The notion of shifting the U.S. Coast Guard to the Department of Defense (DoD) is an old and tired argument, but a perennial favorite nonetheless. The recent partial federal government shutdown renewed these debates, pushing them to the surface and livening the banter at many a coffee mess. In the past, proponents have asserted that such a transfer would ensure the Coast Guard is appropriately funded and “more robust, efficient, and combat ready than ever in its history.” Whether intoxicated by the quixotic allure of fleet-on-fleet engagement or the department’s ostensibly bottomless treasure chest, supporters of this future seemingly overlook the Coast Guard’s raison d’être and the practical implications of their rationale.
Yes, the Coast Guard, a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), by statute is one of the five armed services and in times of necessity can be transferred to DoD under the Secretary of the Navy. This is well known and rather uncontroversial. However, 14 United States Code §3, which allows for the transfer of the service upon declaration of war or when directed by the President, has likely outlived its necessity. Though such a declaration was enacted twice in the service’s history, the Coast Guard has not transferred to the Navy since World War II and has still participated in every war and major military operation since.
This post-World War II reality is likely a result of legislative changes that led to the Unified Command Plan, and were further shaped by the National Security and Goldwater-Nichols Acts. The broad structural changes to DOD have shifted the responsibility of planning and executing the fight to functional and geographic combatant commanders, and placed the role of manning, training, and equipping the forces upon each of the individual military services. The Coast Guard supports DoD in much the same way, negotiating support levels on an iterative cycle and providing combatant commanders with ready forces.
Why is this important? Proponents of a more combat-ready Coast Guard largely focus on the service’s cutters, envisioning them as de facto surface combatants and advocating for them to be outfitted with ship-killers and integrated into battle groups. These hankerings, however, are inconsistent with the functions DoD expects the Coast Guard to perform. Rather than requesting cutters to execute naval functions, DoD planners are asking for cutters, aircraft, deployable specialized forces, intelligence specialists, and marine safety professionals to conduct maritime interdiction, ice operations, homeland security and counterterrorism, search-and-rescue, marine safety (including aids to navigation), and counter-trafficking functions.
Supporters of shifting the Coast Guard to DoD further opine such a move would sharpen the service’s capabilities and push them into the realm of the warfighter. The Coast Guard Strategic Plan 2018-2020 notes the service’s “unique authorities, capabilities, and partnerships . . . bridge the gap between the law enforcement prowess of DHS and the lethality of DoD.” While the Coast Guard’s partnership with DoD remains mutually beneficial, especially so with the U.S. Navy, the service should continue to position itself to bridge that gap by incorporating the best technologies, strategies, and tactics from all of its federal, state, local, and industry partners. The Coast Guard’s ability to flow seamlessly between defense and security responsibilities strengthens the broader national security regime and provides the nation a flexible instrument of power to counter its adversaries irregardless of war footing.
While it may seem a reasonable argument to shift the Coast Guard to DoD and increase the service’s defense readiness posture, there are real world implications to such actions. This past year the China Coast Guard (CCG) was transferred from the civilian State Oceanic Administration to the Central Military Commission. This structural change brought into question the veracity of the CCG as a law enforcement instrument, and significantly undercut China’s messaging that their maritime activity had benevolent intentions.
Is the CCG a constabulary agency enforcing sovereignty and the rule of law, or are they a paranaval organization being used for power projection? Will their significant increase in weaponry and the CCG’s growing role under the military commission result in more provocative actions and further blur China’s intentions in the maritime grey zone? If the Coast Guard were to transfer to DoD, the service (and nation) would have to reckon with similar questions as it establishes legal agreements with international partners, provides training to other nation’s domestic law enforcement agencies, and operates around the globe to uphold the rule of law and bolster international norms.
There are also practical realities associated with pushing Coast Guard forces into the more lethal side of the maritime security continuum. Setting aside that DoD is neither asking nor expecting the Coast Guard to be part of the carrier battle group or in their distributed lethality mix, the Navy’s advanced weapons systems and tactics are training and maintenance intensive. Their integration into the Coast Guard’s capability mix would require trade-offs, with crews either increasing their time out to sea or reducing operational days to participate more in naval training and exercises. Mishaps like the collisions of the USS Fitzgerald and John S. McCain should serve as a stark reminder of the readiness challenges associated with increased operational tempo and training. The Coast Guard instead should focus on honing and executing their broader operational responsibilities, which increases proficiency in the functions DoD is relying on and building into their plans.
If you pull the wheat from the chaff of these arguments, the underlying rationale is simply that the Coast Guard should “shift to DoD to get a bigger budget.” Though the Coast Guard’s discretionary budget has been underfunded and flatline for nearly a decade due to other national priorities, transferring the service to DoD is not a panacea. First and foremost, it is implausible the Coast Guard’s current appropriators would desire to transfer their budget authority to defense counterparts whom already consume one-sixth of the federal budget. Second, transferring to DoD when they are looking to establish a Space Force and the Navy is pushing to increase its fleet to 355 ships seems a fool’s errand. Last, proponents admittedly recognize that the Coast Guard would need to “carve out a safe niche under the Secretary of the Navy” to protect its budgetary needs and keep its regulatory responsibilities intact. If a prenuptial of that magnitude is required prior to the marriage, the relationship is suspect already.
Today’s Coast Guard is ready, relevant, and responsive to countering sources of discord and deterring threats to our national interests in times of peace and conflict. The service is positioned to meet their defense readiness commitments; not due to the fact that they can carry out naval functions, but rather that they are excellent at “coastguarding.” When presented with the question of whether the Coast Guard should be a component of the Navy in 1919, the Coast Guard’s first Commandant, Commodore Ellsworth Bertholf, wrote, “the Coast Guard does not exist solely for the purpose of preparing for war. If it did there would be, of course, two navies—a large one and a small one, and that condition, I am sure you will agree, could not long exist.” As a colleague and friend noted, lucky for us good quotes never go stale.
