There is broad agreement that United States’ sealift is too small, too old, and not optimally designed for even the most permissive operations we have built it for: American’s uncontested access and control of the high seas.
If you have not looked recently, here they are:
Though the smartest of us have warned that our seas are not uncontested, that argument has not been received properly in the places it should have been. Where are the discussions of replacing lost ships and the equipment they will carry? How much an we lose before a logistical shortfall becomes a strategic risk?
Are the few large ships so efficient at peace the same that will be effective to support the nation at war?
The rest of the maritime national security world accepts the growing threat posed by China’s expanding fleet and already existing layered anti-ship capability, it is time we do that same for the sealift that will bring the fight from our shores.
If we are ever asked to surge west of Wake, sustain operations, and supply the fight … have we looked hard at how we do this in contested seas – with the inefficient routing requirements, marginal unloading locations, and loss to enemy action that entails?
How complacent are we with the assumption that we are entitled to the open sea?
