Author’s note: I wrote the initial version of this paper one year ago during a course on professional ethics. Unfortunately, the events surrounding Captain Brett Crozier’s relief from command of USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) have given new relevance to the discussion of ethical obligations. I hope the observations below can contribute to professional discourse taking place around the Fleet.
Naval officers are charged with both readiness and employment of their units and make numerous decisions with ethical implications. In rare instances, the officer may consider refusing an order. Cases that are clearly illegal, immoral, or unethical cross a bright line in the law giving the officer a duty to refuse. The My Lai massacre is often used as a counterexample to illustrate an instance when this duty was ignored. Then there are grey areas where the consequent harm is not so clear.
Two recent examples illustrate situations where a commander may have been justified in refusing to get underway: the 2014 Farsi Island incident and USS Fitzgerald’s (DDG-62) 2017 collision with ACX Crystal. [1] In both cases, the vessels were not materially ready to go to sea and their crews were undertrained and exhausted. Both commanding officers had tried unsuccessfully to remedy the situation by engaging with the chain of command.
Their orders were lawful and moral, but in the face of poor readiness, they may have confronted an ethical grey zone. What, and to whom, were the ethical obligations of these officers? Do insufficient material and personnel readiness threaten these obligations enough to make the order unethical? In evaluating the decision to disobey, how does an officer approach the consequences? This paper is offered not as a definitive guide, nor to cast blame; rather, it seeks to provoke discussion among officers charged with leading the fleet through challenging times.
Obligations, Orders, and Obedience
The commissioning oath is the quintessential description of an officer’s responsibility . Where enlisted men and women swear to follow orders, officers swear to “well and faithfully discharge the duties” they are entrusted with. This underscores officers’ duty not to simply obey, but to act in good faith with and on behalf of several entities, including his/her superiors and the laws of the United States, the American citizens they defend, and the service members they lead. They are charged with, and the chain of command expects, that they will carry out difficult orders in pursuit of national security.
Naval officers have an obligation to “protect and conserve federal property.”[2] There is some dissonance with this in a context that explicitly requires hazarding warships in combat. This practice defaults to the obligation to “well and faithfully discharge the duties” of an officer in using his or her discretion to balance the need to safeguard assets in peacetime against the exigencies of war when the time comes. Officers have an additional obligation to pursue the mission while considering the effectiveness and well-being of their personnel. This is not a matter of comfort, but of ensuring that one’s sailors are mentally and physically equipped for the demands of their mission. These form the twin pillars of military leadership: mission accomplishment and troop welfare.
In both the Farsi Island and Fitzgerald incidents the commanders confronted untenable circumstances. Operational tempo, inadequate funding, and other macro-level factors combined to bring these units to a dire state of unreadiness. Radar systems, internal and external communications, propulsion, electrical, and other systems were broken. Both crews had been worn down through months or years of mental and physical exertion; as they struggled to keep their units functional, the time and resources available for training were sacrificed. Various commanders and other officials advocated additional maintenance, reduced tasking, supplemental personnel, and other requests. These attempts were often denied and ultimately unsuccessful.
The critical moment in both situations was the decision to get underway. The Fitzgerald had experienced two back-to-back near-miss collisions a month earlier that stemmed from the same problems.[3] Rather than building anxiety, continued near-miss operations brought a normalization of deviance that fostered acceptance of poor readiness as the status quo.
The default response to orders is, and must be, obedience. It is the foundation of good order and discipline. In many cases, refusal can result in a larger harm by undermining military cohesion. For officers in these situations, the duty to defend the country, adhere to Navy regulations, and be reliable to their chain of command all weigh in favor of obedience.
The keel of obedience in the Navy is trust. It extends up and down the chain of command, providing a sense that most orders given and received are legal, ethical, and moral, therefore demanding of obedience. In the Pacific, Vice Admiral Joseph Aucoin knew of the problems and was fighting for solutions: “During video conferences, he detailed his fleet’s pressing needs and the hazards of not addressing them. He compiled data showing that the unrelenting demands on his ships and sailors were unsustainable. He pleaded with his bosses to acknowledge the vulnerability of the 7th Fleet.”[4] While the Farsi Island investigation showed evidence that the chain of command was not supporting its subordinate unit, the Fitzgerald’s commander had good reason to believe his concerns were known.[5] Trust predisposes officers in this position to believe they are unlikely to receive unnecessary or unreasonable orders from a senior commander, especially one who has been in their shoes and knows the challenges.
