Since the forced subordination of naval strategy to military strategy after the National Security Act of 1947, the sea services continue to lose their naval identity in favor of “jointness.” Many naval officers now view the sea services solely as a warfighting organization without regard for its full range of impact—economic, financial, and influential. Falling victim to this intellectual trap diminishes not only potential naval contributions to national security and prosperity, but the future of U.S. power itself and with it, our very way of life.
The naval services revere the proper place of strategy, meaning the continual adjustment of ways and means to achieve political ends. Since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act of 1986, our naval strategy must also align to higher-level strategies, such as the National Security Strategy of the United States and National Defense Strategy, which constrain its span and scope. Operationally, combatant commanders develop plans to meet specific threats based on their best estimates of the enemy, the environment, and the policies of U.S. political leaders. Between these two layers of strategy and operations lies doctrine.
Naval doctrine often is viewed as a static document that guides U.S. naval forces in how to operate and as a repository of terms used in professional discussions. However, doctrine also must be viewed as our theory of victory. In general, good theories explain a phenomenon, identify the relationship between relevant components, climb the ladder of abstraction, and have inherent predictive power. Good theory has a temporal aspect, showing cause and effect relations, and creating a logical construct. Considering the United States’ return to great power competition and the changing character of warfare, what is our new theory of victory?
Much of the discussion on military preparedness today centers on building new lethal capabilities, inventing new military technology, and adopting new operational concepts to defeat an adversary’s military. This perspective is particularly challenging (tactical at best and wrong-headed at worst) for the naval services, as it is difficult to conceptualize “victory” simply by eliminating the naval force of a great power, which may be irrelevant, or projecting naval power ashore, particularly when at a significant population disadvantage (see: the Korean War).
If Sino-American relations continue to turn more competitive, the United States will approach a dangerous crisis situation. It is important to note how different each classic school views the concept of crisis. The original Greek meaning of krisis relates to a turning point between a favorable and unfavorable outcome, whereas Chinese culture views crises as a combination of danger and opportunity. In that context, the 2008 global financial crisis was an opportunity for China to accelerate its national rejuvenation strategy. Therefore, it is easy to conceive a scenario in which China initiates a crisis for its own benefit. This may involve its leadership accepting a short-term loss (say a few ships) for a long-term gain (the American public demands U.S. presence in the Pacific is reduced).
Since we have returned to an era of great power politics, Cold War crisis scholarship offers important insights. Oran Young’s model of political behavior provides a useful framework for understanding the transition of China from strategic partner in the Cold War to strategic competitor today.
According to this model, a continuum exists in the behavior between two states. One pole is pure cooperation and the other is pure conflict; neither extreme takes place in reality. Zone A represents normal interactions between two states. These exchanges can be either cooperative or conflictual in nature, or combination of both, and are considered to occur within the norms of the international system. Zone B represents crisis behavior, which is characterized by highly coercive political interactions falling between ordinary “power politics” and open warfare, Zone C. Two important thresholds exist along this continuum, which mark the use of coercive and violent interactions.
In an historical examination of Sino-American crises, J. H. Kalicki, observes that the variations occurring in Young’s model, and in international behavior in general, can be classified as escalation (the aggravation of a crisis, characterized by the intensification of conflictual interactions), de-escalation, and declension, or the stabilization of crisis situation characterized by balancing conflictual and cooperative interactions. These distinctions are relevant when examining the variation in patterns of behavior amidst enduring rivalries.
I would argue that victory in great power competition means setting the conditions for both states to continue pursuing national interests, while limiting escalation to war. In effect, the theory of victory means effectively managing the crisis zone noted above. This cause-and-effect goal demands establishing and enforcing clear red lines at the lower spectrum of competition and clearly articulating national interests to one another—an essential part of diplomacy.
The maritime environment may serve as an “arena” in which great power competition takes place. The objective of such interactions is to both test resolve and identify intentions. In the South China Sea we are already witnessing a series of probing and signaling interactions; the exchange of strategic information. All of these steps are psychological in nature. Therefore, short of total war, the conditions of victory lie in the psychological realm rather than the physical domain. In that scenario, naval diplomacy may have greater utility than naval warfare, but it often is overlooked. Furthermore, it is likely that this type of competition will occur solely in the maritime domain (to include cyber and air), without the use of significant land forces. Therefore, a naval theory of victory is essential to U.S. success. We cannot afford to leave ourselves with conventional or nuclear war as our only (irrational) options in the future.
Before 1986 and the follow-on effects of Goldwater-Nichols, great power scholars such as Stan Turner, Ken Booth, and Edward Luttwak understood and often wrote about the benefit the naval services offer to maintaining peace, policing maritime commerce, deterring enemies, and supporting a land force in the event of total war. In the changed context since then, the nation now needs an integrated naval doctrine. That begins by constructing a naval theory of victory and developing a new logic of actions-to-outcomes to achieve it.
