On 27 February 2019, the U.S. Navy announced its proposal to retire the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) early in 2024, rather than proceed with its planned refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH). The last time the Navy retired an aircraft carrier was in 2012, when the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) was decommissioned, inactivated, and stricken from the Naval Vessel Register. The inactivation process resulted the Enterprise being gutted and reduced her to a floating hulk.
After reading Six Frigates by Ian W. Toll, the parallels between the challenges the early Navy faced and the challenges the Navy faces today are striking. Early captains struggled with manning ships and getting the maintenance them the needed before cruises, as the government fought over the high cost of the six capital warships, not unlike today.
As the public willingness to support the large cost of high-end vessels and the intensity of naval conflict waxed and waned over the course of their service history, the original six frigates of the U.S. Navy would be “laid up in ordinary”—drydocked, with armament and equipment removed. Notably, after each of the Quasi-War, Barbary Wars, and the War of 1812, ships were laid up then brought out again when they were needed for the next conflict.[1] Instead of retirement, Navy should mothball the Harry S. Truman, defined for our purposes as fully laid it up in ordinary, as opposed to merely tied up pierside. [2]
Reality is very complex, but for the sake of argument, let’s make a few simplifying assumptions:
- The combat power of CVNs is preserved for the next 50 years (ignore the debate on the value of carriers), and the motivation for the early retirement is more financial than strategic.
- In the proposed retirement of the Harry S. Truman, the Navy plans on executing a similar inactivation process with her as it did with the Enterprise (despite her not having reached the end of her service life, as the Enterprise did).
- Laying up a carrier in ordinary (including the new construction or refurbishment of a graving dock) costs the same as inactivation does (disregarding dismantling costs), and pulling a carrier out of inactive service is logistically and technically feasible. [3]
When the cost of keeping a capital ship in active service exceeds the amount the country is willing to pay, the smartest move is to lay it up—striking the middle ground between shouldering the monetary burden and retirement of a valuable asset. Defueling the Truman and putting her in a drydock will bring the Navy operating costs savings and still allow of the carrier’s associated crew and air wing to be retasked. Then, just like the original frigates, when the need for powerful capital ships arises, the Harry S. Truman can be reactivated to join the fight—more rapidly than a new carrier could be built.
Endnotes
[1] Ian W. Toll, Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy, W.W. Norton & Co., 2008.
[2] At least until its replacement of CVN-85 comes online in the mid-2040’s.
[3] Using an estimated operating cost for a Nimitz-class carrier of $2.5 mil/day, the cost of a new dock is equivalent to about a month of operating costs. Large, modern floating dry docks can be built for about $50 million. Extensions and upgrades to existing graving docks can be even cheaper.