With obedience the default position, there is often little reason to contemplate the consequences of routine orders that are not plainly illegal, immoral, or unethical. At the moment of decision, these officers had years of experience indicating that business as usual included broken equipment and fatigued crewmembers. The same was true for their superiors who, although they may have sympathized with the challenges, would have been unlikely to accept them as sufficient reason to refuse orders.
Disobedience and Consequences
Farsi Island and the Fitzgerald situations presented abnormal circumstances. The litany of equipment problems jeopardized their ability to operate safely and effectively. For example, the Farsi Island crews made overnight propulsion repairs prior to departure to correct an earlier fix (neither of which were accomplished to standard). The failure of the ad hoc work caused the boats to temporarily stop near Farsi Island, allowing the Iranians time to intercept them.[6] Aboard the Fitzgerald, a broken navigation radar that would have aided in preventing the collision had a maintenance note saying, “Problem known since 2012. Declared hopeless.”[7] Both crews were worn thin after months and years of improvising equipment solutions, covering for insufficient manning, and sacrificing the little time afforded for recuperation.[8]
Unit readiness was so vitiated that both commanders may have had compelling reasons to disobey the order to get underway. This argument rests on two obligations: one to avoid unnecessarily hazarding their vessels and one to safeguard their sailors against unjustified dangers. These are the obligations that underpin a commander’s peacetime responsibility to enure their ship and crew are ready for war. The oft-quoted entry in Navy regulations states, “the Commanding Officer is charged with the absolute responsibility for the safety, well-being, and efficiency of his or her command.”[9] Faced with degradations to the most fundamental systems and a crew on the edge of reliability, the commanders would have had strong evidence that they were unable to operate their vessels safely in accordance with their ethical obligations regarding government property. Though they reasonably trusted the Navy to issue feasible orders, only they were in a position to judge the immediate material readiness of their vessels in comparison with the mission being demanded of them.
Getting such degraded vessels underway also increases the risk to the sailors who entrusted their safety to the commander. These sailors were required to follow orders to operate the equipment as directed to get their vessels underway; only the officers in command were legally positioned to refuse on behalf of the unit. The commanders’ potential argument that they could not safely operate their vessels would have been buttressed by the corollary that ineffectual attempts would violate their ethical obligation to safeguard the crew.
In meeting both obligations, it is incumbent on the commanders to judge necessity, priorities, and consequences carefully. Unlike defaulting to obedience, the consequences of disobedience are much more conspicuous. Given the systemic acceptance of poor readiness, an officer who claims it as sufficient cause for refusing to get underway will almost certainly face professional costs. From poor FITREPs to punitive letters, the aftermath can be career ending. If they survive the ordeal officially, they are still liable to suffer unofficial repercussions that impact future assignments or promotions.
Perhaps more important, one must wrestle with the potential negative impacts to national security. Situations that clearly endanger national security (e.g., war and critical operations) are unlikely to meet the same contemplation of refusal, and those where the contribution is minimal are unlikely to require it (e.g., a pier swap). But the cases offered here lay somewhere in between. The Fitzgerald was en route to the contentious South China Sea and the Farsi Island boats were repositioning to support future operations in the Persian Gulf. Neither were vital, but neither were trivial. Refusing to get underway may have generated serious, though not existential, ripple effects. Whether classified or public, further effects may come from adversaries who exploit the situation through their own maneuvers or propaganda.
For a naval commander to refuse to get his or her vessel underway would be a shocking indictment of the system. If such a move went unpunished it would validate the commander’s assertion that their vessel was not ready. This would cause a storm of inquiries and potentially inspire other commanders to do likewise, hamstringing the fleet. On the other hand, if they were reprimanded and replaced it would contradict the assertion that commanders are chosen for their judgment and empowered to fulfill their obligations.
Rawlsian Disobedience
Writing on civil disobedience, John Rawls argues the “obligation to accept existing arrangements may sometimes be overridden [and that one] may justify noncompliance in certain situations.”[10] He continues that injustice can arise if “current arrangements … depart from publicly accepted standards that are more or less just.”[11] In the Farsi Island and Fitzgerald cases, poor readiness failed to meet the just expectations of both the Navy and the public.
