By both a study of history and my personal view of things, when it comes to war with China, I am not from the wishful thinking “short war” school … oh no. I actually have outlined what would either be a series of short stories or a book about the American role in kicking off The Great Asian War, but I have a paying gig that won’t let me wedge out the time … so it is stuck in my mind for now.

The Readers Digest Condensed Books version; it’s a half-decade affair.

As such, I found this little comment at Breaking Defense both correct and interesting in a way I don’t think the author quite thinks;

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. David Berger, dismisses current Marine and Navy plans for amphibious ships as “obsolete,” and worries that in any conflict, China could replace damaged ships faster than the US in a draft operating concept obtained by Breaking Defense.
…
Berger also raises significant concerns about the United States’ ability to replace any combat losses, even in a short, sharp conflict.

“Replacing ships lost in combat will be problematic, inasmuch as our industrial base has shrunk, while peer adversaries have expanded their shipbuilding capacity. In an extended conflict, the United States will be on the losing end of a production race—reversing the advantage we had in World War II when we last fought a peer competitor.”

OK, let’s break this in to digestible bits.

You go to war with the navy you have. Fleet size and shipbuilding capacity is critical in peace, as you build your fleet, and at war when you build more ships and repair existing ones. That is easy. China has that lead in peace, a fact that cannot be ignored. As she becomes a more wealthy nation, her ability to leverage that capability towards a larger navy will be established fact.

That being said, at war at different set of variables come in to play. From a maritime perspective, geography is not on China’s side. She is a continental land power with maritime interests. Any WESTPAC war will be facing her single-ocean coastline where her shipyards are. In any war, large static shipyards close to the reach of enemy units are vulnerable – just ask the Germans.

Large static coastal targets are just that – targets. They are perfect for guided weapons of either cruise or ballistic delivery.

The short-war school is rightfully focused on the battle of the first salvo, but there is no guarantee that such a thing will be a war-ender. The long-war school also believes the battle of the first salvo will be critical, but see it as just the frantic opening events of a larger campaign. What you have left after the battle of the first salvo – and your ability to recover from it, is what determines the outcome of the long war at sea.

The USA has something the PRC does not – geographical diversity of its shipyards. Even USA West Coast shipyards are a bit of a reach for PRC forces in the near and medium term, but even if they were, we are blessed with yards in the Gulf of Mexico and the East Coast that are well outside PRC’s reach for decades by even the most pessimistic forecasters (assuming conventional forces).

Who has the advantages for a long slog at sea? It really has to do with protected capacity, economics, and political will.

How long can you hold, after both sides exhaust their peace-time magazines early on, through the operational stalemate at sea waiting for replenishment and resupply … and new production?

Are we building the long range strike needed to degrade their shipyards capacity – and keep it that way – so we can slowly grind their maritime capability down to near shore?

Yes, yes, yes … I’ve read the, “..but we’ve had wargames that…” and all that – but wargames have assumptions. You can tailor a variety of outcomes depending on the variables you weight and the Courses of Action you select.

We have significant infrastructure challenges, we’ll have more as we struggle through the 2020s, but at war … we are more robust than you may think.

Be more inventive in your wargames.