Fundamentals. As anyone who struggled to be an athlete knows, until you master these, you cannot be your best. Ignore them, and you will be an underperforming and probably spasmatic object of scorn and pity.
So, how long has it been abundantly clear that the military challenge of this century would be China? Some very insightful people saw this clearly in the immediate post-Cold War period with the laughable “we’re going to make it a floating casino or scrap it” purchase of the partially completed second Soviet CV. More started to see what was coming with the Loral Space disgrace of late 1990s.
If we were to be kind to everyone else, what if we used as a benchmark, “Some random middling terminal O5 saw it” as a benchmark? That works for me, as that pretty much describes me when I started the “Long Game” series at my homeblog in July of 2004.
Besides that self-referential flattery, what about other fundamentals of naval warfare? As readers here will fully understand, the key to American success fighting a WWII on the far side of both her oceans came less from her battle fleet, but the ability to sustain it for years at long distance. We prepared for that prior to the war, and learned some hard lessons where we did not prepare as much as we should have.
Consider as well in the clear challenge west of Wake today, with the blaring fundamental requirement of a robust and resilient logistics and sustainment force … this refreshingly candid remark from the CNO this week was … well … refreshing;
“We wargame and we study logistics all the time, but we never have developed really a plan for sustaining the fleet in a fight. And so that’s an important project for us in 2021, to actually develop a plan for how we sustain a fleet – not just logistics, but battle damage. We just, we haven’t been forced, we haven’t forced ourselves to take a deeper look in terms of a plan, and we need one,” the CNO said
I’m sorry, but who is this “we” he is referring to? I know that from the cheap seats, people have been screaming about logistics and sustainment shortfalls for this entire century. In traditional defense media, online, podcasts, and uncounted panel discussions the crisis in the “unsexy but important” part of our maritime power has been brought up, but no action by those who hold the levers of power and influence were made. The CNO’s comments, while on one hand are gobsmacking, are on the other a refreshingly welcome moment of truth. He should be commended for it as it opens the door for discussions on a broad spectrum of related topics that might, might, lead to action.
However, it begs the question; what were we “forcing” ourselves to do instead? First of all, I don’t want to hear, “…but muh groundwars in Asia…” excuse. Our CNOs since that July of 2004 benchmark have sure expended a lot of personal, professional, and institutional capital pushing and promoting agendas, programs, and personal priories that had next to nothing to do with IRQ, AFG, and GWOT.
They did not push for more logistical support or industrial base development.
This is, of course, old news to many … but a great thing to see a CNO finally admit it, even without calling people out specifically.
This brings us to the dawn of the 3rd decade of the 21st Century where we have:
– What: “We haven’t thought about sustaining a battle fleet or responding to battle damage for a long fight.”
– So What: “We need a plan to figure out what to do.”
That leads us to the next step, the “What next?”
I would offer that this is not it;
The Navy and Marine Corps plan to conduct a large scale exercise involving multiple strike groups and multiple numbered fleets next year, after the original plans for a Large Scale Exercise 2020 this year were postponed due to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic.
We spent 2020 double-pumping CVN and their escorts while at the same time talking about how we are not properly sustaining and maintaining our fleet in the condition they need to be so we can be ready to war.
We do not need to spend 2021 pushing OPTEMPO even higher delaying again any effort to reset, rest, repair, and think.
We do not need large scale exercises, shooting up an already knackered and blown horse, in order to,
…plan for sustaining the fleet in a fight … not just logistics, but battle damage.
No, not in 2021, a year that should be focused on addressing the wear and tear issues we said such nice words about in 2020.
No, we can start by making efforts and finding funds to grow the “unsexy but important” part of our fleet. Take the good option now, as you work on better options next POM cycle. We can take concrete steps we were supposed to already make following the “no excuse” responses to the collisions in WESTPAC in 2017.
That is what present senior leadership can do in 2021 to make up for lost time. I know that isn’t as sexy as big multi-CVN exercises with dope PHOTOEX opportunities, but if you want a navy that can fight at the 72-week mark as opposed to tapping out at the 72-hr mark, that is what needs to be 2021’s focus.