Rawls’ construct may be modified to apply to the Navy. Naval officers recognize the legitimate authority of the Navy similarly to citizens’ recognition of their government. According to Rawls, civil disobedience is undertaken “with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government.”[12] This principle could be applied if a commander believes the Navy has broken faith in a grievous way. They are presented with the option of dissenting in order to bring about beneficial changes that restore their compact with the Navy, namely receiving sufficient time and resources to ensure their units meet the standards of readiness. Further, that readiness issues were previously raised through normal channels satisfies Rawls’ analogous condition “that the normal appeals to the political majority have already been made in good faith and that they have failed.”[13]
It would be disastrous for numerous commanders to take such action simultaneously or in quick succession. Rawls recognizes this tension, noting that “there is a limit on the extent to which civil disobedience can be engaged in without leading to a breakdown in the respect for law and the constitution.”[14] Put another way, refusal must reflect consideration of how much disobedience is already present. This imbues limited instances of disobedience with greater potency in conveying how dire the circumstances are, as well as reflecting a systemic stability that can absorb a limited number of these dissents without destabilizing the fleet.
Conclusion
It is a mistake to say the commanders were unequivocally wrong for not refusing to get underway. The challenges and consequences of professional disobedience were numerous and tangible. But so were the threats to their vessels and crews, threats that were widely annunciated as with the Fitzgerald:
The alarms had been sounded up and down the chain of command, by young, overmatched sailors, by veteran captains and commanders, and by some of the most respected Navy officials in Washington. Two three-star admirals told ProPublica they had explicitly notified superiors of the growing dangers. The two people who served successive terms as undersecretary of the Navy, the No. 2 position in the civilian command, said they had, too.[15]
The investigations reveal that the commanders in both cases were aware of their units’ readiness problems. That they did not refuse to get underway is not a sign of weakness, but the reflection of a troubled system.
It appears the commanders could have reasonably argued that they could not ethically execute their sailing orders. In the Fitzgerald incident, the investigation found that “The command leadership allowed the schedule of events preceding the collision to fatigue the crew … and failed to assess the risks of fatigue and implement mitigation measures to ensure adequate crew rest.”[16] Faced with such poor readiness, they were fatally compromised in their ability to “well and faithfully discharge the duties” of command. The same Navy regulation that gives commanders “absolute responsibility” goes on to state “the authority of the commanding officer is commensurate with his or her responsibility.” One option would have been to exercise that authority by refusing to get underway in recognition of insufficient readiness. Furthermore, these officers would have been fulfilling a higher obligation to safeguard the nation by escalating the urgency of readiness issues.
The consequences of disobedience, for both the Navy and the commanders, pale in comparison to those of the incidents that unfolded: lives either lost or permanently changed, diplomatic embarrassment, degraded operations, the cost of repairs and investigations, and tarnished reputations. Balancing the prospect of alternative futures on the morning these vessels left port is an unenviable task. But such is the burden of command: the total and unrelenting responsibility for one’s vessel and crew, for every decision made whether right or wrong. In evaluating their options, the charge to “well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office” must weigh so heavily that commanders willingly accept personal harm to do what is right for country, ship, and crew.
Endnotes
[1] The author acknowledges legal and customary differences between “command,” “officer in charge,” and senior officer present. The phrases are used interchangeably here to smooth reading in the discussion of leaders’ ethical obligations.
[2] Office of the Secretary of the Navy, “U.S. Navy Code of Ethics,” https://www.secnav.navy.mil/Ethics/Pages/codeofethics.aspx
[3] Geoff Ziezulewicz, “Worse than You Thought: Inside the Secret Fitzgerald Probe the Navy Doesn’t Want You to Read, The Navy Times, 18 January 2019, https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/01/14/worse-than-you-thought-inside-the-secret-fitzgerald-probe-the-navy-doesnt-want-you-to-read/.
[4] Robert Faturechi, Megan Rose, an T. Christian Miller, “Years of Warnings, Then Death and Disaster,” ProPublica, 7 February 2019, https://features.propublica.org/navy-accidents/us-navy-crashes-japan-cause-mccain/.
[5] Farsi Island command investigation para. III.C.1-III.C.19; and Faturechi et al, “Years of Warning.”
[6] Farsi Island command investigation, para. IV.G.13
[7] T. Christian Miller, Robert Faturechi, and Megan Rose, “Fight the Ship: Death and Valor on a Warship Doomed by its Own Navy,” ProPublica, 6 February 2019, https://features.propublica.org/navy-accidents/uss-fitzgerald-destroyer-crash-crystal/.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Standard Organization Regulations of the U.S. Navy (SORN), para. 301.
[10] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971), 309.
[11] Ibid., 309.
[12] Ibid., 320
[13] Ibid., 327.
[14] Ibid., 328.
[15] Faturechi et al, “Years of Warning.”
[16] Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, “Consolidated collision reports for USS Fitzgerald and USS McCain,” 23 October, 2017, 22, https://s3.amazonaws.com/CHINFO/USS+Fitzgerald+and+USS+John+S+McCain+Collision+Reports.pdf.
