By now even the casual military enthusiast is aware of the inherent difficulty of learning to fight a counter-insurgency fight against an enemy that shields itself in an anonymous and foreign society whose basic outlook is hostile and suspicious to our own. Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused an inward look at the “traditional” American way of war. There has been a vast reservoir of publication by experienced and incisive authors such as David Kilcullen and LTC John Nagl, and many others, regarding the tactics and measures required to succeed.
That said, sometimes what is forgotten is that an insurgent enemy, frustrating and hard to pin down as they can be, is not perfect. They must walk a fine line at times, and on occasion, will cross that line. In Iraq, Al Qaeda in Iraq and its affiliates shifted tactics in the Spring of 2004, to a very classic insurgency of assassination, kidnapping, bombings, and propaganda. The effects were immediate and severe. During my time in Ramadi (OIF II, Feb-Sep 2004), this period was one where Iraqi Provincial officials (or anybody for that matter) were petrified to meet with Coalition entities. Bodies turned up almost daily among those who had contact with us. Cooperation dried up, and several seemingly promising projects languished.
Civil Affairs detachments with the respective Regimental or Brigade Combat Teams assumed significant risks to try and engage the population of Anbar’s cities and towns. The security situation was abysmal, and the hard fighting that began in April of 2004 all across the Province lasted more than two years. While the infantry fought so bravely, CA teams and the Provincial Governance Support Team did what they could, but results were disappointing. Success for their missions depended largely on the engagement of the population.
Subtly, however, the shift in tactics by the insurgents changed how the insurgency was perceived by the Iraqi people. The idea of the insurgents as “holy Mujahedeen” standing up to the Infidel became tainted by their new activities. Assassination of Iraqi Police and government officials, Tribal Sheiks, and moderate Imams were perceived by many Iraqis as the activities of common criminals. While the populace of Anbar was still fearful and hesitant to cooperate with the Coalition, they became sullen and resentful of the insurgents and their presence.
Yet, the absolutely heroic efforts and sacrifices of the Coalition forces were not in vain. During this time, Army and USMC units in Al Anbar showed the population that we were going to stand up to AQI and others, and not back down. This was more important than most outside of Anbar believed at the time. The insurgent activities continued, and indeed intensified. The Governor of Anbar resigned after the kidnapping of his two sons. His successor was kidnapped and assassinated. The leader of a prominent Anbar tribe was murdered and his body dumped outside of Fallujah. But Iraqis were becoming increasingly, and sometimes openly, hostile to the insurgents.
The murder of nearly 70 Police recruits with a VBIED outside a Ramadi police station was perhaps the final impetus for the nascent Anbar Awakening. Months of murders and bombings, haranguing that the Iraqis’ brothers, fathers, sons, and husbands were bad Muslims deserving of death for trying to help their fellow Iraqis, had spurred a frightened and intimidated populace to resistance. The insurgency had gradually lost the support, tacit or otherwise, of the populace in which they hid. They had lost that support by misunderstanding the Iraqi people, and engaged in acts that alienated and angered them.
Why do I tell the story? Because it seems that the Taliban in Pakistan has made a similar miscalculation. They may have presented a significant opportunity to the Coalition effort. If the Coalition is wise, the IO campaign in Afghanistan and whatever message bleeds over into Pakistan needs from this point forward to emphasize the evil and destructive nature of the Taliban, and by association, Al Qaeda. The time for that message is NOW.
In Iraq, our IO message (a polite and doctrinal term for propaganda) had attempted to emphasize the “good guy” nature of US and Coalition forces, who were there to help protect the Iraqi people and help them build a better existence. It was an abysmal failure. The results were IO messages that appealed to ourselves, and might resonate on Main Street, USA. To their targeted audience, they fell more than flat in Ramadi, Fallujah, Qa’im, and elsewhere. We could not get our collective heads around the fact that the Iraqi people might choose to side with Muslims who were trying to hurt them rather than Christians who were trying to help them.
What was required then, and what is needed now, is a gloves-off propaganda campaign by the Coalition that highlights the evils of our enemy. And that our enemy is also their enemy. Five or six consistent themes to be hammered home over and over again. The Taliban in Pakistan has clearly blundered, and seriously. We need to capitalize on this mistake and the outrage it has spurred. Images of violence and murder of Afghanis and Pakistanis killed by Taliban/Al Qaeda need to be in front of the Afghan people daily. Much as in Iraq, until the people of Afghanistan decide the enemy is more evil than the Coalition, success there will be fleeting and temporary.
There is much, much more than an IO message required to bring success to our efforts in Afghanistan. But to the extent that such a message hits home to the Afghan people, we must be ready to repeat it loudly and often. The Taliban in Pakistan may have presented us with an opportunity. While Afghanistan is not Iraq, the common denominator between the two is us. We need to ensure that the lessons of Al Anbar and the Anbar Awakening are not forgotten.
