aviators and interested candidates. Aviation needs to play up the fact that flying is a childhood dream for most aviators. They are generally inspired, motivated, “type A” personalities; they also have a lot of questions, the Navy needs to have ready answers.
This may also require some legal maneuvering. U.S. Title 10 seems to allow some flexibility in this regard. It says: “Officers to be promoted to the grade of . . . lieutenant (junior grade) shall be promoted in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary [of the Navy].” SECNAV apparently has some leeway regarding promotion; after all, each service promotes their junior officer grades on slightly differing timelines. How much leeway we have is up to our sea lawyers to determine, but changing the requirements for aviators to address a readiness crisis that has been discussed in Congress may be an easier sell than it seems.[9]
The practical application is that naval aviation’s DHs and COs would be older than their counterparts in other communities, and would have more time in service, but the level of experience, excepting flight school, would be similar. Two extra years could translate into a tour with industry, graduate education, exchange programs with foreign services, increased instructor experience, or simply more time in a fleet) squadron operating at a high tactical level.
I have no illusions that this proposal will solve all of aviation’s retention woes. Among other problems, it may be illegal, which would be what we aviators call an “other.” But aviators consistently bemoan quality of life, OPTEMPO, and lack of flying as motivators to leave the service. Combine that with the poor messaging on pay and you have a recipe for mass exodus.[10] This will only get worse as fewer aviators are eligible for the legacy retirement pension and switch to the blended retirement system (BRS). BRS incentivizes leaving the service early because without an “all or nothing” retirement system, there is no compelling reason to stay in for 20 years.
Adjusting aviation officer promotion would move the associated milestones, creating more “white space” in aviation career tracks, allowing officers time to recharge, branch out, or stay tactical when they otherwise could not. Coupled with changes to the bonus and flight pay, and with a serious look at career options that keep off-track aviators in the cockpit, this sort of flexibility may have the benefit of increasing aviation retention and improving the breadth and depth of aviation’s talent pool.
Endnotes
[1] As a primer, start with this flurry of articles from USNI: CDR Mike Lisa, “Fix Aviation Career Pay,” Proceedings, vol. 143, no. 10 (October 2017), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-10/fix-aviation-career-pay.
LT Jeremy Cappalo, “Fix Officer Retention!” Proceedings, vol. 143, no. 11 (November 2017), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-11/fix-officer-retention.
CDR George Perry, “Fix the Fighter Pilot Shortage: It can Be Done,” Proceedings, vol. 143, no. 12 (December 2017), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/fix-fighter-pilot-shortage-it-can-be-done.
LCDR Anthony Kochanski, “To Fix TacAir Pilot Retention, Follow the Money,” Proceedings, vol. 144, no. 1 (January 2018), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-01/fix-tacair-pilot-retention-follow-money.
LCDR Anthony Kochanski, “The Road to Retention is Paved With good Intentions,” Proceedings, vol. 144, no. 3 (March 2018), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-03/road-retention-paved-good-intentions.
VADM Robert Burke, “We are on the Road to Aviation Retention,” Proceedings Today (March 2018), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-03/we-are-road-aviation-retention.
[2] CDR Colin Price, “Flexibility (For the Bonus) is the Key to Air Power,” USNI Blog (January 18, 2018), https://blog.usni.org/posts/2018/01/18/flexibility-for-the-bonus-is-the-key-to-air-power.
[3] CDR Guy Snodgrass, “Keep a Weather Eye on the Horizon,” republished at USNI Blog (March 20, 2014), https://blog.usni.org/posts/2014/03/20/keep-a-weather-eye-on-the-horizon-a-navy-officer-retention-study.
[4] US Government, “10 U.S. Code § 624 – Promotions: how made,” https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/624.
US Government, “10 U.S. Code § 611 – Convening of selection boards,” https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/611#a
[5] Note: These numbers are based on information provided by the Bureau of Personnel.
[6] For a discussion of recent DH screen rates, see the 2017 Tailhook Reunion PERS 43 briefing, https://livestream.com/wab/tailhook2017/videos/162513511.
[7] For communications issues regarding OBOGS, reference CDR Salamander, “The IPs Revolt,” http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2017/04/the-ips-revolt.html.
For messaging and trust issues regarding pay, reattack LCDR Kochanski’s “The Road to Retention is Paved With Good Intentions,” https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-03/road-retention-paved-good-intentions.
[8] Note: In discussing this piece with LCDR Kochanski, he raised the prospect of making this process voluntary. Because I’ve droned on long enough, I do not have time to devote to it now, but allowing off-track or non-competitive aviators to opt out of O-4 but continue flying under this model is an interesting possibility. Title 10 does not mandate screening every eligible officer for O-4, but the Navy does it any way, and it forces a lot of lieutenants out in the process. An opt-out process could allow O-3s to stay in the Navy longer without worrying about promoting to O-4.
[9] House of Representatives, “Military Pilot Shortage” (March 29, 2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg25095/html/CHRG-115hhrg25095.htm.
[10] A draft Chief of Naval Personnel brief includes the quote: “While not a top reason, $$$ is a growing factor,” and yet most solutions to this point have focused solely on money, not the factors cited here.
