Manning matters.
That’s the basic conclusion of a pair of Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) studies that were directed by the 2017 Comprehensive Review of Surface Force Incidents (CR). Essentially, the task was to compare two like ships in a controlled environment, one with a normal “currently acceptable” manning (95 percent fill and 92 percent fit) , and one that was “plussed up” to 100 percent of the basic allowance requirement.
The abstract of the reports read as follows:
CR 53: U.S. Navy crews were sharply reduced following the Optimal Manning Initiative of 2003. Extensive research from the Crew Endurance Team at the Naval Postgraduate School suggests that Sailors work extremely long days with little time for rest as a result. After multiple mishaps in 2017, the Navy conducted a Comprehensive Review that directed various actions be taken. One of those directives was to compare two ships, one with normal crew and one with an augmented crew, to explore how manning is related to sleep and fatigue levels.
LT Murph Mansfield: This thesis looks at levels of manning, fatigue, mood, and sleep of crew members onboard two Flight I U.S. Navy Destroyers (DDG) over the six-month course of the Basic Phase. Unfortunately, due to overall fleet manning shortfalls, the requirements necessary for a successful comparison between the two ships were not met (i.e., a significant difference in the manning level for the two ships was not achieved until quite late in the Basic Phase). Because of these challenges, all participants in the first two data collection periods were pooled to provide an appraisal of the work and rest patterns of enlisted and officers in the Basic Phase. For the final data collection period when the Fit rates differed by 8.7%, compared to Sailors on the normal ship, Sailors on the augmented ship received ~43 minutes more sleep on average (6.35 ± 1.09 versus 5.64 ± 0.88 hr./day) and had better overall moods according to Profile of Mood State scores.[i]
LT Ben Garbacz. Findings from the CR53 study showed that overall, Sailors reported 50.8 hours of activities compared to the 54 hours proposed in port Naval Availability Factor (NAF). Combined total productive and non-productive work hours in port was 48.0 compared to the NAF estimate of 46.6 hours. In contrast, reported hours of leave/special liberty during the CR53 study was 0.0 hours compared to the 7.4 hours designated in the in-port NAF. During the single data collection event when manning was different between the two ships, crew members on the ship with increased manning reported working 0.8 hours less per day.[ii]
One noteworthy (and deeply ironic) aspect of these manning studies was that in order to conduct it, sailors had to be found to plus up the study ship; this proved to be difficult, according to the abstract, “due to fleet manning shortages.” I will be the first to admit that when I saw this exercise in the CR, I dismissed it as a fool’s errand because I did not think the measures are in place to see a difference. News Flash: I was wrong.
Accolades to these two hard-working naval officers and research students and to the staff at NPS for producing a detailed and clear-eyed report. In short, these two comprehensive, multiyear studies told us what many could have guessed. Crews manned to the full requirement:
- Perform Better (Improved Basic Phase Scores)
- Are Better Rested (13% more sleep)
- Are more mentally fit (Improved Mood State Scores)
- Work less hours in port (10% less hours)
- Get to actually take leave and special liberty
Here is my interpretation of this research study set:
- Manning does matter. An 8 percent increase in personnel resulted in a 14 percent increase in sleep per day under way and 10 percent fewer work hours in port. In other words, the study ship (manned to 100 percent) was almost able to meet the surface force crew endurance requirements while the ship manned at fleet average was not. One indicator: The “normally” manned ship executed ZERO leave or special liberty during the 20 week basic phase.
- Sailor well-being as measured by the mood test was increased. This sounds like touchy-feely stuff, but in an environment where self-destructive behavior is a huge problem, this is an important finding. The connection between workload, stress, fatigue, and mental health issues is indisputable; this finding alone should make a compelling argument to look harder at the impact of manning shortfalls on the health of the force.
- The naval allowance factor fails to account for a critical portion of the sailor workload, represented by the execution of inspections, certifications, assessments and visits (ICAV) events, which represented almost 50 percent of the measured workload during the basic phase. There was review of these events after the CR that eliminated about 32 percent of the overall number, but as the author points out, “events are not created with expected man-hours required to complete them in mind, and no method or model exists for this to be achieved.”
Figure 1. The workload associated with ICAV’s is concentrated in the Basic Phase, and is not accounted for in manning models – ships have to make up for this with longer days and limiting leave and liberty, affecting morale. Source: COMNAVSURFPAC.
