In the age of great powers competition, the gray zone operations of the Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) and distant-water fishing fleets are the leading edge of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) efforts to establish de facto control over the South China Seas through division in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite the complications a pandemic, the aggressions of the CMM and these fishing fleets in the South China Seas have continued unabated. The success of these fleets is due to their ability to influence nations individually at a level below conflict for a long enough duration that by the time the targeted nation is asking for international support, the PRC has already solidified control and is building islands and military installations in areas such as the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoals. Outside of the South China Seas, the Chinese fishing fleets have encroached on the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of countries from Africa to South America, such as Argentina and Djibouti, who have very little in the way of individual diplomatic power to protect their territorial integrity and fisheries. A multinational response is required in order to compete against this low intensity, long term effort to change the political and territorial lines. The United States should immediately begin diplomatic efforts to create an Indo-Pacific Fishery Security Cooperation (IPFSC) organization to provide diplomatic unity, sharing of intelligence, and sharing of security forces to protect the member states economic integrity and food security.
The activities of the CMM and PRC distant water fishing fleets have a massive influence on the economies and food security of nations around the world. Estimates of the number of PRC fishing vessels around the world has now hit the 17,000 ship mark, well above the declared 3,000 ships the PRC has stated fish outside its waters. Economically, these fleets drain billions of dollars worth of revenue from developing countries, ecologically they devastate protected fisheries and reef systems, and operationally do not abide by any international or local legal structures. Such activities even escalate to violence such as the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel by a Chinese maritime surveillance vessel inside Vietnams EEZ or the sinking of a PRC fishing vessel illegally operating off the coast of Argentina. As the PRC’s demand for seafood increases and willingness to use activities below the threshold of armed conflict to pursue its strategic goals these types of incidents will only increase in number and severity.
If the United States wishes to seriously compete with the CMM and distant-water fishing fleets, it should spearhead the establishment of an Indo-Pacific Fishery Security Cooperation (IPFSC) that includes nations from Asia, South America and Africa. This organization would enable the member states to ensure territorial and economic integrity through diplomatic pressure, the sharing of intelligence and the sharing of security forces. The initial recruiting priority for the organization should be the major economic nations in the area of concern to include Argentina, Australia, Canada, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. If the United States can convince these nations to buy into the IPFSC, then the combined diplomatic and economic power will help convince smaller nations of the capability of the effort. The ultimate goal of the IPFSC would be to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing throughout the Indo-Pacific region. As the majority infringer, the PRC would have a unified treaty organization economically and diplomatically pushing back against their illicit activities and enforcing international decisions such as the South China Seas Arbitration case.
The primary benefit of the IPFSC would be the combined political and diplomatic force behind the organization. This would be somewhat similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as organized against the now defunct Soviet Union, except with an economic and law enforcement focus rather than a military focus. The current PRC approach relies on division and coercion to conduct land grabs and illegal exploitation of other countries EEZs. The IPFSC would be able to compete against these techniques by unifying nations in their economic and food securities interests against an aggressive, local great power. The IPFSC would also be able to provide a method of airing and resolving grievances and reducing tensions between member nations under the goal of ensuring food security and economic stability.
A vital portion of the IPFSC partnership would be the sharing of intelligence, focused on the CMM and distant-water fishing fleets. This intelligence sharing apparatus would be part of the enforcement of international and local norms and regulations concerning EEZs and fisheries through the tracking of ships of the CMM and fishing fleets and their crews. This will build a picture, shared by all member states that will enable them to gain awareness, police and prosecute in a court of law the captains and crews of these illicit fishing vessels. With the participation of multiple nations in the intelligence picture, the IPFSC would be able to better develop framing the problem of the massive distant-water fishing fleets and assist in discerning the direction of the PRCs concerns and intents.
The final piece of the IPFSC is the sharing of security forces to ensure the physical integrity. This sharing of security would primarily fall to the larger partners such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and India as they have the capability and capacity to conduct such operations. A key part of the security sharing would be a status of forces agreement allowing member nation security forces to operate in the territory of other member nation for the purpose of intelligence collection and security operations focused on the CMM and distant-water fishing fleets. Right now, the U.S. Navy conducts freedom of navigation operations in these contested areas and the U.S. Marine Corps is developing the Marine Littoral Regiment that is based off of operating in foreign nations supporting other element of national power before the shooting war starts.1 A guarantee of sharing of security forces (Army, Navy, Coast Guard, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force) is required to enforce international and local norms on the PRC CMM and distant-water fishing fleets in order to supply the security forces in quantity and capability to member nations and bring all elements of U.S. national power in support of the IPFSC,.
The difficulty of establishing the IPFSC is the underfunded state of the United States Department of State (DoS) and the diversity of government types/history deeply embedded in the region. It is no secret that the recent radical defunding of the DoS has severely hampered the diplomatic clout of the United States. However, the new administration is prioritizing revitalizing the DoS with boosts in hiring and bonuses in a return to diplomacy. By pursuing an economic agency such as the IPFSC, the DoS can leverage the experienced diplomats they still have while training the newer one they are currently hiring. As for the diversity of governments and current/historical grudges of some of the key members for the IPFSC, the purpose of the organization is to keep territory secure, secure member states economic zones, and ensure the food security of member nations. The IPFSC would not bet NATO, it would be an organization dedicated the economic stability and food security of member nations.
The United States should immediately begin the diplomatic efforts to create an Indo-Pacific Fishery Security Cooperation organization to provide diplomatic unity, sharing of intelligence, and sharing of security forces to protect the member states economic integrity and food security. The IPFSC would provide the United States a multinational economic and diplomatic organization that enables greater competition against the aggressive actions of the People’s Republic of China.
- Eric M. Smith, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (Washington DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, February 2021), 2–4.
