As we watch one of the largest buildups of land forces ready to cross another nation’s border in Europe since 1968’s Prague Spring, it would be helpful to look at how we got here.
At this point, how we got here may not be all that useful for Ukraine today, but for everyone else it could be very helpful to realize the limits of diplomacy and the wafer-thin protections smoothly spoken and well crafted words can be in a world that is still defined by blood and iron.
First step is to head back to the Budapest Memorandum signed in 1994. You can get the full text of the document here, but the LA Times article from 1994 gives a good summary;
President Clinton on Monday announced agreement with Ukraine and Russia to dismantle Ukraine’s entire nuclear arsenal, hailing the long-sought accord as “a hopeful and historic breakthrough that enhances the security of all three participants.”
The agreement, disclosed at the NATO summit here and scheduled to be signed in Moscow on Friday, must survive potentially serious opposition by nationalist factions that oppose elimination of the weapons and control the Ukrainian Parliament. But if it survives attack, the accord will represent a substantial step forward for the U.S. policy of curbing nuclear proliferation.
Ukraine, politically and economically unstable since it became an independent state after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, has 176 intercontinental missiles armed with some 1,240 nuclear warheads–all aimed at the United States. It also has 592 nuclear warheads aboard bombers, which would be covered by the agreement.
The chaos in Ukraine, while possibly threatening the ability of Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk to carry out the agreement, also underscores the pact’s potential importance. It would allay Russia’s fear of a hostile nuclear neighbor and answer concerns that Ukraine’s nuclear weapons could wind up in the hands of other countries.
Under the agreement, the United States, Russia and Britain will provide security assurances for Ukraine when it gives up its weapons and becomes an adherent of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
20 years later was the next major inflection point. Steven Pifer at Brookings gives us a nice snapshot in time after Russia decided it had a different future in mind;
A key element of the arrangement—many Ukrainians would say the key element—was the readiness of the United States and Russia, joined by Britain, to provide security assurances. The Budapest memorandum committed Washington, Moscow and London, among other things, to “respect the independence and sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine” and to “refrain from the threat or use of force” against that country.
The Kremlin has violated those commitments. Using soldiers in Russian combat fatigues without identifying insignia, whom Mr. Putin later admitted were Russian, Moscow seized Crimea in March.
Russia subsequently encouraged and armed separatists in eastern Ukraine. When the Ukrainian military appeared to gain the upper hand against the separatists, regular Russian army units entered Donetsk and Luhansk to support them.
What part of its commitments to “respect the independence” and “refrain from the threat or use of force” do the Russians not understand?
Five years later, Pifer again weighed in;
In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the United States, Russia, and Britain committed “to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” and “to refrain from the threat or use of force” against the country. … Unfortunately, Russia has broken virtually all the commitments it undertook in that document. It used military force to seize, and then illegally annex, Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in early 2014. Russian and Russian proxy forces have waged war for more than five years in the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas, claiming more than 13,000 lives and driving some two million people from their homes. … Washington did not promise unlimited support. The Budapest Memorandum contains security “assurances,” not “guarantees.” Guarantees would have implied a commitment of American military force, which NATO members have. U.S. officials made clear that was not on offer. Hence, assurances.
…and there we go. What are the big lessons here? Back to the Czechs, they learned in 1939 the perfidy of larger nations who promise help without skin in the game. In 2022 will the Ukrainians get a better deal? It appears the international community, belatedly, is sending more help to the Ukrainians than the Czechs ever received … but does that change the calculus for the Russians enough?
February will be the month to watch. Mobilization has a momentum all its own as the larger and longer it goes, national pride, senior leader ego, and the chance with all those armed forces hurrying up and waiting something stupid might happen.
We’ll see. Until then, I will think of the Ukrainians I once served with and wish them and their families well … and will pray for peace.