This leads this author to a couple of key takeaways:
- The timing presents a tremendous opportunity. The Navy was on a trajectory to man 355 ships in the future, and was starting to implement policies to support that plan. The new lower number is still more than the current manning can support but if we can simply resist the urge to scale back those efforts and continue to strive for 100 percent, that goal may actually be attainable!
- More people equals better operational performance. Ships were built with a basic manning requirement to do their job. The normalization of deviation represented by formally accepting manning levels below 100 percent jumps off the pages of this report.Top performing organizations don’t tell their team that’s the best we can do; they ask themselves “What’s the best we can do?” Figure 2 illustrates this point:
Figure 2. For years, the Navy has accepted a “Readiness Gap” that was obvious but ill-defined. New research puts a finer point on this cost and risk. Maybe it is time to stop accepting the risk and fund the requirement , if not the Wartime requirement, at least to Billets Authorized (Blue Line). Source: NAVMAC.
If you listen to many senior leaders, we may have a war to win against a peer competitor in the not too distant future. Let’s act like it, and set the manning goal at 100 percent of the documented (and often validated) mission-based manpower requirement and pull out the stops to meet it. Last year, I offered a detailed discussion of this issue with some concrete recommendations based on my 30 years of experience. When it became apparent that they were not resonating with anyone other than now-retired Navy Admiral Joseph Aucoin, I offered a second more satirical piece that also landed like a tree in the woods. Nobody has to listen to me, but data speaks louder than words, and perhaps this formal, actionable study will flip a switch somewhere. A quick summary of recommendations:
Manpower (BLUF: Fund the Requirement):
- Increase the frequency of naval allowance factor (NAF) and workload modeling for all ship classes to annual or even “continuous” evaluation.
- Account for realistic estimates of Inspections and Assessments in the NAF.
- Fund 108 percent of the basic allowance to account for historical friction in manpower account—acknowledge that people are human and sometimes break.
- Estimate manpower needs for future fleet now (whatever the number is!) and fund it.
- Expand experience-based models like those in use for F-18 maintainers and SPY technicians to better leverage advances in human factors knowledge.
- Quantify the risk of gaps and shortfalls and codify set points for high-, medium- and low-risk situations.
- Find creative ways to keep the skilled and trained Sailors we have by expanding HYT and other incentives. Not everyone has to be the master chief petty officer of teh Navy to have a successful career.
Manning (BLUF: Measure and report the true picture against the requirement—perhaps a manning dashboard fed by real-time data that:
- Focuses on fit vice fill as the key metric (better indicator of capability)
- Measures fit against 100 basic allowance requirement.
- Tracks and reports Fit for all ships and all OFRP phases against the 100 percent standard.
- Tracks and reports all individual chief petty officer gaps and trends up to echelon 1.
- Tracks and reports critical Navy enlisted classification gaps up to echelon 1.
- Tracks and reports TEMADD and cross deck numbers and trends by type commander monthly and report to echelon 1.
This very short treatment does not do full justice to the two academic efforts by these fine officers. They do an excellent job presenting the data available and results, as well as the limitations of this experiment, and recommendations. One researcher added an epilogue that tells its own story:
Ship B will now have to regain and retrain Sailors to replace those who were onboard only for the CR53 study. As the ship progresses towards deployment, efforts will have to be redoubled to deploy with acceptable watch teams, albeit different from those teams the ship originally certified.
In the end, the final summary says it all:
Appropriate manpower planning and adequate funding must be allocated to muster an end-strength for USN ships so that it can meet its requirements.
So simple. So true.
Now what?
Endnotes
[i] Mansfield, Murph– Lieutenant, United States Navy, HOW INCREASED MANNING AFFECTS CREWMEMBERS’ FATIGUE, MOOD, AND SLEEP PATTERNS: RESULTS OF A STUDY ONBOARD TWO U.S. NAVY DESTROYERS, Naval Postgraduate School, 19 September 2019
[ii] Garbacz, Benjamin D. – Lieutenant, United States Navy, HOW INCREASED MANNING AFFECTS CREWMEMBERS’ WORKLOAD INPORT AND UNDERWAY: RESULTS OF A STUDY ONBOARD TWO U.S. NAVY DESTROYERS IN BASIC PHASE, Naval Postgraduate School, 19 September 2019
